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The rapid increase and popularity of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in civil 
usage around the world is due to their versatility. With advancement in technology 
across the globe, there are UAS of different sizes and capabilities in the market. It 
is imperative to note that the use and operation of UAS have numerous merits and 
equally, potentially poses serious risks to aviation safety, unlawful interference with 
States’ security as well as invasion of the privacy of persons. This reality poses a 
challenge to integration of UAS into the civil airspaces of different States. 
Accordingly, the international community developed the Chicago Convention that 
provides the principal framework to address the threefold concerns. At the 
international level, however, there is lack of a unified system of regulation of UAS. 
Consequently, the Chicago Convention requires States to develop national 
institutions and legal frameworks to not only effectively address these concerns, but 
also create a delicate balance between national security and right to privacy. 
This thesis evaluates how the legal, institutional and policy frameworks for UAS in 
the US, South Africa and Kenya have addressed the current needs and challenges 
in operation and integrating them into regulatory frameworks for civil aviation. It 
follows that the three States have developed constitutional frameworks, legislation, 
regulations, policies and strategic plans as they seek to address the challenges that 
emanate from integrating UAS into the civil aviation airspace. This encompasses 
ineffective enforcement mechanism of regulations.  
The thesis maps out experiences of integration in the three countries, emanating 
from research goals including investigating the extent to which existing international 
regulatory frameworks address the threefold concerns. The study establishes that 
the common thread running through UAS regulation is each country’s unique issues 
and paths to integration. Additionally, that the approach for integration of UAS into 
civil aviation needs be gradual and pragmatic. For this reason, this thesis 
recommends the development of institutional capacity, coordination and funding, 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.  Background 
This thesis focuses on integration of unmanned aircraft systems into civil aviation 
with specific study of the US, South Africa and Kenya. Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) are aircraft and their associated elements, which are operated without pilots 
on-board.1 UAS also describe a category of remotely piloted aircraft used for non-
recreational purposes and intended for commercial, military, governmental, or 
scientific purpose.2 The UAS either fly autonomously or are remotely controlled.  As 
a system, the UAS has four critical elements, namely: the command, control, 
communication system, and a ground crew who control the aircraft.3 UAS is not a 
precise term and is sometimes referred to as unmanned aircraft, Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAV), remotely piloted vehicles and remotely operated aircraft or drones.4   
 
Generally, UAS are identified by a number of titles such as Remotely Operated 
Aircraft (ROA), as previously used by the FAA and the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA), of the United States (US), Unmanned Aircraft (UA) 
or Drones. Other terms that have been employed are: Remotely Piloted Vehicles 
(RPV), a term used during the pre-Gulf War times, Remotely Piloted Aircrafts (RPA), 
also commonly known as UAV, are used mostly by the military in many European 
countries.5  Sometimes, the difference in terminology is associated with how UAS 
are operated. For example, if they are operated from a remote-control centre, they 
                                                          
1  ICAO Circular 328-AN/190 explanation of terms p x. See also FAA “UAS operations in the U.S. 
National airspace system- international operational guidance” htpp:// www.uavn.com 
/images/AFS-400 (Date of use: 10 November 2015).  
2   Yenne B Attack of the drones: a history of unmanned aerial combat (Zenith Print 2004) 13. 
3 US Department of Defense “Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2010-2035” 
https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas-army.pdf  (Date of use: 10 October 2019). See also K 
Nonami et al Autonomous flying robots, unmanned aerial vehicles and micro aerial Vehicles 
(Springer Science and Business Media 2010) 13. 
4 De Garmo MT Issues Concerning Integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Civil Airspace (The 
MITRE center for advanced aviation system development, Mclean Virginia 2010) 11. 
5 Newcome L Unmanned aviation: a brief history of unmanned aerial vehicles (American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics 2014) 20. 
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may be referred to as RPA.6  However, for purposes of this thesis and to ensure 
uniformity, the term UAS is used to represent all these pilotless aircraft, except 
where specific circumstances necessitate an analogous term.  
 
From the hypotheses provided shortly under this chapter, the US has a longer 
history of interactions with UAS and, hence, is the country most likely to have robust 
provisions and legislative steps on regulation of UAS. Studies suggest, however, 
that the US still experiences challenges regarding implementation of the existing 
regulatory framework in areas such as oversight of UAS, Sense and Avoid 
Technology (capability of UAS to detect other aircraft while airborne and avoid 
crash), standardization of safe UAS operation, and data collection, among others.7    
 
South Africa has made strides in development of a robust regulatory framework for 
UAS, and also rates high in the implementation index by the ICAO scheme through 
incorporation of visibility, provision for extended visual line-of-sight operations and 
development of technical guidance materials.8 Even so, States such as South 
Africa, that have made strides in developing regulatory frameworks, still face serious 
implementation challenges, such as effective enforcement mechanism.9  First, the 
registration system in South Africa does not provide for means of approving and 
registering UAS models for private operation and operation by community-based 
organizations. The deficiency leads to loopholes that could expose the South African 
citizenry to safety and security challenges.10  Secondly, the South African civil 
airspace is yet to fully integrate commercial operation of UAS. The South African 
                                                          
6 Newcome Unmanned Aviation 20. 
7 Shima T and Rasmussen S UAV cooperative decision and control: challenges and practical 
approaches (Society of Industrial and Applied Mathematics Philadelphia 2009) xix. 
8 South African Civil Aviation Authority “South African Civil Aviation Authority Technical Guidance 
Material for RPAS Part 101” 
http://www.caa.co.za/Pages/RPAS/Remotely%20Piloted%20Aircraft%20Systems.aspx  
(Date of use: 28 March 2017). 
9 Ingham LA, Jones T and Maneschijn A “Considerations for UAV design and operation in South 
African airspace” (2006) 110 TAJ 695- 699. 
10 Ingham, Jones and Maneschijn “Considerations for UAV” 2006 TAJ 698. 
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regulatory framework also has the effect of precluding UAS from eligibility of being 
certified for commercial operation in airspaces that have not been segregated.11 
 
In Kenya, UAS are not yet fully integrated into the civil aviation legal framework due 
to their sparing use. However, since 2016, the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA) 
has made significant progress, driven by applications for licenses for the use of 
robotic aircraft for shooting films, relief services and commercial purposes. This has 
necessitated the need to bring their use under the civil aviation legal framework. By 
6 October 2017, KCAA, which is the government agency responsible for regulating 
the aviation industry in Kenya, drafted UAS regulations to provide for licensing and 
registration of UAS, as well as make privacy provisions. The opportunity for 
integration and regulation of UAS-related issues were, however, short-lived when 
the regulations were declined by Parliament on 26 June 2018 for non-compliance 
with existing laws as well as inadequate security provisions and public participation 
during formulation was deemed insufficient as per the requirements of Article 10 of 
the Constitution of Kenya 2010, and section 5 of the Statutory Instruments Act, No 
23 of 2013.12 These challenges, including non-adherence to protection of rights to 
privacy as enshrined under Article 31 of the Constitution of Kenya, fines and 
penalties not aligned to the parent Act among others, have caused Kenya to lag 
behind other African countries, such as South Africa, in integration and regulation 




                                                          
11 Ingham, Jones and Maneschijn “Considerations for UAV” 2006 TAJ 698. 
12 Mutai E and Otuki N “MPs annul drones rules over concerns of security, fines” 2018-6-18 Business 
Daily https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/shipping/KCAA-s-revised-drones-
rules-set-for-Parliament/4003122-5135554-vc3c0p/index.html (Date of use: 29 September 
2019). 
13 Andae G “Kenya flies behind peers in drones regulation” 2019-9-18 Business Daily 
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/tech/Kenya-flies-behind-African-peers-in-
drones-adoption/4258474-5278452-fvbplqz/index.html (Date of use: 6 October 2019). 
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This brief, and admittedly preliminary description of the legal frameworks in the US, 
South Africa and Kenya suggests the regulation of UAS remains in flux and 
evolution with technological advancement. These domestic regulations will have to 
be developed in line with regulatory framework in international law, comprised 
mainly of the Chicago Convention, 1944 as well as regulatory instruments adopted 
by ICAO such as ICAO Annexes, Standards, and Recommended Practices. This 
thesis assesses experiences and approaches of integrating UAS into the 
international civil aviation legal framework, in particular in the three countries. In 
doing so, this thesis explores current international and domestic regulatory regimes 
in these countries that apply to UAS operations. Specifically, it does so through 
highlighting safety, security, privacy, and related challenges that are experienced 
both in the substance and application of the respective domestic legal frameworks. 
The overall goal is to come up with best practice models to suggest for adoption by 
the frameworks as they evolve towards ultimately achieving safe, full and 
sustainable integration of UAS in respective civil airspaces.  
 
The study further makes a specific case that in spite of immense promise shown by 
UAS use, a number of issues have to be addressed before they can be integrated 
into civilian or commercial use in Kenya. Foremost among them is expansion of 
binding UAS regulation framework, overcoming inherent challenges facing the 
integration process, harnessing regional initiatives and development of sufficient 
institutional capacity to deal with safety, security and privacy challenges. The next 
section of this chapter rationalizes the general need for regulation of UAS and 
introduces various regulatory approaches. 
 
2. Rationale for UAS Regulation 
2.1 Overview of UAS Legal Foundation  
It is now over a century since the adoption of the Paris Convention on International 
Civil Aviation of 1919 whose provision, under Article 15, allowed for regulation of 
pilotless aircraft. The proviso also informed the spirit of Article 8 of the Chicago 
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Convention of 1944 and the ICAO framework that was adopted 25 years later. This 
reaffirmation of the previous position, coupled with the fact that the adoption of the 
two Conventions was made under the widely recognized United Nations (UN), 
demonstrates a consensus at the global level on the need to regulate UAS and have 
them integrated into civil aviation. The effect of this consensus has cascaded to and 
influenced domestic frameworks of some UN member States.  A review of the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 of the US, South Africa’s Civil Aviation Act 
No.13 of 2009 as amended in 2015, and Kenya’s Civil Aviation Act No. 21 of 2013, 
as amended in 2016, for example, shows that law reform in the area of civil aviation 
has increasingly tended towards regulation of UAS. The next part is generally 
dedicated to a brief discussion on the justification and actual dimensions of the 
necessity to regulate the UAS. 
 
2.2 General Justification  
The following are the reasons that generally necessitate the regulation of UAS. The 
reasons may vary in terms of extent and scope of motivation for regulation 
depending on the individual circumstances of each of the 193 member States of 
ICAO.  
 
2.2.1 Expansion in use of UAS 
UAS were used for military purposes from the 1920s, when the first remotely 
controlled craft, known as Sperry Messenger, was built.14 However, current uses of 
UAS have expanded immensely.  For example, in the mid-1990s, the first non-
military UAS began being used for environmental monitoring.15 Since then UAS 
have attracted a growing demand for civilian and commercial users for law 
enforcement, search and rescue, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, 
                                                          
14 Nunes A and Laursen T “Identifying the factors that led to the Ueberlingen mid-air collision: 
implications for overall system safety” (Paper delivered to the 48th Annual Chapter Meeting 
of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 20 September 2004 New Orleans) 3.  
15 Nunes and Laursen “identifying the factors” 3. 
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firefighting, and agriculture. Other emergent uses are survey, mapping, combating 
poaching, wildlife preservation, and scientific research.16  
 
The phenomenon is generally attributed to the fact that UAS are a cheaper option 
for certain tasks, compared to manned aircrafts. Secondly, UAS are less affected 
by human factors such as fatigue, and are less likely to put a pilot’s life at risk when 
monitoring phenomena like violent crime, hostile environments such as volcanic 
eruptions, securing pipelines and oil facilities, and spotting fires.17  
 
Due to demand and expansion in use of UAS, some civil airspaces that were 
previously monopolised by manned aircrafts have had to accommodate UAS. 
Alongside the increased use is the increase in number of UAS.  These related 
phenomena might endure the future of civil aviation. For instance, as Farber 
predicts, by the end of 2020, the US may have 30,000 UAS occupying its national 
airspace.18  
 
The phenomena are, however, not without their challenges. When UAS is integrated 
into a busy national airspace environment, it raises safety issues, including risks of 
collision and environmental pollution. Security concerns arise since UAS can be 
launched from anywhere. Consequently, they can present security challenges, as 
they become easy tools for criminals through which perpetrators of crime can easily 
disguise their intentions and thus defeat the investigation capacity of a criminal 
justice system. Thirdly, UAS phenomenally provide a rich ground for unauthorised 
surveillance with potential to violate people’s privacy right, testing and 
experimenting weaponry that could cause loss of life and destruction of property.  
                                                          
16 Nunes and Laursen “identifying the factors” 4. 
17 Polkowska M “Latest National Regulations on Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Military and Civil 
Aviation in Poland” 2012 ESPIP 60. 
18 Farber HB “Eyes in the Sky on constitutional and regulatory approaches to domestic drone 




For effective provision of these concerns, all aircraft are expected to meet certain 
minimum safety and regulatory requirements. Such a reassurance requires 
development of a regulatory framework that defines approaches and standards, 
while creating or granting powers to institutions to monitor and implement such 
approaches and standards. For instance, the regulatory framework would bespeak 
that UAS must have ability to avoid collision with other aircraft or what is known as 
Sense and Avoid Technology.19 
   
The urgent need for regulatory provisions is further exacerbated by recent trends of 
UAS’ use in land surveying and adjudication and a further plausible prediction of 
possibility of future expansion of UAS to other important activities, such as 
documentation of heritage.20 The effect of this trend and predicted future use on 
regulation is twofold. First, growth of the uses continues to broaden the regulatory 
issues around unmanned aircraft and, consequently, how they should be mapped. 
Secondly, it evidences the multifaceted interests that must be considered when 
regulating UAS. 
 
2.2.2 New, Increased Concerns and Associated Challenges in UAS Use   
There is an urgent need for regulation of UAS, in order to tackle the challenges that 
exist in the entire aviation chain. Although the major challenges will be discussed at 
length in chapter two of this thesis, it is worth highlighting some of the concerns, 
albeit preliminarily, which justifies the need for more effective regulation and 
integration of UAS in civil aviation. The challenges can be categorised into three. 
First, safety challenges that arise from design and use of UAS making them prone 
to accidents, technological challenges including inadequacy in Sense and Avoid 
Technologies, lack of protective frequency spectrum, and prohibitive insurance 
                                                          
19 Marshall D “Unmanned Aerial Systems and International Civil Aviation Organization Regulations” 
2009 NDLR 693. 
20 Marshall Aerial Systems 693. 
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costs.21 Despite the increase in number and use of UAS, there is lack of adequate 
Command and Control System (CCS) as well as Unified Traffic Management (UTM) 
amongst developing States, which hinders compliance. This means that provisions 
for requirements that cannot be complied with would turn progressive approaches 
into effective bans, which may be perilous in the long run. 
 
Secondly, there are security challenges that relate to possible misuse or cyber-
hacking of data and information owing to capabilities of global positioning system 
technology in every UAS. The challenges are exacerbated by the potentially dirty, 
dull and dangerous nature of uses of UAS. The manifestations for these challenges 
mostly occur in cases where UAS is used in monitoring or espionage and imaging, 
among other uses. Other security challenges emanate from the versatility in UAS 
use, which enables them to be launched or propelled from anywhere thus raising 
security dangers. Other security challenges stand out due to the nature of air traffic 
control in the use of UAS together with its general risk of them falling into private 
hands. 
 
Thirdly, there are privacy concerns. Ideally, privacy assurance at the international 
level is necessary as an extension of the human rights-based approach derived from 
international human rights treaties.22 Traditionally, privacy assurance in the use of 
UAS has been under attack owing to use of traditional photography, where people 
can be photographed or observed from the sky without their consent. There have 
also been challenges caused by possibility of flight of UAS over residential areas. 
There is the possibility that an unregulated or under-regulated overflight can cause 
breach of private life for members of the public. Since UAS can be cheaper, quieter, 
and easy to access and use, it can be a notorious ‘eye in the sky’ which further 
deepens and widens the possibilities of violating privacy rights of the citizenry 
                                                          
21 Marshall Aerial Systems 693. 
22 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration on Human Rights 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), 
Article 12 and UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
16 December 1966 99 UNTS 171, Article 17.  
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compared to the previous traditional photographic technologies. The challenge is 
even graver, currently, since UAS is increasingly gaining high and sophisticated 
operation capabilities. 
 
Already the threat has been the subject of live debate in countries like the US where 
Robert Mueller, a former Federal Investigations Bureau (FBI) Director, told the US 
Congress that UAS deployed for surveillance and procedures were being developed 
for their use in law enforcement.23 This confession is a clear indicator of the develop 
and implement  policy guidelines to ensure that such practices do not unduly 
compromise people’s fundamental rights, such as right to privacy, as enshrined in 
different constitutions. Such a policy, for instance, would contemplate data 
protection and cybercrimes under principal legislations of various States because 
UAS operation may be manipulated for unauthorised purposes hence exposing data 
held by third parties to risk. The regulatory framework should also provide what 
privacy means and move away from overreliance on the constitutions for protection 
of the right to privacy.24 
 
2.2.3 Technological Advancement 
Notably, the relationship between law and technology has been an interesting one. 
Use of technology in operation of UAS complicates its regulation, thus necessitating 
every dynamic rule to contemplate and deal with constantly emerging issues. 
Whereas the law should govern technology, it seems to lag behind. Rawich, for 
example, argues that the ongoing development and use of UAS show that “law 
regulating UAS lags behind technology, it does not lead it.”25 This statement is even 
more relevant today regarding UAS regulation, owing to higher cases of computer 
                                                          
23 Mattingly P “FBI Chief admits Agency uses Drones in Domestic surveillance” 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-uses-drones-in-domestic-
surveillance-mueller-says/2013/06/19/d51d40da-d925-11e2-a9f2-
42ee3912ae0e_story.html  (Date of use: 11 June 2016).       
24 Thompson R Domestic Drones and Privacy: A Primer (Congressional Research Service 
Washington 2015) 6.  




automation, evolution of the internet, high-definition imagery and smart technology, 
which all mean more can be done virtually by remote control. 
 
The information, communication, and transport systems in the world have become 
more ubiquitous and undergone improvements from what they were in 1944 during 
the development of the Chicago Convention. During the formulation and adoption 
of the Chicago Convention, the world relied on pre-information technology systems. 
Much has changed now with the design, uses and manufacturing of UAS and other 
activities associated with its architecture. For instance, there has been an increase 
in the use of sophisticated computer systems to operate UAS, which currently seem 
to increase the potential intrusion into privacy and, by extension, cyber security 
concerns more than was the case during adoption of the Chicago Convention. 
Therefore, even though the Chicago Convention contemplated regulation of 
pilotless aircraft, it did not take technology into consideration. 
 
The need for integration of UAS into the civil aviation regime has emerged because 
its development and use has tremendous potential to completely change the way 
human beings live, travel, fight and eat.26 This adds the perspective that besides 
challenges in the incorporation of ICAO-bound Standards, Annexes and 
Recommended Practices, there is also a chance that the law might never catch up 
with technology. The recognition of this limitation underpins the spirit of Article 37 of 
the Chicago Convention that envisages that once an international standard has 
been set, it would be upon contracting States to develop their own domestic rules 
to implement it. The Convention seems to recognize that reliance on State action 
will enable legal actions to keep pace with technological changes. 
 
                                                          




As Stocker et al aptly state, the envisaged integration can only be achieved formally 
through adoption of standards developed by ICAO under the provisions of Article 37 
of the Chicago Convention.27 States such as South Africa, and lately Kenya, on 30 
March 2020, that have successfully tried to incorporate regulation of UAS in 
accordance with ICAO Annexes, Standards and Recommended Practices still 
grapple with challenges of implementation and enforcement as discussed in detail 
in chapters Five and Six of this thesis. This justifies why some authors, such as 
Marcontelli, opine that most UAS regulatory frameworks are largely conservative.28  
Since each country has its own unique steps and experiences in integration of the 
use of UAS, it suffices to state that new technological issues lead to new legal issues 
affecting the aviation industry and which motivate this study.29 
 
2.2.4 Failure by Courts to fill Regulatory Gaps 
Surveillance by UAS is anticipated to expose citizens to law enforcement agents 
who are permitted to gather unprecedented amounts of information. It could also 
lead to a security threat where States spy on one another.30 These privacy and 
security challenges leave citizenry in a precarious position. Executive arms of States 
are fond of attempts to justify their actions whenever there is a public uproar about 
security, safety and privacy concerns. In such circumstances, protection of the 
citizenry can only be assured through judicial intervention. However, as Kerr ably 
notes, courts have been slow in assessing constitutional effects of new technology, 
such as that of UAS.31  
                                                          
27 Stocker C et al ‘Review of the current state of UAV regulations’ (2017) 9 Remote sensing 459. 
28 Marcontelli D and Douglas S “Why the Use of Drones Still Faces Big Regulatory Hurdles” 2018-9-
10 Forbes https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverwyman/2018/09/10/why-the-use-of-drones-
still-faces-big-regulatory-hurdles/#529c17ea1c0d  (Date of use: 5 October 2019).   
29 Hayhurst KJ et al, “Unmanned aircraft hazards and their implications for regulation” in Aviation 
History and Unmanned Flight (Twenty-Fifth Meeting of Digital Avionics Systems’ Conference 
15 October 2006). 
30 McAuliff M “FBI’s Robert Mueller: Drones are in use in US” 2013-6-19 Huffingtonpost 
http;//www.huffington post.com (Date of use: 12 October 2018). 
31 Kerr SO “The Fourth Amendment and new technologies: Constitutional myths and the case for 
caution” (2004) 102 MLR 86. Kerr discusses challenges which need to be dealt with before 
courts resolve how the Fourth Amendment applies to actual searches not to technologies 
that merely have the potential to conduct searches, hence courts are reluctant to pass on 




2.3 UAS Regulatory Approaches  
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that there are three regulatory issues 
that run through this thesis. The first issue is that whatever the approach, an 
effective regulatory regime must seek to properly balance and address safety, 
security and privacy challenges that arise from the use of UAS.  
 
Secondly, redress for the challenges must be balanced to ensure that neither public 
nor individual interests are arbitrarily compromised. For instance, overemphasis on 
security challenges has capacity to compromise privacy concerns by members of 
the public. 
 
Thirdly, in order to regulate UAS comprehensively, other than the public-private 
interests balance, there is need to ensure a careful balance of the interests of all 
stakeholders. Some of the notable stakeholders are flight operators, end-users, 
aviation authorities, and the States. Any State’s regulatory authority, irrespective of 
the diverse nature of the approaches that they may adopt, can consider these 
regulatory issues.  
 
Generally, different States adopt different approaches in overall regulation of UAS. 
The difference results from the fact that countries face real struggles in integrating 
UAS into the civil aviation framework.32 There are a number of approaches to the 
regulation of UAS depending on the extent of regulation and tools employed for 
regulating UAS operations. Owing to this, the approaches may overlap and are not 
                                                          
32 Jones T, Internationality Commercial Drones Regulation and Drones Delivery Services (RAND 
Corporation 2017) vii & 4. 
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mutually exclusive. Different approaches to regulation of UAS that are endorsed by 
different authors33 are explained below. 
 
2.3.1 Outright Ban 
Outright ban is an approach under which UAS are completely prohibited in the 
territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State. Under this approach, there is no 
single chance of use or licensing of UAS within the jurisdiction of the State. This 
approach has been adopted by countries such as Cuba.34 The practice in most 
countries suggest that the total ban may occur on certain types of categories of UAS. 
An example of this approach was when the Republic of South Africa banned the use 
of camera UAS in 2014.35 For this category of the UAS, no permits could be issued 
by the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA). Another case is the, New 
York City ‘aviation’ law as adopted in New York City—Administrative Code § 10-
126. The code, when read together with New York City Restriction of 2017, makes 
flying UAS within New York an offence.36 The code, for instance, requires members 
of the public to report matters of UAS use to the police.37  However, there have been 
efforts to amend this law by the New York City Council members, Paul Vallone, and 
Justin Brannan who proposed an amendment to the administrative code in January 
2018. The amendment aims to legally allow, but overly restrict UAS flying in New 
York City. Considering UAS technological benefits such as use for marketing, 
inspection of buildings, recreational and hobbies among others, perhaps it is high 
time for New York City policy makers to have a relook at ‘avigation’ law, which 
appears unaffectedly outmoded as there is desire to exempt UAS from such 
provision.38 The challenge is, however, with such a dense population and high 
                                                          
33 Jones Internationality 6.  
34 Jones Internationality vii. 
35 https://www.uasvision.com/2014/06/05/south-africa-civil-aviation-authority-bans-camera-uas/ 
(Date of use: 16 July 2020). 
36 New York City—Administrative Code § 10-126, Section 6 (c). It provides that:  It shall be unlawful 
for any person navigating an aircraft to take off or land, except in an emergency, at any 
place within the limits of the city other than places of landing designated by the department 
of transportation or the port of New York authority.  
37 New York City—Administrative Code § 10-126, Section 6 (3) (g). 
38 According to Collins English dictionary, avigation is defined as aerial navigation. 
14 
 
buildings in New York City, it may be tough for drone pilots to comply with FAA’s 
flying over people rule.39 
 
2.3.2 Effective Ban  
Another regulatory approach by countries is the effective ban. An effective ban is an 
approach where a State allows for licencing of the use of UAS. However, the 
licensing is not liberal, but restricted, such that it achieves the same results as the 
outright ban. The goals are to present a picture that operation of UAS is possible 
within the jurisdiction, but the operational processes are strategically mounted with 
bureaucracies to ensure that practical achievement of the operation is usually 
impossible. This is done through deliberate creation of technical hurdles in 
sanctioning certain allowable UAS activities. The restrictions do not, however, 
amount to a total ban when the conditions are complied with. From the experience 
of the US, this approach is ideal when a State is transitioning from total ban. An 
example was when the US was opening a window for exportation of weaponed 
UAS.40 Previously, the US had banned the exportation of weaponed UAS. 
Nevertheless, currently, licensing and approvals are possible, but certain action 
such as illegal surveillance is prohibited. Further, the export of unarmed version, 
under the new policy, is limited only to US contractors.41 The ban need not come 
from the State or the aviation regulatory authority. In some instances, the National 
Service Park has also banned use of the UAS on land and waters administered by 
it.42 
 
                                                          
39 The US’ Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 107 Section 107.39 provides that: “No person may 
operate a small unmanned aircraft over a human being unless that human being is: Directly 
participating in the operation of the small unmanned aircraft; or Located under a covered 
structure or inside a stationary vehicle that can provide reasonable protection from a falling 
small unmanned aircraft”. 
40 Trible S “US open door to armed UAS exports” https://www.flightglobal.com/us-opens-door-to-
armed-uas-exports/115939.article (Date of use: 16 July 2020). 
41 Trible https://www.flightglobal.com/us-opens-door-to-armed-uas-exports/115939.article (Date of 
use: 16 July 2020). 




2.3.3 Permissive Approach 
The third approach is a permissive approach.43 The permissive approach is nearly 
opposite of the outright ban due to its more liberal approach compared to other 
regulatory approaches. The more liberal approach does not, however, translate into 
lack of regulations. Such an approach may still adopt regulatory framework, 
consisting of manuals, policies and rules on licensing, registration and insurance, 
that are worded in a straightforward manner with step-by-step processes that are 
easy to follow by applicants throughout the UAS value chain. The permissive 
approach can be further divided into either full permission or ad hoc permission. Ad 
hoc permission allows the State to evaluate applications for certification on a case-
by-case basis. 
 
A permissive approach, as opposed to an effective ban approach, envisages that 
straightforward rules and laws are to be supported with adequate State actions in 
matters that include investment in infrastructure, trainings and UAS-based pilot 
examinations, as well as insurance to ensure safety measures are enhanced. In 
other words, countries that adopt and apply this approach must do all they can to 
ensure there are human and technical skills and expertise.44 
 
                                                          
43 https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/Pages/uas_old.aspx (Date of use: 2 January 2019). 
44 Jones Internationality 6.  
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2.3.4 Wait-and-See Approach  
Lastly, States that have not done much in regulation for UAS have adopted a wait-
and-see approach.45 Those adopting this approach first observe how regulations 
are applied in other jurisdictions before they can think of applying them in their 
respective jurisdictions.46 While the wait-and-see approach is what countries ideally 
do in the first stages of UAS regulation, such countries with usually do this for the 
long term and not as a precursor to immediate legal and policy development. 
 
3. Problem Statement 
This study is motivated by the increase in the use of UAS technology without the 
necessary integration into civil aviation by a unified single international legal 
regulation. The void has caused several challenges that are worsened by some 
States’ failure to implement national policy and regulatory framework for UAS.  For 
States that have attempted to enact regulations, continue to face, safety, security 
and privacy challenges including difficulties in compliance and enforcement, slowing 
down the process of integrating UAS into civil aviation. Technological advancement 
of UAS and need for effective legal framework to respond to the influx into the 
airspace is a matter of urgent international and domestic legal concern that needs 
to be addressed as a matter of priority to catch up with the ever-changing 
technology.  
 
UAS of the near future are likely to be bigger in size, and with ability of application 
in many sectors including carrying cargo and people, thus posing real safety 
challenges arising from possibility of accidents, increased avenues for terrorism and 
continued intrusion of privacy. Currently, the UAS-related safety, security and 
privacy concerns have been facelifted and diversified in such a manner and form 
                                                          
45 Jones Commercial Drones Regulation 4.  
46 Ozerov A “Drones for Railway Infrastructure Monitoring” 2019-12-16 International Union of 




that are beyond contemplation of drafters of the Chicago Convention as well as the 
adopting State parties as at 1944. The possible future response to these concerns 
can first be deduced from the international legal framework for regulation of 
international civil aviation.  
 
The international conventional framework, which is the basis of harmonization and 
coordination efforts of integrating UAS into the civil airspace, is difficult to implement 
partly because it relies heavily on soft law, without which the conventional law is 
incomplete. The Convention, which refers to UAS, is the Chicago Convention, in 
which Article 8 refers to pilotless aircraft (equivalent to UAS). The Article is 
rudimentary, however, as it merely states that a pilotless aircraft cannot be used 
devoid of a pilot over and above the territory of a contracting party without special 
authorization from the host State. Further, Article 8 of the Chicago Convention 
specifically states that it is the duty of every State to provide security and safety 
within its borders. The Chicago Convention does not, however, define a pilotless 
aircraft or its classification. Such a definition would have been vital for purposes of 
designing a regulatory framework. The Convention only refers to conditions through 
which a pilotless aircraft is to be permitted into another country’s airspace in a 
manner that is cognisant of security and safety considerations.47 
 
In order to fill the highlighted lacuna existing in the hard law, ICAO has developed 
soft laws, such as UAS Circular No. 328 of 2011 as a guiding material to member 
States to provide for among others, the legal framework for regulation of UAS, its 
systems, and personnel.48 However, the framework developed under the Circular 
does not fully fill this void, but is more of a guide for State parties to the Chicago 
Convention. This and other ICAO adopted instruments, whose status in international 
law and binding force is considered at chapter Three, are not themselves treaties.  
                                                          
47 Chicago Convention, Article 8. 




Further, there is a lacuna in the substantive provisions. The international framework, 
despite its inherent challenges, only focuses on safety and security of pilotless 
aircraft, but there is general tardiness regarding UAS-specific provisions providing 
assurances on the right to privacy. These challenges seem to continue to inhibit 
ability of the civil aviation international law framework to respond to current and 
future safety, security and privacy concerns in use of UAS.  
 
As a result of the above implications, challenges in the international frameworks 
have yielded several implementation challenges in domestic jurisdiction of State 
parties to the Chicago Convention. All frameworks in the US, South Africa and 
Kenya continue to face enforcement challenges. In Kenya, for example, the initial 
UAS Regulations gazetted on 6 October 2017, annulled in June 2018 followed with 
a prohibition to fly legal notice No. 75 of 2019 thus backtracking on regulation of 
private, commercial and recreational use of UAS,49 although the nullification has 
since been remedied with gazettement of the Kenya’s UAS Regulations on 30  
March 2020. It is clear that for several years, as the research progressed, Kenya 
did not have UAS regulation. Conspicuous during the period of lack of the regulation, 
was that Kenya lost some opportunities to take risk-based approaches in regulation 
of UAS activities.50 
 
Moreover, States have been domesticating the ICAO Standards at different times 
as the US’s, FAA Modernization and Reform Act was in the year 2012,51 South 
Africa’s Civil Aviation Act 52 and the Kenya’s Civil Aviation Act.53 This shows the 
differential approach by State parties, which is based on, among others, the laxity 
                                                          
49 Andae https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/tech/Kenya-flies-behind-African-peers-in-
drones-adoption/4258474-5278452-fvbplqz/index.html (Date of use: 6 October 2019). 
50 See ICAO “Development of UAS Regulation” 
https://www.icao.int/safety/UA/UASToolkit/Pages/Narrative-Regulation.aspx> (Date of use: 
16 July 2020). 
51 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 Public Law No 112-095  
52 Civil Aviation Act 13 of 2009 (as amended in 2015). 
53 Civil Aviation Act No. 21 of 2013 (as amended in 2016). 
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in adopting the SAPRs developed by ICAO. Regrettably, the challenges continue to 
represent lost opportunities for domestic regulation of UAS, which can otherwise be 
fast, flexible and considerate to circumstances of each country when considering 
safety, security and privacy issues in use of UAS.  
 
Some States that have tried to embrace the integration and regulation of UAS, such 
as Kenya, are faced with the challenge of striking a balance between respect for 
human rights, including right to privacy and public participation on the one hand, 
and the need to ensure safety, security and privacy, on the other. Other States, such 
as South Africa, despite making positive steps towards integration, are still faced 
with other execution challenges around timelines, annulment of regulations, limited 
approach in regulation by regulators, technicalities in passing laws, and 
conservative nature of regulatory authorities, among others, thereby, delaying the 
process of integrating UAS into civil aviation.54 Further, existing regulatory 
framework is devoid of adequate provisions to address all challenges that come with 
ubiquity of UAS use. 
 
In addition, there is a problem concerning application of UAS for civilian purposes 
and whether they can be successfully flown without violating national or international 
aviation law.55 This is further compounded by the reality that without a uniform 
international legal framework for UAS, operators are subjected to numerous national 
and international regulations and standards. Even laws created by the international 
framework do not seem to fully mitigate issues arising therefrom. 
 
Another identified challenge is that no specific study has been commissioned to 
analyse regulations of major UAS users, considering rapid growth of the aviation 
                                                          
54 L A. Ingham, Consideration for a roadmap for the operation of UAV in South Africa Airspace (PhD 
Thesis Stellenbosch University 2009) p 1-47. Also see Africa Goes Digital, training Africa’s 
Pilots in homogenized regulatory environment (Africa Union and NEPAD) (Date of use 6 
October 2019). 
55 Marshall Aerial Systems 693. 
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industry across the globe. This research, therefore, aims to analyse the extent to 
which international law has responded to integration of UAS into civil aviation, and 
how the US, South Africa and Kenya have responded in their domestic legal 
frameworks, towards incorporating ICAO international standards on the regulation 
of UAS and their respective levels of success in this endeavour. It aims at identifying 
the challenges associated with UAS operations and providing a roadmap for 
integration of UAS into civil aviation, with an opportunity for the two African States 
to draw lessons from the US, which has a longer history of UAS usage. Evaluation 
is significant taking into cognizance the increased use of UAS, which seems to have 
become indispensable, not only for military purposes, but also for civilian 
applications.  
 
To address the legal problem occasioned by the absence of unified international 
UAS regulation, the thesis looks at how international aviation law and domestic laws 
in the US, South Africa and Kenya have responded to challenges of safety, security 
and privacy in their pursuance of integration of UAS into civil aviation.   
 
4. Hypotheses 
At the beginning of the study, the thesis hypothesized that the existing international 
regulatory framework for UAS is inadequate in addressing UAS- related challenges 
of safety, security, and privacy hence States are required to develop their own 
domestic legislations to address the challenges. Further, it hypothesized that the 
domestic legal, institutional and policy frameworks for UAS in the US, South Africa 
and Kenya experience safety, security and privacy challenges in their respective 
paths to the full integration of UAS use into civil aviation. Lastly, it was the author’s 
hypothesis that the long history of US jurisdiction with the UAS puts it in a good 
position to provide lessons that can be drawn by South Africa and Kenya regarding 
achievement effective enforcement mechanisms and assure safety, security and 
privacy protection.  
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5. Research Questions 
The analysis of this research sought to answer the following research questions:  
1. To what extent does the existing international regulatory framework address 
current UAS-related challenges of safety, security, privacy? 
2. What are the rights and obligations of States in addressing those challenges 
under international law?  
3.  How have legal, institutional and policy frameworks for UAS in the US, South 
Africa and Kenya addressed current needs and challenges in operation and 
integrating them into regulatory frameworks for civil aviation?   
4. What are the possible recommendations to aid faster and safer integration of 
UAS into civil aviation by the US, South Africa and Kenya?  
 
The scope of the research and the research questions have been answered through 
analysis in subsequent chapters. The study analyses current and future status of 
the UAS in order to highlight current and potential future challenges. The study then 
proceeds, based on rules of international air law as found in treaties and customary 
international law, to determine whether these rules can contribute to addressing 
some of the operational challenges relating to UAS, such as safety, security, and 
privacy protection. In particular, the requirements of Article 37 of the Chicago 
Convention on domestication of international standards is analysed. On this basis, 
it proceeds to analyse domestic regulations on UAS in the US, South Africa and 
Kenya. 
 
The motivation for the choice and focus of this study is the fact that States whose 
legislative frameworks are subject of analysis have varying pedigrees with 
regulating UAS. The US has had the longest experience, followed by South Africa 
and Kenya, respectively. It is expected that these varying degrees of experience are 
likely to offer lessons in responding to regulation process and not entirely for 




6.  Conceptual Framework  
In undertaking this study, the author identifies that certain concepts run across the 
research whose terms are important to appreciate from the onset. Suffice to note 
that the approach of the study is primarily informed by unity of the concepts of 
sovereignty of airspace and the doctrine of commingling.  
 
6.1 Sovereignty of Civil Airspace 
Sovereignty of States is the idea of exclusive control that a State has over its 
territory.56 It also represents the independence of the State in regard to international 
relations.57 The territory of the State includes land, airspace and territorial waters 
adjacent thereto. The Black’s Law Dictionary’ definition speaks more to the nature 
of this principle whereby the State sovereignty is not only representing a supreme 
power but also an absolute authority above a property or State.58 This means that 
aviation authorities have the power to regulate the airspace, including one that is 
used by the unmanned aircraft systems.59 
 
State sovereignty as recognized under different international law instruments must 
be respected by other countries across the world.60 Traditionally, governance of civil 
airspace has been dominated by a rule that States could not contend with anything 
less than complete sovereignty over their airspace, unless with exception of right of 
innocent passage.61 Since then, the customary law rule has been that aircraft of one 
State have a right to fly over the high seas, but not over the territory or territorial sea 
of another State.62 However, there are exceptions to this general rule in two principal 
                                                          
56 Gevorgyan K “Concept of state sovereignty: modern attitudes” (Proceedings of Yerevan State 
University 2014) 432. 
57 Gevorgyan “State sovereignty” 433. 
58 See Black’s Law Dictionary 6th ed.  
59 Black’s Law Dictionary 6th ed. 
60 The Chicago Convention of 1944, Articles 1 and 2.   
61 Dinu MC “State Sovereignty in the Navigable Airspace” (1950) 17 JALAC 43. 
62 Dinu “Navigable Airspace” 43. 
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instances. The first instance when State whose territory is being overflown gives 
prior authorization, achieved either through bilateral or multilateral agreements 
among States. This exception is reaffirmed by the Chicago Convention of 1944, 
which provides that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the 
airspace above its territory.63 The second exception occurs in instances of innocent 
passage.64  
 
6.2 Commingling Concept  
In the field of international aviation law, commingling is a regulatory concept that 
appreciates the need to allow operation and regulation of both UAS and manned 
aircraft within the same airspace, instead of only allowing domination by manned 
aircraft. The concept has received overwhelming support from literary works of 
Bartsch, who notes that an attempt to regulate manned aircraft in isolation from UAS 
cannot be desirable.65 Further, application of the concept has had a huge and long 
judicial history and has been affirmed as applicable to aviation rules by courts and 
authors. Generally, interpretations have been in favour of laws that regulate UAS 
operations. It has thus influenced the favour of most arguments for integration of 
UAS into civil airspace from a regulatory perspective. However, application of the 
principle has been controversial and not conclusive, as its premise seems to 
suggest.66  
 
Amidst the challenge, there is no doubt that the concept still applies to motivate 
application of State laws to UAS operations. This was affirmed in the Australian case 
law of Airlines of New South Wales Pty Ltd v New South Wales.67 In this Australian 
case, the High Court of Australia affirmed that commonwealth law could extend to 
regulate interstate air navigation. The court also noted that there is nothing that 
                                                          
63 The Chicago Convention of 1944, Articles 1 and 6. 
64 The Chicago Convention of 1944, Article 5 and UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, 
Article 19. 
65 Bartsch R International Aviation Law (Ashgate Publishing London 2012) 19. 
66 Bartsch R International 19 quotes the opinions of Learned Justices Evatt and McTierman JJ. 
67 HCA 3, (1965) 113 CLR 54. 
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prevents commonwealth laws from prescribing measures and mechanism of UAS 
operations. The motivation of the regulation, the court concluded, would be to 
ensure safety and efficiency.68  
 
The commingling concept now applies to UAS operations in both the United States 
and Africa.69 Considering this concept, therefore, defining an aircraft in terms of 
lateral size and shape for the purposes of regulation, is highly misplaced. In any 
event, the laws and courts do not intend to have manifestly unjust result of 
imbalanced regulation of manned aircraft alone in the airspace.70 
 
7.  Literature Review  
The Literature review for this doctoral thesis, was conclusively reviewed in the 
research proposal. Hence, existing literature that was relied upon to build this thesis 
has been integrated into the body of the thesis, hence the absence of a dedicated 
chapter on literature review. The reviewed literature includes writings of other 
scholars mooted from the main concerns identified under the problem statement 
and research questions. There is a lot of literature that has focused on current and 
future challenges that come with UAS operations.   
 
From a previous review of existing literature and conceptual framework, there 
seems to be less focus on the regulation of UAS operation in Africa. The existing 
literature encapsulates the body of knowledge on UAS regulations discussed in 
subsequent chapters. The literature aids in understanding development in the use 
of UAS operations, and how the regulations have at their best, tried to resolve safety, 
security, and privacy challenges in the process of flying UAS. 
                                                          
68 Mulero et al “Remotely piloted aircraft systems as a rhinoceros anti-poaching tool in Africa” (2014) 
9(1) PloS one 21.  
69 Mulero et al “Remotely piloted Systems” 21-23. 





8.  Significance of the Research  
Available literature by various scholars focuses on potential uses and general 
challenges of UAS. Examples include authors such as Masutti, who has focused on 
evolution of the uses of UAS from the military to civil use, which are on the verge of 
sporadic increase,71 Similarly, Saurabh Anand writes on the general challenges and 
risks that the use of the UAS has been associated with.72 Further, Rawich notes that 
operational risks posed by use of UAS are exacerbated as earlier stated by the fact 
that whereas the law is always trying to, it has not succeeded in catching up with 
technology. These challenges are, therefore, real in this era of digital information 
where UAS is viewed as a moving target, with technology also moving at a rapid 
pace.73 In the African context, Mulero et al recites similar challenges and makes a 
case for effective regulation to expand use of UAS into other activities such as 
regulation of poaching.74 The authors conclude that for the system to work well, 
identified challenges have to be tackled to fully integrate use of UAS in civil aviation. 
 
There has, however, not been a specific focus on safety, security and privacy 
concerns represented by the UAS from a perspective of three different jurisdictions, 
an aspect that this thesis seeks to add to existing literature by providing an analysis 
of the approach taken by the US, South Africa and Kenya, with respect to integration 
of UAS into civil aviation. This thesis, therefore, contributes to the limited academic 
research available and contributes to the existing body of knowledge on South 
Africa, Kenya and, by extension, African continent in the field of regulating UAS and 
efforts to enact policy that integrates it into civil aviation. Further, the thesis looks at 
insights that the two African States can share or adopt from the US, which has had 
the most expansive experience emanating from its many years of experience in 
                                                          
71 Masutti A “Regulation of Unmanned Air System Use in Common Airspace” 2012 Journal of Law of 
International Sea 2.  
72 Saurabh A Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems: An Evaluation of Policy Constraints and 
the Role of Industry Consensus Standards (ASTM International Washington 2007) 3. 
73 Rawich “Integration” 597. 
74 Mulero et al “Remotely piloted Systems” 69. 
26 
 
dealing with UAS. The research will provide invaluable information to the public who 
could be absorbed in the field of UAS as operators, manufacturers, stakeholders or 
ordinary citizens.  
 
9. Research Methodology  
9.1 Secondary Materials 
This is desktop research. The researcher collected secondary materials in the forms 
of scholarly books, journal articles, conference papers, bulletins and through library 
searches. Secondly, the author utilized desktop research involving access and 
doctrinal evaluation of preposition of doctrines of legal concepts and principles 
including delivered judgements, statutes and rules applicable to integration of UAS 
into civil aviation in the US, South Africa and Kenya. Further, through the desktop 
research, the study has combed through the legal framework on regulation of UAS 
at the international, regional, sub-regional and State levels of the chosen States.  
  
9.2 Case-Study 
The thesis has adopted a proportional analysis. It an analytical analysis of three 
countries, namely: the US, South Africa, and Kenya. The researcher visited the 
three jurisdictions to appreciate and observe first-hand application of UAS into 
different airspace and how regulation has been developed in response to integration 
of UAS into civil aviation. The choice of US is informed by its extensive involvement 
with regulation of UAS, which provides an avenue for lessons to pick from. South 
Africa and Kenya, with their varying approaches to UAS and rates of compliance 
with international standards, provide an avenue for ease of comparison, with results 
that can possibly inspire other countries on the African continent in reference to 
SACAA and KCAA.75  
                                                          
75 The rationale for the visits to the three countries and make observations was informed due to the 
technical nature of the study to learn from persons with proven record of accomplishment 
and expert opinion on the standards of policy and regulation of UAS in the aviation industry 
27 
 
10. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters, each dealing with a specific and unique 
aspect of UAS integration into civilian aviation in response to the formulated 
research questions. Chapter One sets out the background and basis for the study.  
Chapter Two discusses the background to the evolution of use and expansion in 
design and other specifications of UAS in order to create a general understanding 
of current safety, security and privacy challenges that necessitate a regulatory 
framework. Chapter Three analyses how the international framework has responded 
to specific safety, security and privacy issues, together with associated challenges, 
and ends with a verdict on whether the framework is a perfect system of regulation.  
 
The three subsequent chapters Four, Five and Six focus on the historical, 
institutional, policy and legislative experience of the United States, South Africa and 
Kenya regarding their respective historical redress of the security, safety and privacy 
concerns of UAS use and operation. The analysis of the experience in chapter Four 
is deliberate, since it builds the background to certain deducible lessons applicable 
to South Africa and Kenya as analysed in chapters Five and Six. 
 
Chapter Seven provides a synthesis of the outcomes of the study regarding the 
challenges of safety, security and privacy as well as lessons that can be learnt from 
the experiences of the United States, South Africa and Kenya. Lastly, chapter Eight 
provides general conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the approaches taken 
by the respective States. It proffers recommendations for ICAO, South Africa and 
Kenya, the United States and regional economic communities particularly EAC and 
SADC concerning integration of UAS into civil aviation. In addition, provides and 
suggests areas of further research  
                                                          
and the impact of international and domestic regulatory frameworks.  The views and opinions 
of experts did not influence writing of the thesis but only aided in broadening the mind of the 
researcher due to deep expertise and immense background on the development of 




ABILITIES OF UAS, HISTORICAL EXPANSION AND INTEGRATION CHALLENGES 
INTO CIVIL AVIATION 
1. Introduction  
This chapter presents functioning capabilities of unmanned aircraft system, from the 
perspective of their use in war,1 historical development, recognition in treaties and 
the practice of States. It examines the current and potential uses of UAS, emerging 
from their increase in civil airspace.2 It further analyses the phenomena of uses of 
UAS such as environmental and agricultural monitoring, surveillance, and security 
operations, and examines their nexus with and impact on the safety and security 
concerns for the use of UAS. Beyond safety concerns, are other necessary 
concerns, such as the need to protect privacy and to ensure security of users and 
other civilians. Additionally, this chapter discusses possible efforts that one aimed 
at regulating unmanned aircraft system; and finally, it describes challenges inherent 
during operation of UAS, namely: safety, security, and privacy in integrating them 
into civil aviation.  
    
2. Design and Functioning Capabilities of UAS  
Design and size of UAS may have different rules applicable to them hence, the 
importance of this section on abilities and components of UAS. The thesis examines 
how UAS are made and operated in order to appreciate its competencies in the 
airspace, dynamics of licensing, height limitation of operations, and intensity of 
impacts on inherent safety, security and privacy issues. 
 
                                                          
1 Blom JD Unmanned aerial systems: A historical perspective (Combat Studies Institute Press 2010) 
65. 
2 Bart E Pilotless drones: Background and considerations for congress regarding unmanned aircraft 
operations in the national airspace system (CRS Reports for Congress 2012) 7. 
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2.1 Elements of UAS 
UAS comprise of three features, namely: the UA, ground control station, and the 
operator.3 UA is an aircraft that is flown without a pilot, with a pilot stationed on the 
ground or flown by pre-programmed flight plans or a dynamic automation system 
that is capable of carrying lethal and non-lethal payloads (high and low resolution 
cameras/video) high reconnaissance, equipment, weapons and generally, any 
equipment required for the mission.4  
 
2.2 Flight Computer/ Aircraft Control System 
Figure 1: UAS Avionics 
The figure below represents the avionics of the UAS. The actual operations of these 
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3 Gundlach J Designing unmanned aircraft systems: a comprehensive approach, (American Institute 
of Aeronautics and Astronautics 2012) 43. 
4 HaiYang C and YangQuan C “Autopilots for small unmanned aerial vehicles:  A survey” 2010 IJCAS 
54. 
5 Ellen1 R et al “An investigation into the next generation avionics architecture for the QUT UAV 




Flight Computer or aircraft control system is the flight control and aircraft control 
system that is used to fly the UAS.6 It is either a two-way data link radio for remote 
control or an on-board computer with GPS navigation connected to the aircraft 
control system. Flight and operating system control includes the control station, 
communication link, data terminal, launch and recovery systems, ground support 
equipment and air traffic control.7 
 
Payload can either be high or low-resolution cameras/video cameras, day and night 
vision equipment, high power radar, electronic sights, relay systems, warfare 
machinery (ESM, ECM and ECCM) as required by the UAS to succeed. The need 
for endurance in UA requires high fuel consumption, which lowers the payload by 
between 10 and 20%.8 
 
Sensors are used to provide basic functioning and capacity to maintain motion in 
the absence of human input, radar, photo/video camera, IR scanners. Sensors have 
a laser target designator for guiding missiles and shells. Sensing payloads on UA 
include intelligence collection, reconnaissance and target acquisition that provides 
not only support but weapon delivery due to its ability to detect and identify targets 




                                                          
6 Ellen et al http://eprints.qut.edu.au  (Date of use: 16 June 2016). 
7 Bilbao J “How to design an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle with great efficiency in the use of existing 
resources’ 2008 IJC 2. 
8 Austin R, Wiley J and Chichester S Unmanned Aircraft Systems UAVs Design, Development: (Wiley 
Publishers 2010) 6. 
9 Austin R, Wiley J and Chichester S UAVs Design 6. 
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Navigation sensors and microprocessors constitute a critical element in UAS for 
purposes of navigation to accomplish the set missions. Processors allow and enable 
UAS to fly devoid of a human interface.10 Aircraft on-board intelligence refers to the 
totality of information-gathering equipment placed in a UAS. The amount of 
intelligence put in a UA depends on the complexity of the task it is meant to 
accomplish and the oversight role of human beings. However, these technologies 
are not well developed, thus, their utility and reliability is limited.11 
 
2.3 Control Types 
Since a major characteristic of unmanned aircraft is that it operates without an 
operator sitting inside the cockpit, control is done by some other mechanisms. The 
most common forms of controlling the UAS are ground control (remote piloting), 
semi-autonomous and autonomous forms or a combination of two or more of 
these.12 These forms are briefly discussed below. 
 
2.3.1 Ground Control (Remote Piloting) 
UAS that is controlled from the ground is also known as a remotely piloted vehicle. 
It thrives on uninterrupted input from the operator. RPV are sophisticated radio-
controlled aircraft that use the same basic techniques discussed in preceding 
paragraphs. A few modern UAS are completely remotely controlled. Between the 
1980s and 1990s, a rapid development of remote-controlled techniques and 
programmes enabled establishment of guidance systems for UAS. Since the 1990s, 
however, the trend has been towards creation of more autonomy for UAS.13 
 
                                                          
10 Nonami K et al Autonomous Flying Robots, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Micro Aerial Vehicles 
(Springer New York 2010) 7. 
11 Nonami K et al Autonomous Flying Robots 10. 
12 Nonami K et al Autonomous Flying Robots 10. 




Semi-autonomous control of UAS or guidance system is more commonplace. The 
control requires “ground input during critical portions of the flight such as take-off, 
landing, weapons employment and some evasive manoeuvres.”14 This system 
allows the operator to fully control the aircraft in pre-flight, take-off, landing and 
operations near the base. As soon as it gets airborne, the autopilot kicks in allowing 
the craft to fly along pre-programmed way points.15 
 
2.3.3 Fully Autonomous 
Control that is fully autonomous may not require human beings to accomplish any 
of its missions, because it consists of a sophisticated autopilot, allowing it to fly itself 
on programmed flight paths without interference for almost all missions.16 The task 
of the operator is purely to monitor the system. Where an UA is fully automated, an 
on-board computer controls the aircraft with minimal human intervention.17 
 
2.3.4 Autonomous 
The hallmark of UA is autonomy of its operations, infrastructure and communication 
facilities. Autonomy is the ability of an agent to carry out a mission independently 
without human involvement, other than in an oversight capacity.18 Decisions on-
board the UAS are made by an autonomous system or delegated to an autonomous 
system or sub system having autonomous capacity or learning systems as part of 
the automated system.19 To guarantee smooth flight, advanced control techniques 
such as neutral network, fuzzy logic, and sliding mode control have been used.20 
                                                          
14 Nonami K et al Autonomous Flying Robots 14. 
15 Nonami K et al Autonomous Flying Robots 19. 
16 Nonami K et al Autonomous Flying Robots 15. 
17 DeGarmo M Issues Concerning Integration 11. 
18 Fernández EG Management System for Unmanned Aircraft System (Masters Thesis Universitat 
Politècnica de Catalunya 2010) 67. 
19 https;//www.caa.co.uk  (Date of use: 23 January 2017). 
20 Gupta SG “Review of unmanned aircraft system (UAS)” 2013 IJARCET 1650. 
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Advances in wireless networks and micro-mechanical systems have enabled usage 
of inexpensive micro-autopilots.21 
 
3.  Classification of Civilian Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Arising from the increased use, variety, size and function of UAS, classification may 
be necessary and convenient for lawmakers in coming up with a regulatory 
framework. However, as it is aptly stated by Watts et al, no universal classification 
does exist due to the diversity in capability, size and operations of UAS.22 Some 
States with regulatory framework for UAS have conveniently developed different 
classification systems based on UAS size among other parameters.23  
 
For starters, there are applications that are purely for military purposes and those 
that could be classified as being for civilian use. At a general level, civil UAS are 
categorized according to the payload of the system provided in the subsequent 
diagram as shown in Tables One and Two annexed to this thesis. There are other 
parameters such as endurance, radius of operational area, purpose and tasks 
performed whether dirty, dull or dangerous. For military purpose UAS, the 
classification is, as correctly stated by Arjomandi, mostly based on parameters of 
the altitude and wing loading capacity.24  
 
                                                          
21 Fernández EG Management System 67. 
22 Adam W et al “Unmanned aircraft systems in remote sensing and scientific research: Classification 
and considerations of use” 2012 Remote Sensing 1671-1692. 
23 Section 2.2.7 of ICAO Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft System of 2015 provides that 
categorization of RPA may be important for the purpose of a proportionate application to 
safety risk management, certification, operational and licensing requirements. RPA may be 
categorised according to criteria such as take- off mass (MTOM), kinetic energy, various 
performance criteria, area of operations, capabilities. Work is underway in forums to develop 
categorization scheme.    
24Arjomandi M “Classification of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” 
http://www.academia.edu/2055673/Classification ofUnmannedAerialVehicles2007 (Date of 
use:10 October 2017). 
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The next part is limited to a discussion of the common parameters for classification 
of both civil and military UAS. These parameters are performance specifications, 
level of endurance, maximum altitude, altitude, endurance, and wing loading 
capacity and those that are unique to the military UAS. These classifications are 
discussed in sufficient detail below. 
 
3.1 Classification by Performance Specifications 
Classification under the performance parameter evaluates varying ranges of 
performance capabilities based on maximum weights of carried elements and fuel 
per UAS.25 There range from the small ones called micro UAS to the large ones with 
a wider reach, also called global UAS. Under this classification, five categories are 
recognized: super heavyweight, heavyweight, medium weight, light weight, and 
micro weight UAS, as performance is influenced by weight.26 The super 
heavyweight is capable of carrying a heavy load of more than 2 tons. Examples are 
the X-45, Darkstar,27 Predator B28 and the Global Hawk.29 The category of 
heavyweight refers to UAS that have a weight of between 200 kg and 2,000 kg such 
as the 60 Hummingbird and the Fire Scout. The medium weight category has UAS 
weighing between 50 kg and 200 kg. The fourth category is the lightweight, which 
comprises UAS of weights between 5 and 50 kg, such as the Dragon Eye; whereas 
the micro-weight category has a weight range of less than 5 kg such as the Silent 
Eyes.  
                                                          
25 Jessica H et al “Flying qualities specifications and design standards for unmanned air vehicles” 
2008 AFMCE 6555. 
26  UAS Manufactured by Teledyne Ryan. 
27  UAS Manufactured by Lockheed Martin. 
28  UAS Manufactured by General Atomic. 
29  UAS Manufactured by Northrop Grunman. 
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The above information can be summarized into the table below:  
Designation Weight Range Example 
Super Heavy Weight         Above 2,000 kg Global Hawk 
Heavy Weight         Between 200-2,000 kg    A160 Hummingbird 
Medium Weight         Between 50-200 kg Raven 
Light Weight         Between 5-50 kg Dragon Eye 
Micro Weight Below 5 kg Silent Eyes 
                       Table 1: Classification by performance specifications. 
 
3.2 Classification by Endurance 
The parameter of UAS endurance describes the ability of a UAS to attain and remain 
airborne.30 This is important since it is the ability to stay airborne that determines a 
UAS’ range of operations.31 High endurance UAS such as Global Hawk has capacity 
to be used in far off areas of between 1,500 and 2,200 kilometres away. The medium 
range UAS are the most common types of UAS, with an endurance of about 24 
hours and a range of 100 to 400 kilometres. Examples of medium range UAS are 
the Shadow 600 or the Predator.32 The last category is the low endurance that can 
stay airborne for only 5 hours or less. Ideally, a higher endurance translates to a 
commensurate operational range. 
 
 
                                                          
30 Shawn G and Renaud J “Optimized unmanned aerial vehicle with wing morphing for extended 
range and endurance’ 2002 Symposium on Multidisciplinary Analysis and Optimization 668. 
31 Shawn G and Renaud J “Optimized” 668. 
32  The UAS was manufactured by General Atomic. 
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This classification is critical when a UAS has to be used for a mission that is far from 
the launch site.33 The depth of the challenges and concerns that come with the use 
of UAS obviously has a bearing on how long the UAS can be airborne. As such, 
lawmakers and policymakers around the areas of UAS use and operations should 
consider the parameter. 
Table 2 below summarizes the information on different types of classification by 
endurance: 
Designation Endurance Range Example 
High Endurance  Above 24 hours Between 1,500 










Low Endurance Less than 5 hours Less than 100 km Pointer 
Table 2: Classification by endurance 
 
3.3 Classification by Maximum Altitude 
Altitude is the vertical distance between a reference datum to the point or location 
of UAS.34  UAS in general have a maximum operational altitude, which is the highest 
altitude within which a UAS would operate optimally.35 Flight ceiling is an important 
performance criterion in the context of its applications. Those who fly below that are, 
generally, called low altitude UAS, also known as micro-UAS.36 Ordinarily, military 
UAS would require low visibility to ensure that they avoid detection by adversaries.37 
                                                          
33 Xiao-yd HU “Development of High-Altitude Long Endurance UAV Propulsion Technology” 2006 
Gas Turbine Experiment and Research 4. 
34 Adam W et al “Remote Sensing” 1614. 
35 DeGarmo M Issues Concerning Integration 11. 
36 Thomas P et al “UAS traffic management (UTM) concept of operations to safely enable low altitude 
flight operations” in Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) (16th 
AIAA Conference on Aviation Technology Integration and Operations Conference 3 June 
2016) 3292.  
37 Thomas P et al “Traffic Management” 3292. 
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For that matter, UAS that can operate at high altitude is preferred for military 
operations. UAS operations such as reconnaissance or imaging similarly require 
high altitude as it provides a better chance of making high quality pictures.38  
 
As Watts et al rightly states, there are three categories of UAS based on the 
parameter of maximum altitude.39 The first category comprises low altitude UAS, 
which has capacity to fly up to an altitude of 100 metres. This category of UAS is 
purely experimental. The second category under this classification is the medium 
altitude UAS with a maximum altitude of 1,000 to 10,000 metres. The last category 
is the high altitude UAS, that can fly over 10,000 metres and better suited for 
reconnaissance and imaging. 
 
Table 3 below summarizes categories of UAS under classification by maximum 
altitude:  
Designation Maximum   Altitude Examples 
Low altitude Below 1,000 m Dragon Eye 
Medium altitude Between 1,000-10,000 m Finder 
High altitude Above 10,000 m Darkstar 
                                         Table 3: Classification by altitude40 
 
3.4 Classification by Endurance and Altitude 
This classification scheme combines endurance and altitude parameters as 
separately explained above. Generally, classification by endurance and altitude 
comprises nine categories of UAS. The categories are Handheld, Close, NATO 
                                                          
38 Thomas P et al “Traffic Management” 3292. 
39 Adam W et al “Remote Sensing” 1614. 
40 Adam W et al “Remote Sensing” 1614. 
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type, Tactical, Medium Altitude Long Endurance, High Altitude Long Endurance, 
Hypersonic, Orbital, and CIS Lunar Earth-Moon Transfer.41 
 
The nine categories of UAS differ in terms of endurance and altitude, with an 
increase along numerical expression from low altitude to low endurance. Handheld 
have an altitude of 2,000 feet or 600 metres, with a range of 2 km.42 The close type 
has an altitude of 5,000 feet or 1,500 metres and a range of up to 10 kilometres. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) type UAS, has an altitude of up to 
10,000 feet or 3,000 metres with a range of 160 kilometres.  Medium Altitude Long 
Endurance UAS has an altitude of up to 30,000 feet or 9,000 metres and a range of 
over 200 km.43 High Altitude Long Endurance UAS has an altitude of over 30,000 
feet with an indefinite range of distance.44  Hypersonic types are high speed UAS, 
further classified into supersonic and hypersonic. Supersonic UAS have speeds of 
between Mach 1-5, while Hypersonic UAS have speeds of beyond Mach 5.45 
Hypersonic UAS have altitudes of 50,000 feet or 15,200 metres or suborbital altitude 
with a range of over 200km. Orbital UAS have a low earth orbit altitude with speeds 
of beyond Mach 25.46  
 
The table below summarizes the categories of the UAS in terms of endurance and 
altitude.  
Category Range Altitude 
Handheld 2 km range 2,000 Ft (600 m) 
CLOSE Up to 10 km range 5,000 Ft. (1,500 m)  
                                                          
41  Peterson ME “The UAV and the current and future regulatory construct for integration into the 
national airspace system” 2006 Journal of air law and commerce 522-551. 
42 DeGarmo M Issues Concerning Integration 11. 
43 DeGarmo M Issues Concerning Integration 11. 
44 DeGarmo M Issues Concerning Integration 11. 
45 Freeman NC “On the theory of hypersonic flow past plane and axially symmetric bluff bodies” 
1956 JFM 366-387. 
46 DeGarmo M Issues Concerning Integration 12. 
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NATO type About 160 km range 10,000 Ft. (3,000m)  
Tactical - - 
MALE Over 200 km range Up to 30,000 Ft. (9,000 
m) 
HALE Indefinite range Over 30,000 Ft. 
HYPERSONIC Over 200 km, 50,000 Ft. (15,200 m) or 
suborbital altitude 
ORBITAL  Over Mach 25 Low earth orbit 
CIS Lunar Earth Moon Transfer 
                          Table 4: Classification by range and altitude 
 
3.5 Classification by Wing Loading Capacity 
Wing loading capacity is the capacity of the total area of an UAS that is divided by 
the area of the wing often measured in Ounce square foot.47 UAS classification by 
wing loading capacity comprises three categories: low, medium and high. The 
formula for arriving at the wing loading capacity is as shown below: 
 
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑾𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒂𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚 = 𝑼𝑨𝑽 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑾𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 (𝒌𝒈)/ 𝑨𝑽 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑾𝒊𝒏𝒈 
𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒂 (𝒎2) 
UAS with wing loading capacity of below 50 kg/𝑚2 are considered to be of low 
loading, while those with wing loading capacity of between 50 kg/𝑚2 and 100 kg/m2 
are considered to be of medium loading capacity. UAS with wing loading capacity 
                                                          
47 J Thomas et al ‘AirSTAR: A UAV platform for flight dynamics and control system testing’ (2006) 
(25th AIAA Aerodynamic Measurement Technology and Ground Testing Conference) 3307. 




of over 100 kg/𝑚2 are high loading capacity.  Table 5 below summarizes the various 
categories of high and low loading capacity for UAS.  
 
Designation Wing loading kg/𝑚2 Examples 
Low Loading Capacity Below 50 hours Predator B 
Medium Loading 
Capacity 
Between 50-100 hours Silver Fox 
High Loading Capacity Above 100 hours Pointer 
                           Table 5: Classification by wing loading capacity. 
 
3.6 Classification of Military UAS 
Military UAS is a type of UAS, which is used to support operational, tactical and 
strategic operations of the military.48 UAS have been used for military applications 
since the Second World War. For example, in 2005, application of UAS for military 
onslaught in Iraq reached 100,000 flight hours. This creates another classification 
scheme that relates to the various roles of the mission as well as the size and 
capability of the military UAS. They include micro-aerial vehicles, local area support 
vehicles, tactical area support vehicles, and theatre area support vehicles.49 These 
classifications of military UAS are dependent upon the environment, which 
determines the level of autonomy and capacity of manoeuvrability required for 
purposes of accomplishing the mission at hand.50 
 
                                                          
48 Vachtsevanos GV and Valavanis KP “Military and civilian unmanned aircraft” 102. 
49 http://www.nasa.gov (Date of use: 9 October 2019) 
50 http://de.calameo.com (Date of use: 9 October 2019). 
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3.7 Other Classifications 
According to Arjomandi’s panoptical views, there are other parameters for 
classification of UAS such as engine, which further yields various categories such 
as Turbofans, two strike, Piston Rotary, Turboprop, Push and Pull, Electric and 
Propeller. These categories do not fall under the classifications cited above.51 The 
other possible parameters are based on power or thrust loading, which is defined 
by the amount of weight a UAS can lift.52 It is, however, different from the parameter 
of performance arrived at by calculating the ratio between the thrust and its weight. 
 
The import of the above highlighted classifications inevitably suggests that any 
effective UAS regulatory framework must not only focus on omnibus prohibitions 
and prescriptions. Instead, such a framework ought to be comprehensive to cater 
for differences in the weight load, performance capacities, and use among others. 
For instance, use of the UAS for strategic military operations raises more security 
issues. In addition, UAS that are more likely to fly at a high-altitude risk exposing the 
citizenry to possible intrusion into their privacy. Subsequent chapters shall analyse 
how international law and some domestic frameworks have tried to cause a 
distinction in regulation of the different classes of UAS. 
 
4. Brief History of UAS   
Apart from the discussion on the various classifications of the UAS, the history of 
manned aircraft and UAS is useful to the study as it informs the invention and 
development of air transport and aircraft. Since the invention of the first manned 
aircraft by the Wright Brothers in 1903, unprecedented leaps have been made in the 
aviation industry. The development of UAS use, which was originally preceded by 
scepticism, has surged especially after the impetus given by the nature of World 
War I, during and after the war into the Cold War era up until now. 
                                                          
51 http://de.calameo.com (Date of use: 9 October 2019). 




4.1 Early History of Manned Aircraft 
The idea of flying has intrigued man since the beginning of civilization.53  That 
humans could fly was first contemplated more than 2,500 years ago in Greece and 
China.54 Pythagoras and Archimedes conceptualized studies on autonomous 
mechanisms for various applications. Archytas from the city of Taranta created the 
earliest known and recorded flying machine or Tarentum in Southern Italy, known 
as Archytas or Tarentine,55 and in 425 BC, became the first engineer to build a 
mechanical landing craft, which flew for about 200 metres.56 
 
During the same era, the Chinese documented the idea of a vertical flight aircraft. 
For many years, the Chinese had experimented with many flying machines like hot 
air balloons, rockets and kites. In 1483, Leonardo da Vinci designed an aircraft 
capable of hovering, controlled by its aerial screw or gyroscope.57  Later on, in 1508, 
da Vinci developed a mechanical bird with ability to flap its wings.58  Over two 
centuries later, the first hot air balloon flew in 1782. The balloon was designed by 
the Montgolfier Brothers and was considered the first unmanned flight. Many more 
flying aircraft were developed in the period 1860 to 1909, initially focusing on vertical 
take-off and landing craft arising from limitations posed by the steam engine. 
 
In the 18th Century, there was general scepticism that man could fly through the air 
with equipment that was heavier than air. In 1895, Lord Kelvin commented that flight 
with machines that were heavier than the air was impossible. Thomas Edison, who 
held similar views, was convinced that possibilities of the airplane had been 
exhausted and that humanity ought to turn elsewhere in innovation.59 Apart from the 
                                                          
53 DeGarmo M Issues Concerning Integration 4. 
54 DeGarmo M Issues Concerning Integration 3. 
55 DeGarmo M Issues Concerning Integration 12. 
56 DeGarmo M Issues Concerning Integration 12. 
57 http://www.hiller.org/ (Date of use: 19 June 2016). 
58 DeGarmo M Issues Concerning Integration 12. 
59 DeGarmo M Issues Concerning Integration 1. 
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impossibility presented by authors of the 18th century, others, such as Simon 
Newcomb, believed that the purported flights were not practical and, if anything, 
insignificant.60 With this scepticism, it was apparent that the end of the 18th Century 
was marked with uncertainty as to whether manned aircraft were needed in the 
airspace and whether the aviation industry meant anything to humanity. 
 
The uncertainty was only tucked in the early days of the 20th Century.  On 17 
December 1903, the world witnessed a remarkable event, by way of the first manned 
aircraft flight by the Wright Brothers.61 The flight, which took place at Kitty Hawk, 
North Carolina, set in motion mechanisms aimed at improving transportation, 
comfort, capability for pilots, as well as safety in the industry.62 This was a historic 
moment because other than its pioneering role, it kick-started a long journey for the 
aviation industry culminating in the diverse entity it has become today.63  It put to 
rest the issue of uncertainty, which was cultivated by the authors in the 18th Century. 
Since then, the use of unmanned aircraft has reached unprecedented levels. 
 
4.2 Development of UAS  
Unlike development in the use and operation of the manned aircraft, the 
development of UAS has been largely associated with wars or military campaigns, 
testing and part of weaponry tools.64 They have also been comparatively more 
spontaneous.65 The first recorded use of UAS was in 1871, when the Austrian army 
dropped bombs in Venice, Italy, using unmanned balloons.66 Current trends in UAS 
technologies, however, trace their origin to the First World War.67 More development 
took place during the inter-war years between 1918 and 1939, the Second World 
                                                          
60 DeGarmo M Issues Concerning Integration 1. 
61 Klaus RA Development of a Sense and Avoid System for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (MS 
Thesis Brigham Young University 2013) 3761. 
62 Wright W “The Wright Brothers’ Aeroplane” 1916 TAJ 100-106. 
63 Wright W “Aeroplane” 1916 TAJ 104. 
64 Suraj GG, Ghonge MM, and Jawandhiya M “Review of unmanned aircraft system (UAS)” 2013 
IJARCET 1646-1658. 
65 Suraj GG, Ghonge MM, and Jawandhiya M “Review” 1651. 
66 Michaelides-Mateou et al, “Flying into the Future with UAVs: The Jetstrea Flight” 2014 ASL 113. 
67 Keane JF and Carr SS “A Brief History of Early Unmanned Aircraft” 2013 JHAPLTD 558-571. 
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War, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. There was further use of UAS in the 
Yom Kippur War of 1969, the Egypt-Israeli War of 1973, the first and second Persian 
Gulf Wars and the war against terror in Afghanistan.68  
 
During the First World War, the focus of unmanned aircraft system technology was 
on manufacture of aerial torpedoes.69 The Korean War also involved 
experimentation in missions, sensors and munitions to enable strikes and 
reconnaissance for military commanders. Subsequently, in the 1950s, there was a 
shift towards development of cruise missile and UAS.70 The use of UAS, however, 
highlighted two major weaknesses. First, the crew was unable to launch and recover 
the UAS as upon striking the target, it was destroyed instantaneously. The second 
challenge was difficulty of stabilizing the UAS while airborne.71 These challenges 
necessitated further development of UAS with better abilities and modern 
technology into what we see today. 
 
5. Current and Potential Use of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) 
The history of use of UAS shows that early traditional uses were confined to warfare. 
Subsequent developments, from the 1910s to date, evidence an increase in 
deployment of the UAS, not only for warfare, but also for varied military reasons, 
such as intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance, border patrol, counter-
terrorism operations, and airstrikes.72 Progressively, there has been an upsurge in 
the use of unmanned aircraft systems in civilian aviation for research, crowd control 
and homeland or internal security. The history of military use of UAS, therefore, 
continues to operate alongside the civilian use.  
                                                          
68 Cole C Drone Wars Briefing (Drone Wars UK Oxford 2012) 558-571. 
69 Cole C Briefing 569. 
70 Fahrney DS and RADM U “The Birth of Guided Missiles” (Paper delivered at Conference of US 
Naval Institute December 1980) 54–60. Cruise missile refers to a one-way lethal munitions 
designed to strike specific targets. 1980. 
71 Cole C Briefing 564. 
72 Koldaev A and Sokut S “Russia Military Conservatism in Relation to Industry” 2005 UAV 




Owing to the increase in civilian uses, UAS have potential to be used in missions 
that are not conducive or safe for human beings (pilots) to operate in. As Koldaev 
correctly notes, these missions have certain chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear properties which present difficulties in their use.73 It is what he summarizes 
as “dull, dirty and difficult missions.”74 In its analysis, this thesis adopts Koldaev’s 
distinction on the missions due to its convenience in highlighting peculiar safety, 
security and privacy issues that arise from each category of the missions. It is no 
doubt that the paradigm shift in use, operation sizes and, consequently, mission 
have deepened the concerns about safety, security, and privacy. 
 
5.1 Dull Operations 
Dull operations can be defined as operations, which would be shunned by human 
for reasons of being boring.75 UAS are preferable for use in dull operations because 
of their virtual ability to operate for long missions and to observe risk incidences to 
the tune of about 30 to 40 hours.76  These tasks can be automated if need be, as 
they only require oversight rather than continuous and consistent human presence. 
The tasks comprise observations of patterns of life, surveillance of fixed locations, 
support of services over electronic warfare, relaying communication and aerial 
refuelling.77 They could also raise other complex and sensitive tasks that are unlikely 
to be undertaken by a simple task platform.78  
 
                                                          
73 Koldaev A and Russia S “Military Conservatism” 100. 
74 Koldaev A and Russia S “Military Conservatism” 100. 
75 Judson J “Future Unmanned aircraft to do the ‘dull’ and ‘dangerous’ work” 2018-3-26 Defence 
News. https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/global-force-
symposium/2018/03/26/future-unmanned-aircraft-to-do-the-dull-and-dangerous-work/ (Date 
of use: 22 December 2019). 
76 Office of the Secretary of Defense “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027” 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai (Date of use:18 October 2017). 
77 Gupta SG “Review” 1646.  
78 Gupta SG “Review” 1646. 
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One of the most common dull operation is the internal security and border control. 
Further, UAS have a potential to be used in civilian tasks like internal/ homeland 
security, monitoring of the coastline and the provision of security in public 
gatherings. This operation is evident in the US. After the terrorist attack of 11 
September 2001, surveillance became a critical issue for UAS,79 particularly for 
State institutions that require constant surveillance. Accordingly, the US patrol is 
operated under the Customs and Border Protection, along the border with Mexico 
and Canada.80 The UAS is preferred for ability of some UAS to carry out about 30 
hours’ monitoring mission, which requires services of up to 10 manned helicopters.81  
 
In the US still, the use of technology to secure and monitor coastlines has been 
applied to enhance border patrol along the US coastline for a long time now. For 
example, the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper is used along the Arizona-Mexico 
border to isolate not only persons entering the country illegally, but also those 
involved in smuggling.82 Growth of insecurity from terrorism as illustrated by the 9/11 
debacle increased demand for UAS. In the US as stated earlier, the use of UAS for 
security purposes is restricted to customs and border surveillance on the US/Mexico 
and US/Canada borders. For customs and border protection, Predator has filled 
gaps in surveillance where the terrain is difficult.83 
 
The services offered include sustained border coverage, which has significantly 
reduced risks of fatigue and harm to border agents.84 They are equipped with 
infrared and high-resolution imaging equipment have been used to monitor drug 
smuggling along the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of El-Salvador. Unmanned aircraft 
                                                          
79 Padgett T “Using Drones in the Drug War’ 2012-6-8 Time http://www.time.com (Date of use: 15 
October 2017).    
80 Haddal CC and Gertler J Homeland Security: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Border 
Surveillance (Library of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service 2010) 
8. 
81 Haddal CC and Gertler J Homeland Security 8. 
82 Customs and Border Protection Agency “U.S. Customs and Border Protection UAS Overview’’ 
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systems are also deployed by law enforcement agencies for purposes of facial 
recognition forward-looking infrared imaging.85 UAS help the police respond to 
emergencies, conduct surveillance, search and rescue especially during bad 
weather; as well as traffic monitoring, nuclear, biological and chemical sensing and 
tracking.86 
 
Another possible dull mission is agricultural monitoring. Unmanned aircraft systems 
technology has a role to play in agriculture, such as monitoring soil erosion, crop 
maturity, frost mitigation and application of fertilizers.87 In Japan, for example, 
robotic helicopters attached to UAS are used to monitor more than 10% of that 
country’s rice farms, driven by the Fuji Heavy Industry. Yamaha has also developed 
UAS that is used in chemical spraying, with more than 8,000 pilots in 2007.88  
 
UAS are chosen for such missions because of their efficiency in image-taking. This 
is so since UAS can also fly pre-determined flight paths and take accurate pictures 
of target flight.89 Accordingly, high-resolution vineyards and coffee field images that 
show crop maturity have been developed using UAS.90  The efficiency results from 
UAS’ use of technologies that include airborne platforms, thermal infrared imaging 
technology, and data telemetry. Others are development of algorithms that track 
tagged wild animals as well as monitor wildlife inventory.91 
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Secondly, the use of UAS can be comparatively cheaper. There is evidence that 
UAS have helped farmers detect crop growth and blight at a cost that is 25-50% 
less than that of fixed wing aircraft.92 Consequently, farmers are able to save money, 
time and resources. All these show the potential of UAS in agriculture and wildlife 
conservation. 
 
Thirdly, UAS can be used for scientific research. The research often requires data 
to be collected over long periods. Specific types of UAS fixed with advanced 
technological systems are preferred for the research due to their high endurance 
capacity.93 In comparison to satellites, UAS have superior sensor capabilities 
suitable for collecting data.94 They are able to collect atmospheric data in air 
columns using inbuilt instruments, thus offering a broad basis of data than could be 
collected using satellite.95 These added advantages have enabled humans to gain 
insights into atmospheric science that was previously thought to be the preserve of 
science fiction. This potential, however, is only realizable if UAS is fully integrated 
into existing civil aviation legal and policy framework. In the words of Ali Mazrui, it is 
safe to state that:  
“Globalization is much more than the Information Superhighway and the new 
expansion of international markets. Globalization consists of all the forces, 
which are pushing the world towards becoming a global village. Globalization 
is the villagization of the globe.”96 
 From this perspective, therefore, the UAS technologies are here to stay and States 
must adopt it for the benefit of humankind in scientific research.  
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Fourthly, dull missions may take the form of environmental monitoring. UAS have 
become pivotal in complementing existing satellite installations to increase capacity 
for monitoring climatic, and specifically, rainfall patterns.97 They are equally useful 
in navigating environments that are dangerous to human beings, such as volcanic 
activities.98 This capacity for measurement of geophysical processes that relate to 
natural hazards, such as aerosols, gas levels in the clouds, changes in the ozone 
layer, pollution, quality of air, water vapour, composition of vegetation, and coral 
reefs, is unrivalled. They are also used in monitoring emissions, which pollute the 
ozone layer, oxygen and carbon dioxide levels in the clouds, soil moisture, extreme 
weather observation, and forecasting.99 
 
5.2 Dirty Missions  
A dirty mission is a mission that is chemically contaminated or has potential of 
radioactivity.100 Potential of use of UAS in dirty missions results from its preference 
at times of peace and in hostile environments that are unsuitable for manned 
aircraft. For example, after an atomic bomb was dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
in Japan during the World War II, use of manned flights would have been impossible 
due to the risk of exposure to radioactive materials that cause grievous harm to 
different life forms. Admittedly, sampling and observation of chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear weapons is best suited for the unmanned aircraft system 
so long as it is fitted with appropriate sensors, with a choice of either small and 
portable systems for local tactical use, or large aircraft sized systems for global 
monitoring purposes.101  With regard to civilian use, fire brigades apply UAS to 
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locate fires in remote areas or those with huge smokes and flames. In such cases, 
it makes it possible and convenient for successful approach and containment.102 
 
5.3 Dangerous Missions 
Dangerous missions can be defined as missions that enter airspaces of conflict or 
spaces with contestations.103 In military terms, a dangerous mission refers to one 
that may be used to suppress an enemy’s air defense.104  Operations, such as 
reconnaissance in enemy territory, are dangerous in the sense that they could 
expose manned aircraft to unnecessary risk. Thus, unmanned aircraft systems are 
preferred for such missions. Consequently, less expensive UAS are used to destroy 
enemy positions or force the enemy to expend a large number of missiles.105 The 
potential for UAS to replace dangerous missions, such as delivery of tactical 
supplies and identification of improvised explosive devices, is therefore unlimited 
owing to increase in areas in which manned aircraft would be unsuitable for use 
owing to the obvious risks to human life. 
 
6. Civilian Application of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
From the above analysis, it is clear that UAS has been emerging as a new 
evolutionary component to civil aviation, thus offering innovative and exciting 
opportunities for day-to-day operations. Some of the available solutions to 
humankind are identified above. These include management and prevention of 
disasters, fire-fighting missions106 as well as real time assessment of extent of 
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damages.107 For example, during the 2010 Haiti earthquake, UAS were used for 
long hours to collect data on the disaster.108 With such gathered information, 
especially by the aid of high-resolution photography, it was possible to locate ideal 
areas for landing and take-off by response teams. Another example is when in 2011, 
UAS known as High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) were used to fly over the 
Fukushima Daichi Nuclear Plant in Japan to assess the extent of damage after the 
country was hit by a tsunami.109 
 
Further, the UAS’ emerging role in inspections and border controls, scientific 
research, environmental and agricultural monitoring cannot be gainsaid. In Kenya, 
for example, actual attempts have been made to have UAS integrated in tracking 
cattle, directing security personnel and surveillance to locate rustlers and stolen 
cattle.110 
 
Accordingly, UAS applications and uses have become an integral part of the life of 
citizens. This obviously draws from the importance of their role in gathering 
information and ability to be used in salvaging shipwrecks, airplane crashes or 
victims, which are common occurrences of the 21st Century.111 Accordingly, if the 
UAS are well utilised and regulated, they could play a huge role in bridging the 
information and technological gaps that were traditionally considered 
insurmountable. 
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The need to be deliberate in the utilization and regulation of UAS is widened by the 
fact that most countries are gradually recognizing new and future activities for 
survey, mapping and other uses of UAS.112 Kenyan researchers, such as Mbote and 
Muruingi, project potential use of UAS in the mapping and surveying in areas that 
are far away from town.113 UAS is increasingly becoming an integral means of 
determining and surveying distribution of various species and habitat owing to its 
ubiquitous aerial activities. Through its activities, UAS can be used to plan, fly, 
visualize, process, and deliver various data, which is then essential for land 
mapping.114 Advanced UAS also utilize Global Positioning System, which uses 
baselines and records kinematic observation with a higher degree of accuracy in 
surveying and mapping as compared to traditional means. The UAS are also 
convenient for mapping due to their speed in data collection, collation and delivery.  
 
According to Bolebruch, UAS type mdLiDAR3000, for instance, is preferred for its 
ability to survey approximately four acres of land in just 18 minutes.115 This is a 
speed that normal ground survey cannot match. As such, UAS offer opportunity for 
potential achievement of the much needed security in any country’s property market. 
Chad’s position is affirmed by Bryan Phillip who observes, “UAS is a viable 
alternative to the traditional methods of land surveying owing to its capability and 
versatility.”116 In his thesis, he correctly concludes that the flight time for UAS is 
comparatively shorter when compared to traditional methods.117  
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7. Challenges of Integrating UAS into Civil Aviation  
The increase in civilian use and ownership of the UAS under different mission 
capabilities calls for an urgent need for their integration into civil aviation and 
regulation, especially owing to related technological developments. Rawich, for 
example, argues that the ongoing development and use of UAS shows that the law 
regulating UAS always lags behind technology.118 The statement is a pointer to 
related struggles in integrating UAS into the national airspace in different 
jurisdictions. 
 
Already, a positive step regarding recognition of the need for integration of UAS has 
been made. For instance, the ICAO Global Air Traffic Management Operational 
Concept recognizes that UAS is an aircraft according to Article 8 of the Chicago 
Convention. This view was subsequently endorsed by the 35th Session of the ICAO 
Assembly of 28 September to 8 October 2004. Ordinarily, therefore, one would 
expect the manned and unmanned aircraft to be integrated in the civil airspace.119  
 
Certain concerns, however, lead to segregation of the UAS in order to lessen 
dangers. Some challenges are practical. For example, the use of UAS for survey 
and mapping continues to encounter the challenges of the high cost associated with 
hiring such services and instances of bad weather, characterized with unclear 
visibility.120 This comes with the additional challenge of meeting the visual line of 
sight in expansive tracts of land. 
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Even more disturbing are safety, security, and privacy concerns, which were 
previously mild in the early usage of UAS during the First and Second World Wars, 
but have since been emboldened.121 As Yeonmin correctly notes, the emboldening 
results from, among others, obvious growth in agitation amongst the citizenry, 
legislation, and judicial interpretation.122 These agitations and developments are 
very well demonstrated in analysis of the domestic UAS laws of the United States, 
South Africa, and Kenya in chapters Four, Five and Six, respectively of this thesis.  
Despite these developments, prospects of growth in the use of UAS rates high 
owing to its ability to downsize risks and wade through missions that would 
otherwise be unfavourable to humans. 123 
 
7.1 Safety Challenges     
From the history of the use of UAS, it is clear that safety of manned and unmanned 
aircraft ought to be accorded similar importance. The laws on investigation of 
incidents should be similar to both types of aircraft.124 Owing to the differences in 
uses and design of the aircraft, the processes would, however, take different 
dimensions.125 For instance, while investigation in manned aircrafts would consider 
the embankment and disembankment of people, the one on UAS would be effective 
if it considered the opening and shutting of the primary propulsion system. 
 
The main safety challenge concerns the design of UAS and in particular sense and 
avoid. Instructively, safety management is defined, under ICAO Annex 19 and UAS 
Circular 328 –AN/190 under Clause 2.16, as being the state in which possibility of 
harm to persons or property damage is reduced and maintained at or below an 
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acceptable level through a continuous process of hazard identification and safety 
risk management. 
 
The design challenges arise from visual issues which can best understood via a 
comparative approach. For manned aircrafts, there is a wide range of laws that 
guide air traffic control, including use and maintenance of visual ranges. UAS, 
however, faces difficulties in ensuring safety, owing to difficulty in operating them in 
civilian airspace due to limited control and operational capacity.126 Further, UAS has 
unique characteristics in terms of size and performance that require turbulence 
avoidance criteria. UAS are designed with capacities based on the weight, that is, 
smaller or bigger. Some of the UAS have low loading capacity that can operate for 
more than 50 hours, while others can operate within a range of 2 kilometres under 
altitude of 2,000ft (600m).127 
 
Some have capability for indefinite range over 30,000 ft. Such differences provide 
challenges in cases where an operator is supposed to maintain visual sight of the 
UAS and yet it has ability to go beyond visual sight. This means that the ground 
UAS operator might not avoid air collusion or be in control of the safety of other air 
or ground operators. 
 
Sense and avoid capability of the UAS refer to the capability of an aircraft to remain 
well clear from, and avoid collisions with, other airborne traffic.128 In respect to 
manned aircraft, it is the ability of the pilot operating the instrument to observe flight 
rules or visual flight rules required and to manoeuvre to avoid another aircraft and 
circumvent air accidents.129 Sense and avoid provides functions of self-separation 
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and collision avoidance to establish an analogous capability required by manned 
aircraft.130  
 
This challenge is unique for UAS. For manned aircraft, Sense-and-Avoid system 
already exists in civil aviation, based on a transponder concept known as global 
navigation satellite system.131 This is a communication, navigation and surveillance 
system capable of calculating own position while transmitting the same information 
to other units within the vicinity.132 This information is what is used in collision 
avoidance. The global navigation satellite system transponder is critical for 
separation and avoidance, pilot-in-command and autonomous operation.133 The 
system has successfully been used by both civilian and military UAS. These 
technical developments are necessary for all UAS to achieve successful integration 
into civilian use. 
 
Conversely, to meet operational requirements, UAS should be able to meet 
standards of manned aircraft, such as Sense and Avoid capability, radar, visual 
sighting, separation standards and pilot behaviour, which are combined for safe 
operation of manned aircraft. Unlike manned aircraft, Sense and Avoid technologies 
for UAS are immature and undeveloped, meaning that standards would have to be 
developed to match those of manned aircraft in order to harmonize integration of 
UAS into civil aviation.134 This is despite the fact that UAS are increasingly reporting 
adoption of Sense and Avoid technology. 
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Safety concerns during the use of civilian UAS are of utmost priority especially for 
airspace that is not segregated. The requirements for an effective collision 
avoidance mechanism as well as a Sense and Avoid mechanism cannot be over-
emphasized.135 With such a facility, a pilot in command would easily access 
information to facilitate collision avoidance. Pilots in command also require technical 
assistance to enable them detect and avoid collision similar to what a manned 
aircraft uses in accordance with virtual flight rules.136 This would help in ensuring 
safety for all concerned and if all fails, an automatic system should take over to 
ensure collision avoidance. The technical assistance given to the pilot for purposes 
of Sense and Avoid would enable the UAS pilot-in-command to maintain visual 
meteorological conditions, detect conflicting traffic, while interacting with conflicting 
traffic in accordance with the right-of-way rules and ensure automatic collision 
avoidance in the event of loss of control data-link.137 Despite these challenges, the 
potential for civilian UAS use is on the rise. This is informed by the relative 
advantages held by UAS over manned aircraft. However, for full integration, more 
needs to be done to improve safety of the UAS, other aircraft and property on the 
ground.138 
 
One of the areas that seems to require the law to quickly follow technology is 
adherence to Annex 2 of the Chicago Convention.139 According to the Annex, all 
aircraft must bear nationality and registration marks of a contracting State. However, 
some contracting States do not have specific regulations that address unique 
characteristics of UAS. The condition persists, despite the fact that UAS by nature 
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may fly across boundaries of different States. This is because the Chicago 
Convention was adopted with manned aircraft in mind and did not envisage 
application of UAS in civil aviation.  
 
Another concern is that development of UAS technologies was not made in 
contemplation of airworthiness standards. For that matter, material property, 
structure design standards, decision reliability standards, and other requirements, 
would need to be evaluated in line with civil airworthiness standards for manned 
aircraft. As currently constituted, UAS operations are done according to 
performance characteristics totally at variance with manned aircraft. This is with 
respect to size, speed, or other flight capabilities. 
 
Similarly, some UAS are incapable of providing the benefit of Sense and Avoid 
technology that remains an important defence against mid-air collisions.140 Although 
the concept of ‘Sense and Avoid’ is not expressly provided for in ICAO regulations, 
it is noted that UAS should exercise vigilance in detecting circumstances that would 
lead to collisions because some of them lack automated collision avoidance 
systems.141  
 
Owing to the design issues and characteristics, UAS pose a challenge to global 
regulators since international civil aviation law is based on concepts of safety and 
security in civil aviation that depend on a pilot operating an aircraft from within.142 
The way UAS are designed, removal of a pilot, as is the case, causes significant 
operational, technical, legal and operational challenges.143 This calls for States to 
urgently introduce legislation that allow integration of unmanned aircraft into civil 
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aviation. Majority of contracting State parties to the Chicago Convention, of 1944 
that are supposed to provide flight information lack policies and regulations that 
address challenges of UAS, such as safety of other airspace users.  
 
7.2 Security Challenges 
ICAO Annex 17 defines civil aviation security as a concept of safeguarding 
international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. Another danger is 
the potential of UAS falling into the hands of criminals, posing real vulnerability to 
national security.144 For example, with UAS, terrorists are able to launch more 
precise attacks. Although security and safety under ICAO are provided under 
Annexes 17 and 19, respectively, there is a close correlation between the two since 
they concern damage and hazards. In fact, it has been touted by some authors that 
divorcing the two makes the airspace insecure. However, while safety is concerned 
with the design issues raised by the sense and avoid technology, the security 
concerns external acts caused by individual, legal persons or other States as threat 
to the UAS or its operators.   
 
The security threats are faced as a result of a number of reasons regarding the 
nature and use of UAS. First, the potential uses of UAS in security such as 
communications, imaging and monitoring pose security threats. Ordinarily, proper 
security in the use of UAS is achieved when a pilot is able to ensure interconnection 
between unmanned aircraft and a control system. Unlike most aeroplanes that have 
compartments for flight crew that can monitor security, UAS are more exposed to 
sabotage and interference without the knowledge of the host State. Secondly, the 
UAS are less restricted in their nature compared to manned aircraft. According to 
Kine, it is this restriction, together with limited inspection, coupled with its ubiquity 
that leaves it more exposed to possible cases of intrusion, and interference. Even 
ICAO, which administers the Chicago Convention, recognizes these as serious 
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integration challenges, hence development of the ICAO Circular on Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems in 2011 to help address this.145 
 
Thirdly, unlike manned aircraft, whose areas for landing and take-off are easier to 
determine and control, UAS differ in the systems they employ for take-off and 
landing. Some take off in a vertical gradient like helicopters, others are hand-
launched, while others are dispatched from remote stations such as high seas.  
Whereas this versatility enables them to be launched from almost any location, it 
creates a security concern as they could be used as conveyors of dangerous 
substances, including chemical and biological weapons. The concern over 
technological advances, especially in controlling these gadgets once licensed, has 
led to reluctance in freely licensing them due to security threats. 146 
 
Fourthly, maintaining security generally becomes a challenge for UAS operations 
due to its expanded uses and operations. As for military uses, the challenge is 
maintenance of the air traffic control systems and exclusion of classified information. 
For civil uses, the history and development in uses and expansion of classification 
with different weights and performance capabilities present security challenges of 
collision and, thus, potential air traffic accidents, some intentionally targeting 
manned aircraft.147 
 
Regarding its nature and scope, the UAS’ security challenges are posed to citizenry, 
States and the international community. These challenges border on policy, 
guidance, and regulation. An effective regulation system, whether at national, 
regional and international level must, therefore, ensure security of ground control 
station and data link. Based on the above exposition, it is clear that the security 
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challenges principally arise from lack of command and control and unmanned traffic 
control. Policies for integration UAS should therefore address the two issues by 
detailing controlling of pilot station, biometric access to aircraft, minimum-security 
standards, data and communication links, among others. Despite these, there 
continues to be challenges regarding the two issues.   
 
7.2.1 Lack of Command and Control System  
Command and Control System is a technological system used by security forces to 
monitor and control movement of manned aircrafts. This system cuts across safety 
and security and has capacity to identify and destroy a manned aircraft while 
airborne in case they gain unauthorized access to another country.  Most of the UAS 
lack capability to connectivity of the pilots in command to the UAS.148 Lack of this 
capability brings to the fore security challenges to countries that may not have 
erected such installations. 
 
7.2.2 Lack of Unmanned Traffic Management  
Unmanned traffic management (UTM) is ideally a safety measure tool but cuts 
across security as well. It is an advanced traffic management ecosystem under 
development for autonomously controlled operations of UAS.149 It is a digital system 
that can monitor increased activity based on digital sharing of each operator's 
scheduled flight details in a digital form. Under the system, each user of an aircraft 
obtains a situational awareness of airspace, unlike what happens in today’s air traffic 
control.150 UTM works as a networked collection of services that communicate 
together based on common rules. Rather than relying on centralized control, these 
frameworks around the world will use the principle of distributed authority, which 
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opens up the system to more service providers who can adapt as the market evolves 
and needs change. The system is useful for collision avoidance as a safety measure 
and, additionally, plays a major role in providing security countermeasures.  
 
The UTM has the capability to detect where UAS’ command and control centre is 
located for tracing those that enter other countries’ territory.151 Unfortunately, most 
States do not have UTM systems installed for UAS within their jurisdictions to detect 
unauthorized entry of UAS. This makes such States vulnerable to external intrusion 
by UAS and interference without their knowledge, hence, infringing on State 
sovereignty. At the centre of regulation of aviation is the principle of State 
sovereignty, as affirmed in both the Chicago Convention, Article 1 and Article 2 of 
the United Nations Charter of 1945.  
 
In a nutshell, this challenge presents a paradox in the use of UAS as security tools 
and threats at the same time. This adds a novel perspective to regulation. The 
perspective is the delicate balance in regulatory framework for UAS. On one hand, 
the regulation should not be too restrictive to deny its role of being used as a security 
tool. On the other hand, it must not be too liberal to turn it into a security threat.  
 
7.3 Privacy Challenges in UAS Operations  
The UAS have capacity to use Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to take 
aerial photos. This coupled with the ability to fly above residential areas increases 
chances of taking photos containing confidential information without the consent of 
those on the ground. These systems can also be hacked in this era of increased 
cybercrime activities,152 and can lead to leakage of information on location, among 
                                                          
151 Prevot et al UAS traffic management (UTM) concept of operations to safely enable low altitude 
flight operations (Paper presented to the 16th AIAA Conference on Aviation Technology, 
Integration, and Operations Conference 2016) 3292. 
152 Zhi Y et al “Security and Privacy Issues of UAV: A Survey” 2020 MNA 95-101. 
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others. The effects on privacy may be devastating when the photos or information 
find their way into phone-based or computer-based social applications. 
 
For unmanned aircraft systems, the danger of privacy is much graver. Unlike 
manned aircraft that are not effective for dull operations, UAS, often preferred for 
such operations, potentially turn into privacy threats. One origin of such potential is 
their ability to fly at comparatively lower levels compared to the manned aircrafts. 
Accordingly, current and potential uses, such as filming and delivery of goods, could 
be turned into malicious uses that infringe on the right to privacy. A case in point is 
the admission by the FBI that it used UAS to follow up citizens’ protests in Baltimore 
in 2018.153 These ‘eyes in the sky’ have privacy implications owing to their intrusive 
nature. Historically, the kind of intrusion began in the 1960s with the use of 
reconnaissance UAS. Other than the capacity for dull operations, the privacy 
implications have been made graver with the UAS technology leading to cyber 
security, hacking or even cyber terrorism, which are threats to protection of personal 
data. 
 
Unlike safety and security issues that have largely been dominated by States owing 
to the potential effect on their sovereignty, privacy issues largely affect individual 
rights and agitations of civil societies. It is noteworthy that, as expected, most 
agitations have been in favour of embracing restrictive rules to widen enjoyment of 
privacy concerns. 
 
As a consequence of the persistence of the above occurrences, there has been a 
challenge in use of UAS and ensuring that they meet human rights standards under 
international law. Indeed, the United Nations system recognizes that member States 
must respect the peoples’ right to privacy. For instance, the Universal Declaration 
                                                          
153 INFOSEC “Beware of the drone! Privacy and security issues with drones” 
https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/privacy-and-security-issues-with-drones/#gref (Date 
of use: 23 December 2019). 
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of Human Rights154 offers protection from arbitrary interference with individual’s 
privacy, family, home or correspondence. This is further affirmed under Article 17 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).155 Article 5 of the 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man Article 11 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights156 both recognizes this right. Article 11 of the 
Convention provides for the States’ responsibility to protect the right of privacy in 
cases of surveillance.  
 
As for Africa, there are several instruments such as the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights, 1981 and Article 4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women which guarantee the right to 
life through which privacy right is guaranteed.157 Further, African regional economic 
communities, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
and Southern African Development Community (SADC), have made significant 
steps in promoting protection of the privacy of the people.158 The organizations have 
also entered into agreements on privacy of data as well as adoption of model 
laws.159 Specifically, SADC has come up with a model SADC Model Law on Data 
Protection,160 while ECOWAS has the Supplementary Act, both of which protect the 
peoples’ right to privacy.161 Explicitly, Article 19(1) of the Act provides that 
information, communication and technology systems should respect the privacy and 
liberties of citizens.162 On its part, EAC recognizes the principle of human rights as 
                                                          
154 UN General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
155 UN General Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 
March 1976). 
156 Rodriguez K, Hernandez V and Jara C “The Inter-American Legal Analysis: The 13 Principles and 
the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights” 
https://necessaryandproportionate.org/americas-legal-analysis (Date of use: 22 September 
2019). 
157 The Africa Union (AU) Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the 
Rights of Women of 21 July 2003 (entered into force 2005) (hereinafter referred to as the 
Maputo Protocol), Article 4(m).  
158 Mabika V “Privacy and Personal Data Protection Guidelines for Africa” 2018-8 ITU 
https://www.itu.int/en/ITUD/CapacityBuilding/Documents/IG_workshop_August 2018 
Presentations/Session%207_Verengai%20Mabika.pdf (Date of use: 30 September 2020).  
159 Graham G and Georges M “African regional privacy instruments: Their effects on harmonization” 
2014 PLBIR 19-21. 
160 The SADC Model Law on Data Protection of 2010. 
161 https://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/mar/ecowas-dp-act.pdf (Date of use: 2 September 2019). 
162 ECOWAS Supplementary Act of 2007, Article 19(1). 
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a fundamental and operational principle governing its integration.163 Respect to 
privacy is one such key right that is envisaged by the commitments.164 
 
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the spirit of these international 
frameworks promotes the position that respect for personal data is vital for the 
protection of human life. As such, the right to privacy forms the foundation of other 
rights, including the right of access to information, human dignity, and right to life. It 
is also related to the right to self-determination, which means the right to do what a 
person wants, including who to associate with. Important decisions are influenced 
by the protection of the right. This right is interconnected with security and safety 
concerns. First, while the right to privacy is often claimed by citizens, security and 
safety are always the first line of defence for the State. In most instances, the former 
is sacrificed at the altar of the latter. No wonder, States have been reluctant to 
uphold privacy, especially when it compromises State security and safety concerns. 
 
7.4 Other Challenges inhibiting Integrating UAS into Civil Airspace 
There are challenges that cannot be conveniently categorized under the three main 
ones already discussed above. First, absence of consensus on regulatory 
framework from a global front is a major obstacle to achieving full integration of UAS 
into civil aviation across several regions. The challenge is that ICAO, which is the 
UN’s specialized agency for regulation of aviation in the whole world, only provides 
materials and circulars to guide States to enact their own domestic UAS regulations.  
However, there continues to be enforcement setbacks, such as the inability to 
provide sanctions on member States, which have not implemented the guidelines in 
enacting UAS regulations.165 
                                                          
163 The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community of 1999 (entered into force 2000) 
(hereinafter referred to as the EAC Treaty 1999), Articles 6(d) and 7(2). 
164 Media Council of Tanzania an Others v Attorney General of the Republic of Tanzania App 5 EA 
2019 (EACJ). 
165 Marcontelli D and Douglas S https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverwyman/2018/09/10/why-the-use-




Secondly, there is general lack of effective data collection and sharing among States 
concerning UAS operation. This makes it difficult for States to share the data 
collected and disseminated by UAS, a situation that is perhaps compounded by lack 
of consensus on policy formulation and co-operation among neighbouring States. 
 
Thirdly, although States are required by ICAO to establish agencies responsible for 
civil aviation with mandate on oversight, such civil aviation authorities continue to 
lack sufficient manpower and mechanism to deter unauthorised or unlicensed 
operation of UAS.166 In addition, aviation personnel are not everywhere to monitor 
and prosecute those found to be in violation of the State’s aviation rules.  
 
8. Conclusion 
The development of UAS makes its integration into the civil airspace inevitable. 
There are potential applications in security and environmental surveillances, which 
further points to the extension of the need for its integration in future. The UAS uses, 
whether traditional or modern, can be conveniently classified as recreational, dull, 
dirty and dangerous operations. These operations greatly distinguish UAS 
operations and uses from those of manned aircraft. Moreover, manned aircraft have 
operations and uses that are less intrusive and have more elaborate laws governing 
specific aspects, such as traffic control, visual sighting, take-off and landing 
management, as well as Sense and Avoid technologies.  
 
Owing to the structural differences and versatility of UAS, there is bound to be 
safety, security, and privacy challenges that arise from use of UAS and its ultimate 
integration in the national airspace. Little attention, and sometimes, absence of 
                                                          




standards for the training of air traffic controllers on UAS, ineffective policy for data 
collection and information sharing and poor oversight, among others, raise  safety 
and security concerns that slow down the process of integration.  
 
Also noteworthy is the possible push and pull between governments, the 
international community, and civil societies in advocating for, and balancing, the 
safety, security and privacy concerns arising from use of UAS. For example, the 
human rights approach taken in furtherance of privacy concerns must compete with 
sovereignty of States, which is a cardinal principle of international relations 
recognized in the United Nations Charter of 1945. The battle of wits can take an 
interesting turn in cases of countries, such as the US, South Africa, and Kenya, 
where there is a guarantee of rights to security, safety and privacy in the national 
constitutions.  
 
The next chapter is dedicated to providing an overview of the international civil 
aviation law and institutional framework, with focus on how the international law has 




INTERNATIONAL LAW RESPONSE TO CHALLENGES IN UAS REGULATION 
1.  Introduction  
This chapter addresses the regulatory framework in international law for UAS, in 
particular how the international framework addresses the challenges identified in the 
previous chapter on safety, security and privacy. The chapter analyses the existing 
international legal and institutional frameworks applicable to civil aviation and those 
regulating UAS. The prevailing legal framework consists mainly of treaty law. The 
treaty law framework includes the Chicago Convention of 1944 and various 
decisions and instruments adopted by ICAO. Such instruments include Annexes to 
the Chicago Convention developed as Standards and Recommendations Practices 
(SARPs).  
 
In addition, analysis of other sources of law, including customary international law 
that complement the relevant international law, as set out in the treaties, is also 
discussed. As a roadmap, the analysis of the framework is made with a view to 
describing, assessing, and drawing conclusions on how the existing international 
legal structure has developed to address the threefold challenges of safety, security, 
and privacy issues in the field of civil aviation.  
 
2.  Background to International Law and Rules Applicable to Civil Aviation 
Architecture  
As an overview, the legal framework and principal conventional law on regulation of 
UAS at an international plane is the Chicago Convention. The Convention lays down 
the core principles for regulation of international air transport and addresses the 
concerns of security through Annex 17 and safety Annex 19.1 At the time of its 
adoption in 1944, the Chicago Convention envisaged the creation of a specialized 
                                                          
1 The Convention on Civil Aviation of 7 December 1944 15 UNTS 295 (entered into force 4 April 
1947) (hereinafter referred to as the Chicago Convention), Article 37 (a), (c), (e), (f) and (g). 
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institution, vested with support, advisory and organizational roles in achieving 
international cooperation.2 The need for such a body immediately became 
paramount and led to the establishment of Provisional ICAO in 1945, succeeded by 
ICAO, effective from 4  April 1947.3  
 
2.1 Overview of the Chicago Convention of 1944 
Since the Paris Convention of 1919, treaty law was the primary source of aviation 
law. As stated above, the principal conventional law governing aviation is the 
International Convention on Civil Aviation adopted in 1944, also known as the 
Chicago Convention that established ICAO. The Convention was adopted in 1944 
to replace the Paris Convention of 1919.  ICAO plays a pivotal role, since it is the 
conventional basis for dealing with aviation issues at international, regional, sub-
regional and State levels. 
 
From the commencement of the Convention, the principle of sovereignty under 
international law, safeguarding equality and mandate of States emerges as a 
fundamental right and obligation of every State. By the time the Chicago Convention 
was coming into effect in 1945, the new world order established under the United 
Nations in that year had reaffirmed the right to sovereignty, equality and territorial 
integrity of States. The principle was maintained in the Chicago Convention as 
articulated under Article 1, which provides that: 
 “Every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace 
above its territory”. Further, and in order to eliminate any ambiguity on 
definition of the State territory, Article 2 of the Convention defines the territory 
of each State to mean land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under 
the sovereignty suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State”.  
  
                                                          
2 The Chicago Convention, Article 43 provides for creation of ICAO and its and organs while Article 
44 outlines its objectives.  
3 https://www.icao.int/about icao/History/Pages/default.aspx (Date of use: 11 July 2020). 
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The relevant scope of the Chicago Convention is set out in Articles 3, 8, 9 and 12. 
The twofold nature of the Convention is worth noting. First, is the transboundary 
nature of the Convention, which emanates from the fact that aircraft move across 
boundaries of different States.  Secondly, Article 3 is instructive that it applies only 
to civil aircraft and not State aircrafts, which category also includes the military 
aircrafts. The excluded category of aircrafts is regulated by the rules of international 
humanitarian law as well as respective domestic laws of different countries. The 
delimitation of State aircrafts is necessary for avoidance of doubt since the 
Convention adopts a use-based approach in delimiting its scope of application to 
dedicated military rules. It is also possible that the distinction was made for 
convenience and to avoid complexity of laws due to the difference in functioning of 
the civil and military aircrafts. 
 
Regarding the civil aircraft, the Chicago Convention applies to both manned and 
unmanned aircraft. Similar to manned aircraft, UAS require special authorization to 
fly through the airspace of contracting States. The Convention is instructive, at 
Article 8, its substantive provisions apply to pilotless aircraft, which it refers to as 
‘aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot.’ The Article repeats the spirit of the 
provisions of Article 15 of the Paris Convention. Specifically, Article 8 of the Chicago 
Convention reads as follows: 
“No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot aircraft shall be flown 
without a pilot over the territory of a contracting State without special 
authorization by that State and in accordance with the terms of such 
authorization. Each contracting State undertakes to ensure that the flight of 
such aircraft without a pilot in regions open to civil aircraft shall be so 
controlled as to obviate danger to civil aircraft”. 
 
From the provision of Article 8, it is clear that the original intention of the drafters 
was to create a special authorization requirement for pilotless aircraft to operate. It 
is envisaged that such authorization is provided in each State’s rules and 
regulations. As such, it forms part of ‘the rules and regulations relating to the flight 
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and manoeuvre of aircraft’ for every aircraft as envisaged under Article 12 of the 
Convention, which provides as follows: 
 
“Each contracting State undertakes to adopt measures to ensure that every 
aircraft flying over or manoeuvring within its territory and that every aircraft 
carrying its nationality mark, wherever such aircraft may be, shall comply with 
the rules and regulations relating to the flight and manoeuvre of aircraft in 
force. Each contracting State undertakes to keep its own regulations in these 
respects uniform, to the greatest possible extent, with those established from 
time to time under this Convention. Over the high seas, the rules in force shall 
be those established under this Convention. Each contracting State 
undertakes to ensure the prosecution of all persons violating the regulations 
applicable”.4 
 
Accordingly, the reading of Article 8 together with Article 12 of the Convention, 
brings out two principal perspectives of the regulatory approaches and obligation of 
States under the Chicago Convention. First, it is now unequivocal that the 
Convention applies to the pilotless aircraft. Despite its existence since 1944, for 
some time, it was not clear whether other provisions of the Chicago Convention 
could apply to UAS. However, one may argue that this lacuna is cured by chapter 1 
of Annex 6 to the Convention regarding Operation of the Aircraft, which expands the 
definition of an aircraft to include, any machine that can derive support in the 
atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than reactions of the air against the 
earth’s surface. Presently, ICAO, through its Eleventh Air Navigation Conference of 
2003, has settled it that the Convention is applicable to the pilotless aircraft, which 
include UAS. 5   
 
The second perspective is that the Convention grants a wide discretion to States to 
make regulations regarding what, in their circumstances, would amount to a special 
authorization for flight and operation of pilotless aircraft. Despite the wide discretion, 
                                                          
4 The Chicago Convention, Article 12. 
5 https://www.icao.int/SAM/Documents/2003/ANCONF11SEM/ANConf11PREP_Ip03.pdf (Date of 
use: 24 December 2019). 
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the contracting States are still obligated to keep their own regulations in conformity 
with the rules established under the Chicago Convention to the greatest possible 
extent.  
 
Currently, enforcement of these rules and procedures by contracting States has 
been effective for manned aircraft due to coordinated communications to control 
towers. There has, however, been a challenge concerning unmanned aircraft 
systems since some of them are not identified by radar systems to allow effective 
enforcement applicability. It may, perhaps be attributed to admittedly lack, by the 
drafters of the Convention, of contemplation of more technological developments in 
respect of UAS. It is commendable, however, that the member States to the Chicago 
Convention contemplated future need for amendments of the Standards by ICAO 
from time to time and as may be necessary.6 In order to support effective 
implementation of the Chicago Convention, it states as follows in Article 37:  
“Each contracting State undertakes to collaborate in securing highest 
practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and 
organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services 
in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air 
navigation”.7 
 
Pursuant to Article 37 of the Convention, ICAO has developed 19 Annexes. The 
Convention’s provisions obligate contracting States to put in place local 
mechanisms to domesticate ICAO Annexes.8 The Convention further recognizes 
that implementation must be through establishment of civil aviation authorities by 
                                                          
6 The Chicago Convention, Article 37. 
7 The Chicago Convention, Article 37. 
8 Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation 9 ed, (2011) (hereinafter “ICAO Annex 
17). The ICAO Annex 17 provides that each State shall put measures in place in their 
respective States, example the under the general principals of ICAO Annex 17 dealing with 
aviation security it is provided under clause 2.1.2 of chapter two that: each Contracting State 
shall establish an organization and develop and implement regulations, practices and 
procedures to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference taking into 
account the safety, regularity and efficiency of flights. 
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the contracting States. The authorities are given mandate to provide legislative 
framework and oversight concerning airspace of their respective States.   
 
Before addressing additional substantive and normative aspects of the framework, 
the chapter will provide a descriptive analysis of the institutional framework 
underpinned by ICAO, also recognized under section 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice to regulate the security and safety aspects of UAS. 
The next part shall address the structure, including the organs, as well as the various 
decisions that ICAO makes which contribute to the strengthening of the normative 
framework. 
 
3. Institutional Framework of ICAO 
Having discussed the Chicago Convention as the specific international law and rules 
applicable to civil aviation, this section focuses on the relevant institutional 
framework under ICAO created by the Chicago Convention as a responsible entity 
to regulate and administer matters of civil aviation including UAS across the world.  
 
3.1 ICAO Instruments and Legal Status 
Before delving into the establishment functions and organs, it is important to 
understand the different instruments developed by ICAO. Currently, ICAO has a 
high ratification rate of 193 member States that develop SARPs which are 
documented as part of the Annexes to the Chicago Convention. Once documented, 
they become international standards. Pursuant to Article 37 of the Convention, State 
parties undertake to collaborate to ensure they achieve the ‘highest practicable 
degree’ of uniformity in the SARPs. The test of ‘highest practicable degree’ may 
prima facie be understood to give a leeway for States to opt-out of some of the 
Recommended Standards and Practices. Contextually, however, the same 
standards also apply to the binding rules of the air. Secondly, in ordinary meaning, 
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it is an obligation of the States to comply; deviations under Article 38 can only be 
done in good faith in accordance with the international rules of interpretation of 
treaties.9 Further, on this second rationale, the provision of Article 92 of the Chicago 
Convention unequivocally invites States to which it is open for ratification, to adhere 
to it. The two premises, therefore, mean that the level of undertaking of States in 
respect to the Standards is not envisaged to be discretionary on the member States 
by virtue of the opt-out mechanisms provided for under Article 38 of the Chicago 
Convention alone. In any event, international law requires States to adhere to the 
treaty obligations in good faith owing to the operation of the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda which guides States in the implementation of treaty obligations.10  
 
Another key pointer to the binding nature of the Standards and Recommended 
Practices is the consensual nature of adoption and amendments to the Annexes to 
the Chicago Convention. The procedure of adoption and amendment of Annexes is 
an exemption to the general majority decision rule by the Council set out under 
Article 52 of the Convention. Article 90 (a) prescribes a two-third majority of the 
Council to adopt or amend an Annex. Subsequently, a majority of the member 
States, acting in their individual capacities, have to approve the amendment or 
adoption.11 Antwerpen, correctly affirms that the Standards and Recommended 
Practices are legally binding by virtue of principles and interpretation of international 
law.12 For Milde, binding nature of the Standards and the Recommended Practices 




                                                          
9 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 
1980). 
10 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, preamble and Articles 2(1) (a) and 26. 
11 Chicago Convention, Article 90. 
12 Niels V “Cross-border provision of air navigation services with specific reference to Europe: 
safeguarding transparent lines of responsibility and liability” 2008 KLI 32. 
13 Milde M Air law 117. 
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In addition to the above, the formulation of all the Standards and Recommended 
Practices stipulated in the 19 Annexes, shows that it is only in respect of the 
international standards that any State variance has to be reported under that Article 
which may result in supplements to the Annexes. 14 This is a pointer that the two 
main categories of instruments have different legal statuses, position that elevates 
the legally binding status of the standards above those of the Recommended 
Practices and ICAO policies. Practically, the Standards have more elevated binding 
status since unlike the Recommended Practices, they attract the immediate and 
unconditional obligation to inform ICAO.15  
 
ICAO also develops Manuals and Circulars, which are necessary for regulation of 
the various aspects of UAS.  Adherence to the ICAO resolutions in form of policies 
and manuals, has not been expressly recognized as attracting the undertaking of 
compliance by States in the Convention. As such, they are generally not binding, 
but are guidance materials only save for instances where they are adopted by States 
through other multilateral agreements.16 This does not, however, mean that the 
same can be simply disregarded by States. Milde agrees that these ICAO 
resolutions cannot be ignored with impunity.17 The author’s compelling rationale is 
that ICAO resolutions are like the inevitable force of gravity, compliance with which 
is almost unavoidable in practice since there are enormous consequences attached 
to failure to do so.18 
 
3.2 ICAO: Main Functions and Organization  
ICAO is established under Article 43 of the Chicago Convention. ICAO was originally 
conceived to be an organization with the capacity to enter into arrangements with 
any general organization. After the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, 
                                                          
14 See the chart of flow of standard-making process at https://www.icao.int/about-
icao/AirNavigationCommission/Documents (Date of use: 11 July 2020). 
15 See Niels V “Cross-border” 32 for more discussion on this. 
16 Niels V “Cross-border” 32. 
17 Milde M Air law 117. 
18 Milde M Air law 117. 
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ICAO became a specialised agency of the United Nations in 1947.19 This was 
pursuant to the Assembly decision made to Article 64 of the Chicago Convention to 
get into international arrangements. Since then, the independent and autonomous 
agency has been vital in providing guidance towards regulation of UAS at the 
international level. It has been responsible for development of international 
consensus on a number of issues relating to security, safety and privacy in UAS-
related activities through development of SARPs, manuals, circulars and policies in 
civil aviation.  
 
The main focus of ICAO when undertaking its duties is ensuring aviation safety and 
security, and by extension privacy concerns for the orderly management in the 
international civil aviation sector, enhancement of efficiency, capacity and 
environmental protection, building capacity of member States, among other 
functions.20 ICAO works with member States to continually develop consensus 
about efficiencies in the management of civil aviation. 
 
The major decisions by ICAO, which contribute to the development of the normative 
framework on UAS regulation are made through its structures. The structure has 
three principal organs, namely the ICAO Assembly, ICAO Council and lastly, the 
ICAO Secretariat. The ICAO Assembly is responsible for recommendation of 
policies on new standards and guidance to other bodies. Since the Assembly has 
all member States to ICAO, it provides an avenue for the obtaining of consensus on 
development of policies to guide innovative areas such as integration of UAS into 
civil aviation. The Council adopts the standards, recommended practices, and has 
investigative and dispute resolution powers. The Secretariat is headed by a 
Secretary General who through its staff at the head office in Montreal, and the 
regional offices, is responsible for day-to-day the running of the affairs of ICAO. 
                                                          
19 The ICAO Assembly Resolution A1-2 which authorized the relationship.  





3.3 ICAO Structure and Organs 
Structurally, ICAO is an international organization. It enjoys legal capacity in the 
territory of the 193 member States to the extent that it enables it to conduct its 
functions.21 As already set out, ICAO’s decision-making powers in terms of 
rulemaking and enforcement is executed through the ICAO Assembly, ICAO 
Council, ICAO Secretariat, which are the principal organs of the organization.22 The 
organization and functions of the various organs are discussed below.  
  
3.3.1 ICAO Assembly 
The ICAO Assembly is the key policy-making organ established under chapter VIII 
of the Chicago Convention.23 It consists of all ICAO member States that are entitled 
to attend, for deliberations, ordinary meetings convened by the ICAO Council every 
three years or such extraordinary meetings as may be convened upon request by 
at least a fifth of member States.24  The Assembly is responsible for 
recommendation of policies on new standards and guidance to organs of ICAO. 
Since the Assembly has all member States to ICAO, it provides an avenue for the 
obtaining of consensus on development of policies to guide innovative areas of 
aviation. The Assembly also appoints the ICAO Council, considers and implements 
the decisions of the Council.25 It can also delegate or revoke such delegation of 
powers to the Council.26 Its mandate includes undertaking the functions under the 
Chicago Convention, which are not a reserve of the ICAO Council. Unless the 
Convention stipulates otherwise, the general rule is that majority of votes cast by 
delegates of each member State makes Assembly decisions.27 
                                                          
21 Chicago Convention, Article 47.  See also Sochor E “Decision-Making at ICAO: Who Governs the 
Governing Body?” 1991 TPIA 1. 
22 https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/United-Nations-Related-Agencies/The-International-Civil-
Aviation-Organization-ICAO-STRUCTURE.html (accessed on 11 July 2020). 
23 https://www.icao.int/Pages/default.aspx (Date of use: 12 July 2020). 
24 https://www.icao.int/abouticao/assembly/Pages/.(Date of use: 11 July 2020). 
25 See Chicago Convention, Article 49(a)-(k). 
26 The Chicago Convention, Article 49(a)-(k). 




3.3.2 ICAO Council  
The ICAO Council is established under chapter IX of the Chicago Convention as a 
permanent, body. The ICAO Assembly elects the members of the Council, who 
serve a three-year term.28 The election to membership of the Council aims to 
represent the contribution of States in air transport, and major geographical 
locations of the world.29 A President of the Council who is elected from among the 
member States and serves a three-year renewable term, heads the council.30 The 
President is not a representative of the member States but of the Council.31 
 
The main rule-making function of the ICAO Council is to adopt Standards and 
Recommended Practices that are ratified by the Assembly.32 It also has investigative 
and dispute resolution powers. ICAO plays a key role in implementation of 
Standards and Recommended Practices through its mandate to receive 
notifications of deviance from the international standards and procedures under 
Article 38 of the Convention.33  
 
                                                          
28 https://www.icao.int/Pages/default.aspx  (Date of use: 12 July 2020). See also The Chicago 
Convention, Article 50(a). 
29 Chicago Convention, Article 50(b). The category of contribution has two sub-categories, which are 
contributors of chief importance and largest contributors in air transport.  
30 The Chicago Convention, Article 51. 
31 The Chicago Convention, Article 51(c). 
32 The Chicago Convention Article 37. 
33 The Chicago Convention, Article 38 provides that:- Any State which finds it impracticable to comply 
in all respects with any such international standard or procedure, or to bring its own 
regulations or practices into full accord with any international standard or procedure after 
amendment of the latter, or which deems it necessary to adopt regulations or practices 
differing in any particular respect from those established by an international standard, shall 
give immediate notification to the International Civil Aviation Organization of the differences 
between its own practice and that established by the international standard. In the case of 
amendments to international standards, any State, which does not make the appropriate 
amendments to its own regulations or practices, shall give notice to the Council within sixty 
days of the adoption of the amendment to the international standard, or indicate the action 
which it proposes to take. In any such case, the Council shall make immediate notification to 
all other states of the difference which exists between one or more features of an 
international standard and the corresponding national practice of that State 
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Any decisions differences, which are lower than international standards, are 
recorded as part of supplements to the Annexes hence having a binding effect on 
specific member States filing the differences.  
 
This ‘difference system’ prima facie appears to be a missed opportunity of achieving 
uniformity of UAS regulation at the international stage since it allows for the 
application of two sets of rules to States towards complying with Article 37 of 
Chicago Convection. It must not be lost, however, that the system can still achieve 
the harmonization of the UAS regulatory approaches in the long term since it 
recognizes the inevitably unique circumstance of each States and allows them to 
take a progressive path to catch up with others towards an ultimate uniformity.34  
 
The Council as it carries out directions of the Assembly,35  is, mandated to issue 
infraction notices to the States who fail to comply with its determinations or 
recommendations. In case of any further failure, the Council is mandate to report 
such non-adherence by States to the ICAO Assembly.36 The decisions of the council 
are made by majority of votes cast by members unless the members are party to an 
issue under consideration.37  
 
3.3.3 ICAO Secretariat 
The Secretary General, appointed by the Council, heads the ICAO Secretariat. The 
Council makes provisions for other appointments of the Secretariat staff.38 The seat 
of the Secretariat is seated at Montreal, Canada. The Secretariat also functions 
through regional offices in Nairobi. Paris, Dakar, Mexico, Lima and Bangkok in order 
                                                          
34 Hsu YM “A New International Legal Order” 2016 CYILA 231-234. 
35 Chicago Convention, Article 54(d). 
36 The Chicago Convention, Article 54(j) and (k).  
37 The Chicago Convention, Articles 52 and 53. Instances of adoption and amendment of Annexes 
under Article 92 of the Convention is one such an exemption which requires two-thirds.  
38 The Chicago Convention, Article 54(h). 
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to coordinate the day-to-day running of the affairs of the Organization.39 The day- 
to- day running of the secretariats operations is conducted through the Air 
Navigation Bureau, Technical Cooperation Bureau, Bureau of Administration of 
Services, Legal Services and External Relations Bureau, all under the office of the 
Secretary General.40 There are also various Sections that deal with audits and 
programmes. The personnel appointed in the Office of the Secretary General, have 
international legal character and conduct their activities with independence.41 
 
3.4 ICAO and UAS-specific Instruments  
Through the concerted efforts of the organs as discussed above, ICAO develops 
different instruments to regulate the UAS. These UAS instruments are contained in 
relevant Standards, Recommended Practices and ICAO Resolutions, which include 
ICAO policies, procedures, manuals, and circulars. The instruments are vital for the 
achievement of the overall ICAO’s role.42 The SARPs developed by ICAO Council 
are contained in 19 Annexes to the Chicago Convention that regulate different 
aviation issues of safety and security in aviation. 
 
The Annexes dealing with rules of the air, units of measurement, aircraft nationality 
and registration marks and airworthiness contain international standards. The 
others, which contain both international standards and recommended practices, are 
Annexes on meteorological services, aeronautical charts and operation of aircrafts. 
Others are Annexes on air traffic services, aerodromes, search and rescue, 
facilitation, environmental protection, security, aeronautical services, safest 
transportation and safety management. The aim of the Annexes is to achieve State 
                                                          
39 https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/United-Nations-Related-Agencies/The-International-Civil-
Aviation-Organization-ICAO-STRUCTURE.html (Date of use: 11 July 2020). See also The 
Chicago Convention, Article 58. 
40 For full view of the structure of ICAO Secretariat, see 
https://www.icao.int/DownloadDocsFix/Organigramme_en.pdf (Date of use: 12 July 2020). 
41 The Chicago Convention, Article 59. 
42 Hsu YM “Legal Order” 234. 
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collaboration in securing uniformity in regulations, standards and procedures in 
relation to aircraft, personnel and airways to improve air navigation. 
 
The law mandates ICAO to issue resolutions governing various aspects of UAS. 
These resolutions take the form of policies, procedures, manuals and circulars. 
These instruments provide guidance materials to States.43 In this category, ICAO 
mainly authorizes circulars envisioned to harmonize concepts, terms and co-
ordinate guidance of regulatory evolution.44 Particularly, the circulars have three 
main purposes: First, to apprise States of the emerging ICAO perspective on the 
integration of UAS into non-segregated airspace and at aerodromes, aid in consider 
action of fundamental differences from manned aviation that such integration 
involves. The circulars also encourage States to help with the development of ICAO 
policy on UAS by providing information on experiences associated with these 
aircraft.45  
 
So far, ICAO has adopted UAS-related circulars and manuals, such as, Circular 330 
AN/189 on Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management of 2011, Manual on 
RPAs, Doc 10019 AN/507 of 2015, and Circular 328-AN/190 on Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems adopted in 201146. The substance of the rules stated in these circulars and 
manuals are discussed in the next part on international rules. As Antwerpen  
correctly notes, policies, manuals and circulars are complementary to the SARPs in 
the Annexes.47 
 
                                                          
43 Niels V “Cross-border” 32. 
44 The Chicago Convention, Article 54 (I) of Chicago Convention one of the mandatory functions of 
the Council is to Adopt, in accordance with the provisions of chapter VI of this Convention, 
International Standards and Recommended Practices; for convenience, designate them as 
Annexes to this Convention; and notify all contracting States of the action taken  
45 Niels V “Cross-border” 32. 
46 Zafar MA et al Design and development of effective manual control system for unmanned air 
vehicle’ (Paper presented to the 3rd International Conference on Computer Research and 
Development 2011) 349-353. 
47 Zafar MA et al Design 350. 
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Notably, ICAO has mechanism for implementation of instruments through its organs 
as discussed above to impose sanctions, however, Article 6 of the Convention would 
be invoked by other States for not having faith in their safety system. Suffice to note, 
at this stage, that the ICAO Assembly can disqualify a member State that does not 
comply with the Standards and Recommended Practices.48 However, this power 
has not been exercised to date.49 On the other hand, ICAO Council has put in place 
a reporting mechanism that monitors compliance at State levels through legislation, 
and receives notification of instances of deviance from the standards.  
 
Related to the reporting are research procedures, which forms ICAO’s 
implementation approach of development of metric of performance, performance 
evaluation on safety and security audits. These audits usually take the form of 
Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) and Universal Security Audit 
Programme (USAP). The audits, therefore, present an ideal opportunity for the 
organization to coordinate compliance by making practical recommendations to 
aviation authorities to adopt the existing standards. The ‘effective implementation’ 
scores of every country are available online, and this has a capacity to catapult the 
rate of compliance.50 It is obvious, however, that with the high number of contracting 
States to the Chicago Convention, the ICAO audit team is overstretched. Such a 
strain on skill and human capital risks reduces the quality of audits as an oversight 
tool to promote safety, security and privacy assurance. 
 
The implementation is donned with challenges of participation of fewer member of 
States in reporting of deviances from the Annexes and submission of substantive 
comments in case of amendments.51 Against the backdrop of these challenges, 
ICAO in 2015, adopted the strategic objective that no country should be left behind 
in implementation of the standards. The ICAO Council launched the ‘No Country 
                                                          
48 https://www.icao.int/abouticao/assembly/Pages/. (Date of use: 11 July 2020). 
49 https://www.icao.int/abouticao/assembly/Pages/. (Date of use: 11 July 2020). 
50  https://www.icao.int/safety/pages/usoap-results.aspx (Date of use: 26 December 2019). 
51 Niels V “Cross-border” 33. 
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Left Behind’ (NCLB) campaign. The aim of the initiatives under the campaign is to 
assist States to effectively implement ICAO Standards, Recommended Practices 
and Resolutions.52  
 
3.5 ICAO and Partnerships Relevant for UAS Regulations 
In response to integration of unmanned aircraft system into civil aviation and 
addressing the identified challenges in chapter Two of this thesis on safety, security 
and privacy, ICAO works through cooperation and partnerships with other 
organizations. Among the most prominent ones are global organizations such as 
the World Meteorological Organization, World Tourism Organization, International 
Maritime Organization, and World Health Organization, among others.53  
 
In addition to these global organizations, ICAO collaborates with and gets support 
from regional organizations. These bodies are pivotal in ICAO’s role of regulation of 
aviation safety, security, efficiency and related matters. ICAO, for instance, 
recognizes that the European Civil Aviation Conference, an intergovernmental 
organization of 44 European States, aids this role through creation of forum for 
understanding of policy and harmonization of ICAO-adopted aviation Standards and 
Recommended Practices amongst member States.54 The partnership in this regard 
includes further liaison with the European Organization for the Safety of Air 
Navigation and the Council of Europe. 
 
 
                                                          
52 https://www.icao.int/annual-report-2015/Pages/all-strategic-objectives-nclb-initiatives.aspx> (Date 
of use: 12 July 2018). 
53 https://www.icao.int/safety/RunwaySafety/GRSS2011/Pages/PartnersandSupporters.aspx (Date 
of use: 16 July 2020). 
54https://www.icao.int/safety/RunwaySafety/GRSS2011/Pages/PartnersandSupporters.aspx> 
(accessed on 16 July 2020). See also https://www.ecac-ceac.org (Date of use: 30 September 
2020) for more information on the operation of the European Civil Aviation Conference.  
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In Africa, ICAO partners with the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC). The 
Commission is a specialised organ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
responsible for civil aviation matters in Africa.55 The Constitutive Conference 
convened by ICAO and the OAU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, initiated the AFCAC in 
1969.56 Thereafter, the AFCAC became the specialized agency of OAU / AU on 11 
May 1978.57 Article 2 of the AFCAC Constitution, provides for establishment of 
AFCAC as the specialized agency of the African Union (AU) responsible for civil 
aviation matters.   
 
Another key arrangement is partnerships at State levels. In the USA, for example, 
ICAO partners with the FAA, which is principally responsible for regulation of civil 
aviation in the United States of America. ICAO cooperates with FAA, as well as non-
governmental organizations, key among them, the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA). 
 
Lastly, ICAO works through established regional offices. For example, relevant to 
this research, is its Eastern and South African Office, located at Gigiri in Nairobi, 
Kenya. In terms of the regional cooperation, ICAO has mandated the creation of 
Regional Aviation Safety Groups (RASG) to serve as regional cooperative forums 
integrating global, regional, sub-regional, national and industry efforts in continuing 
to enhance aviation safety and security worldwide. RASGs develop and implement 
work programmes that support regional performance frameworks for the 
management of safety on the basis of the Global Aviation Safety Plan. RASGs build 
on the work already done by States, and existing sub-regional organizations. ICAO 
equally, encourages pooling of technical resources through Regional Safety 
Oversight Organisations (RSOOs) such as East Africa Civil Aviation Safety and 
                                                          
55 Abeyratne R “The future of African civil aviation” 1998 JATWW 30-49. 
56 Abeyratne R “The future” 43. 
57 Abeyratne R “The future” 30. 
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Security Oversight Agency (CASSOA) in a bid to develop safety oversight 
framework. 
 
These robust steps for ICAO’s international cooperation are commendable. One 
principal concern, however, is inadequate mechanism by the regional bodies to 
provide avenues for the partnerships with ICAO on UAS integration into civil aviation 
and regulation enforcement especially regarding the African States under this 
study.58 Despite their role in the development of regulations, encouragement of 
Member State to domesticate the international framework for aviation regulation as 
well as regulation of audits on safety of aviation, the East Africa Community’s Civil 
Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency (CASSOA) still lack these 
partnership arrangements with ICAO.59 Lubner considers the implications of this role 
by noting, the other side of the coin, that the partnerships are pivotal for 
strengthening of regional aviation bodies that has the potential of acting as a binding 
force for member States in efforts to seek regional integration of UAS into civil 
aviation.60 
 
The author in agreeing with Lubner’s views expressed above61 notes that a practical 
example can be obtained from the US. Since the Organization of American States 
is the oldest regional organization, the partnership arrangement between ICAO and 
FAA, should inspire further partnerships with these continental or sub-regional 
entities especially in light of the comparative successes that FAA has made in 
regulation of aviation, which will be discussed in the next chapter. In any event, the 
EAC Treaty of 1999 contemplates adoption of common policies at the sub-regional 
level to achieve collaboration with ICAO.62  
                                                          
58 https://www.icao.int/safety/RunwaySafety/GRSS2011/Pages/PartnersandSupporters.aspx (Date 
of use: 16 July 2020). 
59 Abeyratne R “The future” 30 
60Lubner B et al “The Continuing Challenge of Aviation Safety in Africa”  
(Paper presented to the 16th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology 2010) 80. 
61 Lubner B et al “Continuing Challenge” 80. 




Indeed, such cooperation could offer an important avenue for ICAO to take 
advantage of the geographical proximity and interdependence of Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs). To harness compliance with safety, security and 
privacy issues arising from use of UAS as has been the case with the European 
Union civil aviation organizations whose partnership arrangements with ICAO are 
perused though not relevant under the scope of focus for this study.63 This would be 
so considering that Article 37 of the Chicago Convention relies heavily on the 
discretion of States for implementation of its convention and the annexes thereto. In 
the author’s analysis, owing to the transboundary nature of UAS flying across 
nations, the sub-regional economic blocks offer opportunity to encourage members 
to comply with safety, security and privacy measures supporting the process of 
integration of UAS into civil aviation.    
 
A further challenge is that despite this well thought out idea behind establishment of 
the AFCAC many decades ago, little efforts have been made towards creating 
unified regulation for UAS in the African continent that binds member States.  
 
Even if the challenges were to be addressed, regional economic communities 
unfortunately seem to suffer from some other challenges that must first be sorted 
out to create meaning to the envisaged, and of course much needed, collaboration 
with ICAO. First, there are issues of capacity. For instance, despite entry of South 
Sudan into the East African Community, CASSOA64 is yet to create an office within 
its organizational structure to specifically deal with UAS in the six East African 
States. The entity also has a lean organizational structure. 65 For example, CASSOA 
                                                          
63 The Chicago Convention, Article 65 on arrangements with other international bodies. It provides 
that:- The Council, on behalf of the Organization, may enter into agreements with other 
international bodies for the maintenance of common services and for common arrangements 
concerning personnel and, with the approval of the Assembly, may enter into such other 
arrangements as may facilitate the work of the Organization. 
64 EAC Treaty 1999, Article 92. 
65 http://www.cassoa.org/cassoa/> (Date of use: 21 January 2018). 
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had only 21 members of staff by the year 2020, serving the entire East African region 
with the mandate to provide oversight in the six EAC partner States.66 It is also 
grossly underfunded making it difficult to execute its other mandates, which include 
ensuring that UAS entering the region are documented, this data is shared among 
member States and complies with safety management systems as provided for 
under ICAO’s Annex 19. The situation is not any better in the SADC. SADC has 
made no effort to establish a regional civil aviation agency such as South African 
States Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency (SASCASSOA). 
Nevertheless, recent SADC efforts have led to establishment of an Interim SADC 
South African Safety Organization (iSASO), specifically to deal with civil aviation 
regulations within the sub-region. The organization is yet to be ratified by all the 
member States to have full force of the law among them. Moreover, emphasis is on 
safety without much focus on how to address security and privacy challenges. While 
the step is commendable, the lack of a substantive organization is a serious setback 
in cooperation efforts by ICAO.67 It denies the SADC member States an opportunity 
to galvanize support and to assist and encourage members in complying with ICAO 
Standards and Recommended Practices in the manner envisaged under Article 4(b) 
of the Constitution of AFCAC, which is a continental civil aviation regulator.  
 
This partnership contrasts with the continental position in the US, which has FAA as 
the body responsible for aviation functions.68 FAA has established unified UAS 
regulations as are discussed in chapter Four of this study. The same lessons from 
the US are a near replica of the European Union, under the European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA), which has the mandate of developing aviation regulations 
for EU member States.69  
 
                                                          
66 http://www.cassoa.org/cassoa/> (Date of use: 21 January 2018). 
67 The Chicago Convention, Articles 65 and 77.  
68 The Chicago Convention, Article 65 and 77. 
69 See Button K et al “African decolonisation and air transportation” 2015 JTEP 626-639. 
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4. International Air Law Responses to Regulation of UAS Challenges  
This section provides substantive elements of the chapter on how existing 
international law framework has provisions that regulate safety, security and privacy 
issues arising from the use of UAS. These provisions are located in different 
frameworks as already pointed out in this chapter. This part discusses how the rules 
of international law including the Conventions, Annexes and other instruments 
address safety, security and privacy challenges that were identified and expounded 
in chapter Two of this thesis. 
4.1. International Response to Aviation Safety in UAS Regulation  
Aviation safety is defined under ICAO Annex 1970, Safety Management Manual Doc 
9859, ICAO Annex 2 on Rules of the Air and Circular 328-AN/19071 as the state in 
which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and 
maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard 
identification and safety risk management.72 From the definition, it emerges that the 
obligation of ensuring the safety of UAS is a two-fold process. It involves identifying 
safety risk and managing the risk. The risk management aspects encapsulate 
reactive and proactive approaches to management of safety concerns.73 As noted 
in chapter Two of this study, the challenge of safety in the use of UAS arises from 
the lack of sense and avoid technology in some UAS. When such technology lacks 
in UAS, there are increased chances of collision. The international general rule is 
that the UAS use and operation must be safe and not compromise the lives of 
others.74  In full realization of this general rule, a framework for redressing safety 
challenges was contemplated by the contracting parties through the establishment 
                                                          
70 Annex 19 on Safety Management to the Chicago Convention (hereinafter referred to as ICAO 
Annex 19). 
71 ICAO Circular on Unmanned Aircraft Systems No. 328-AN/190 (hereinafter refered to as ICAO 
Circular No. 328-AN/190). See section 2.16, 2.17, 2.18, 2.19, 2.20 and 2.21 
72 See Safety Management Manual Doc 9859. Glossary and definition of terms at p vii. 
73 ICAO Annex 19, Paragraph 2.16. 
74 ICAO Circular 328-AN/190, Section 2.8 provides that: The principal objective of the aviation 
regulatory framework is to achieve and maintain the highest possible uniform level of safety. 
In the case of UAS, this means ensuring the safety of any other airspace user as well as the 
safety of persons and property on the ground. 
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of frameworks for aviation safety in the Chicago Convention.75 Instructively, as 
elucidated above, the Chicago Convention established the ICAO, with mandate to 
regulate air safety, communication and technological aspects of international civil 
aviation, including aspects of UAS.76 Article 8 of the Chicago Convention specifically 
provides the basis for regime of special authorization of aircrafts. The objective of 
the special authorization is to prevent obvious safety concerns arising from 
possibility of accidents and collisions if the pilotless aircrafts are left to operate 
unregulated in the airspace.  
 
Still under the Chicago Convention, the contracting parties to the Convention are 
obligated to allow flights of non-scheduled aircrafts into their territories.77  However, 
this obligation, which translates into a right on the operators of the aircrafts, may be 
limited, in case of movements where the States deem inaccessible. The limitation is 
at the discretion of the State, which can only be exercised on grounds of safety.  
 
Similarly, under Article 9(a) of the Chicago Convention, public safety considerations 
inform the basis upon which countries may restrict or prohibit the flying of aircrafts.  
However, the discretion of the States has limitations and cannot be exercised when 
it is unreasonable in terms of extent or rather prevent aviation. Other than prohibited 
areas, circumstances such as public safety and emergency, without express 
prohibitions communicated to ICAO, may warrant a limitation on the right for aviation 
provided there is no discrimination of the aircrafts on nationality basis.78  
 
 
                                                          
75 The Chicago Convention, Article 3 (d) which provides that: The contracting States undertakes 
when issuing regulations for their State aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety 
of navigation of civil aircraft 
76  The Chicago Convention, Article 44.  
77  The Chicago Convention, Article 5. 
78  The Chicago Convention, Article 9(b). 
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The safety considerations are traced to the airports of member States, who are 
required to have navigation facilities and meteorological service for safety of 
aviation.79 Similar considerations are to be made by the States when imposing the 
cargo restrictions provided under Article 35(b) of the Chicago Convention. In order 
to breathe more life into the stated provisions, ICAO is established with objective of 
ensuring ‘safe and orderly growth of international aviation80 and to ‘promote safety 
of flight in international air aviation.’81 Further, ICAO is mandated to adopt and 
amend SARPs from time to time, as discussed in subsequent section of this part. 
Particularly, the Chicago Convention recognizes that the standard may deal with, 
among others: 
“…such other matters concerned with the safety, regularity, and efficiency of 
air navigation as may from time to time appear appropriate.” 
 
From the above analysis, it is clear that the Chicago Convention’s approach is 
establishment of broader frameworks for safety. The mechanism contemplated 
under Article 44(a) as read with 44(h) are dependent on the ICAO’s development of 
relevant SARPs. Regarding the other restrictions and prohibitions of flights, the 
measures for their achievement are significantly dependent on discretionary 
regulations developed at State levels. An example is Article 9, which begins with the 
words, 
‘…each contracting State may, for reasons of military necessity or public 
safety, restrict or prohibit.’82  
 
Lastly, the provisions of Article 15 of the Chicago Convention on requirement of 
facilities and meteorological services at the airports for safety, largely excludes the 
UAS which have the capability of being launched from anywhere and not necessarily 
from an airport. 
                                                          
79 The Chicago Convention, Article 15. 
80 The Chicago Convention, Article 44(a). 
81 The Chicago Convention, Article 44(h). 




Other than the broader framework, the Convention recognizes and regulates two 
other practical activities that have a bearing on mitigating safety concerns for UAS 
use. The first one is the certification of airworthiness envisaged under Article 31 of 
the Chicago Convention. Before an unmanned aircraft system is certified, it should 
be issued with a certificate of airworthiness, declaring it fit for flying.83  This means 
that every aircraft engaged in international navigation shall be provided with a 
certificate of airworthiness, issued or rendered valid by the State in which it is 
registered.84 A certificate of airworthiness is a measure of an aircraft’s suitability for 
safe flight, only applicable to certified UAS. It is conferred on an aircraft by the 
national aviation authority of a respective State and is maintained, subject to 
performance of the required maintenance actions. Until such a time that this 
requirement is harmonized, States continue to apply different criteria for 
certification.85 For example, it has not been effectively possible to offer all UAS with 
certificates of airworthiness, due to rapid technological revolutions as many find 
themselves in the market without going through the procedural certification process. 
More often, they are used in social gatherings to take photographs without 
airworthiness authorization, a lacuna that has partly been associated with absence 
of UAS regulations or proper enforcement mechanisms.  
 
The second practical regulation of safety is pegged on licencing requirements. 
These requirements are made under Article 32 of the Chicago Convention. The 
article provides that: 
“pilot of every aircraft and the other members of the operating crew of every 
aircraft engaged in international navigation shall be provided with certificates 
of competency and licenses issued or rendered valid by the State in which 
the aircraft is registered.”86 
  
                                                          
83 The Chicago Convention, Article 31. 
84  The Chicago Convention, Article 31. 
85  ICAO Annex 8. 
86 The Chicago Convention, Article 32(a). 
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Licensing is the authorization of defined events otherwise prohibited out of the 
hazards that would occur if poorly performed. This means that the licensing has 
safety of operation as one of its prime considerations when a decision to grant a 
licence is made by competent authorities. Applicants for a license must meet certain 
standards that are commensurate with complexity of the event to be performed.87 
 
The two practical activities of certification of airworthiness and licencing, without 
more, do not inspire full safety with regard to the sense and avoid technologies. 
From a plain reading of the provisions of Articles 31 and 32 of the Convention, the 
provisions focus on the ‘international aviation’. This technically leaves out of its 
scope, the concerns relating to safety of domestic uses of UAS. Particularly, Article 
32 of the Convention addresses the ‘crew members’ in licencing subjects despite 
that being uncommon for UAS.88 Ideally, aviation safety demands that remote pilots 
and other UAS crew need to be trained in safety, with proper qualifications, 
appropriate licenses or certificates of competence to provide a modicum of integrity 
in safety of the civil aviation system they eventually are part of.  With little focus on 
the main conventional law, some States continue to operate without clear guidelines 
regarding pilots operating UAS.89    
 
More practically, the ICAO has also developed two relevant ICAO Annexes, which 
are Annex 2 on the Rules of the Air and a manual known as Safety Management 
Manual Doc 9859 providing guidance to States to develop their domestic legal 
framework supports Annex 19 on Safety Management, this Annex. Also relevant to 
safety is the ICAO’s UAS Circular No. 328 AN 190. The Circular is instrumental 
since it has rationalized the application of safety considerations to UAS to member 
States.90 
                                                          
87The Chicago Convention, Article 32(a). 
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Annex 19 was developed to, among others, help achieve the two dimensions of 
safety. The Annex consisted of two programmes and systems, the first one being 
State Safety Programme (SSP) and Safety Management System (SMS). The two 
concepts are divided as between operators of UAS and the State, and are both 
aimed at ensuring that the sky is safe to all users.  
 
State Safety Programme (SSP) is a programme through which ICAO ensures that 
States set of regulations and activities, with objective to improve safety of the 
airspace.91 The Programme as a mandatory system recognizes the acceptable 
levels of safety in aviation practice. It is a system through which the civil aviation 
authorities, having regard to size and resource of the aviation system, regulate, 
monitor and administer safety.92 The key areas of regulation include oversight of 
safety, which comprises monitoring of elements of safety oversight functions like 
areas of significant safety concerns and high safety risks. Others are risk 
management, safety assurance and safety promotion. It, therefore, contemplates 
the conduct policy formulation based on safety information such as identification of 
hazards and safety arising from management, conduct of stakeholder awareness 
and internal audits.93  
 
The programme is very vital since it supports rule-making processes in the 193 
ICAO member States in matter safety. Particularly, SSP supports an analysis of 
potential effects of safety of UAS and other third parties such as service providers 
regulated by civil aviation authorities.94 This is in addition to determining the role of 
‘equivalent level safety’ and ‘acceptable means of compliance’ in their possession. 
The SSP processes on safety assurance, risk management, and promotion are 
                                                          
91 ICAO Annex 19, Paragraph 2.19. 
92 ICAO Annex 19, Paragraph 2.19. 
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designed to be proactive in addressing hurdles that the use and operation of UAS 
pose while in the air; in other words, they are part of countermeasures from a legal 
perspective that address challenges regarding UAS safety operations. 
 
Second, the Safety Management System (SMS) is a system to be adopted by the 
stakeholders. It flows from the SSP for each State on the basis of which it instructs 
the stakeholders to develop their respective SMS.95 Service providers and operators 
under oversight of the State’s implementation of ICAO Annex 19 that requires all 
contracting States to domesticate safety management measures within their 
jurisdiction establish the system, which targets a systematic approach to 
management safety through creating efficiency in organizational structures, 
accountability, policies and procedures, the SMS.  
 
The SSP and SMS are, therefore, inseparable. Persons, be they a pilots of UAS or 
manned aircraft, are required to bear similar responsibilities of being knowledgeable 
about rules of the air, flight performance, planning and loading, human performance, 
navigation, operation procedure and principles of flight.96 They have to get flight 
instruction, demonstrate skill and expertise as well as be licensed. Of necessity, 
also, they would need to be proficient in the language of radiotelephony as well as 
meet the required medical fitness levels. For purposes of UAS, the latter could be 
modified through integration of regulations to ensure that those who operate UAS 
meet the basic levels of space proficiency.  
 
Further, SSP and SMS, require States to establish bodies with oversight of the 
safety mandate at the national level. The authorities specifically are responsible for 
extending safety considerations to UAS responsibility of giving assurance of 
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introduction of UAS within the civilian airspace.97 Further, SSP and SMS have 
influenced regulation of personal licencing in some ICAO member States, in effect 
helping to achieve integration of UAS into civilian application. This translates to 
personnel licensing harmonization in a single airspace across national and regional 
boundaries.98  
 
Without a pilot, the SSP and SMS aside, UAS may still experience challenges in 
meeting safety requirements such as introduction of technology for detection and 
avoidance, command and control, communication with ATC and prevention of 
unlawful interference.99 The interference may occur because UAS have no pilot on 
board and there may be no capacity to communicate with ATC and seek clearance 
before landing at an airport. The Chicago Convention attempts to resolve this 
challenge by imposing UAS regulation and stipulation of conditions under which 
UAS can operate. The import of Article 8 of the Convention is to prohibit flying of 
pilotless aircraft over territories of other States without authorization. 
 
In addition to ICAO Annex 19, the Annex 2 on the Rules of the Air100 is instrumental 
in ensuring safety in civil aviation. The Rules stipulate the responsibilities of the pilot-
in-command to ensure the operation of the aircraft complies with rules of the air and 
punishes those who violate them. The pilot-in-command of unmanned aircraft 
systems is the person controlling it while airborne and has final authority over it.101 
The rules apply whether the pilot is on board or at a remote location in the case of 
unmanned aircraft systems. Further, it is the responsibility of a pilot operating a UAS 
                                                          
97 Provided in relevant ICAO Annex 6 on Operation of Aircraft to the Chicago Convention (hereinafter 
referred to as ICAO Annex 6); Annex 11 on Air Traffic Services to the Chicago Convention 
(hereinafter referred to as ICAO Annex 11” and Annex 14 on Aerodromes Design and 
Operations to the Chicago Convention (hereinafter referred to as the ICAO Annex 14). 
98 The Chicago Convention, Article 8 on pilotless aircraft. It provides that each contracting State to 
ensure use of UAS by any contracting State shall be controlled to obviate danger to civil 
aircraft.  
99 ICAO Annex 19, Paragraph 2.15. 
100 Annex on the Rules of the Air to the Chicago Convention (hereinafter referred to as ICAO Annex 
2). 
101  ICAO Annex 2, Paragraph 2.3.1. 
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to undertake a handing over process even where the aircraft is in flight.102 Others 
are avoidance of collisions and development of flight plans, provision of signals and 
obtaining of air traffic control clearances.103 
 
However, there is a challenge as regards the difficulty of implementing the ICAO 
Annex 2. This is so since in UAS, remote pilots may be separated by long distances 
and expected to hand over to pilots in far-off places. Addressing hand over 
responsibilities by remote pilots is made even more complex by the reality that 
remote pilots may be operating from completely different States or even the high 
seas.104  The other obvious challenge brought about by ubiquity in the use of UAS 
is the difficulty to develop and submit a flight plan, to be used for filming, for example. 
As it stands, therefore, there are impediments to the full attainment of safety in 
licensing and regulation of UAS. It is notable that this might be a missed opportunity 
since rules of the air are, by nature, binding upon member States to the Chicago 
Convention.   
  
Further, safety considerations also underpin the power of the States under 
international law which according to Cooper, include jurisdiction over airspace and 
unilateral right to admit or deny entry, freedom over high seas, right of innocent 
passage, nationality of aircrafts, among others.105 The above position in 
conventional, SARPs and the international customary law are supported by court 
opinions that consider safety as the basis for regulation of UAS. For instance, the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom106 also known as the Lockerbie case has 
been instrumental in defining safety laws in the aviation sector. Though this case 
was applicable to manned aircrafts, the principles developed by the court would still 
apply to the UAS in the current framework under the Chicago Convention.107 
                                                          
102 ICAO Annex 2, Paragraph 2.3.1. 
103 ICAO Annex 2, Paragraph 3.3-3.6.  
104 ICAO Annex 2, Paragraph 3.3-3.6. 
105 See Cooper JC “Backgrounds of International Air Law” 1965 YASL 3. 
106 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom 1992 88 (ICJ) Rep 3 [578]. 
107 Bouve C “Regulation of International Air Navigation under the Paris Convention” 1935 JAL 299. 
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Perhaps, the only notable limitation is that the effect of the binding nature of the 
judgments are limited to those specific cases and respective parties alone.108  
 
Safety concerns are also addressed through traffic clearances, which ensure flight 
completeness. In regards to the traffic management, it is clear that when the 
Chicago Convention was adopted, there was an agreement between parties that 
relates to traffic management. The Agreement stipulated at Article 12 of the 
Convention partly states as follows: 
Each contracting State undertakes to adopt measures to ensure that every 
aircraft flying over or manoeuvring within its territory and that every aircraft 
carrying its nationality mark, wherever such aircraft may be, shall comply with 
the rules and regulations relating to the flight and manoeuvre of aircraft there 
in force. 
 
The reference to ‘aircraft carrying the nationality marks’ under Article 12 of the 
Convention applies extraterritorially. This is a major achievement in ensuring that 
foreign UAS do not cause mayhem or disruptions in the aviation airspaces of other 
countries. However, the implementation of the provision is heavily dependent on 
development of laws at national levels and consequent harmonization of the said 
laws that are to be implemented through the enforcement of the criminal laws.109 
 
Further, the Chicago Convention requires aircraft that are engaged in international 
navigation to fulfil certain conditions, one of which is carrying documents aboard.110 
These documents include: certificate of registration, certificate of airworthiness, 
appropriate licenses for each crew member, journey logbook, aircraft radio station 
license; if carrying passengers, a list of their names, places of embarkation and 
destination, and if it is for cargo, a manifest and detailed declarations of the cargo 
                                                          
108 The United Nations Charter of 26 June 1945 1 UNTS XVI (entered into force 24 October 1945) 
(hereinafter referred to as the UN Charter). 
109 The Chicago Convention 1944, Article 12. 
110 The Chicago Convention 1944, Article 29. 
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should be provided.111 Other than, for purposes of identification, certification and 
ownership, the documents are meant to ensure safety of the aircraft, its crew and 
property, and persons on the ground. The list of passengers would allow for easier 
identification in circumstances where an accident occurs. Declaration of cargo would 
ensure that only legal and not contraband cargo is carried.112 
 
The above regulatory approaches under Article 29 of the Chicago Convention may, 
however, prove difficult to enforce when dealing with UAS as at the moment, there 
are no cases of them carrying people. Specifically, the alternative of fulfilling the 
documentation requirements of Article 29 of the Convention would be challenging 
for UAS. For example, whereas it would be easy for manned aircraft to carry 
specified documents on board the aircraft, carrying paper-based documents on 
board UAS is neither practical nor appropriate. In this context, electronic or 
alternative versions of the documents would need to be considered.113 Secondly, it 
is commonplace that in the event an accident happens, most aircraft end up being 
burned completely, including paper-based documentation. It is, therefore, important 
to have a regulatory framework that ensures that advanced technology is fixed to 
UAS with backup to servers on the ground, which can be retrieved in case of 
accidents. 
 
Regarding the implementation of the above provision, as Pevot et al notes, the 
international response to the safety is still faced with challenges of unmanned traffic 
management. Generally, UAS would require an advanced traffic management 
ecosystem under development for autonomously controlled operations of UAS to 
ensure safety in entry into the airspace.114 Ideally, the system comprises a system 
that can monitor increased activity based on sharing of each operator's scheduled 
flight details in a digital form. Unfortunately, most UAS lack these systems. 
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That notwithstanding, the international response under Article 8 of the Chicago 
Convention contemplates that the UAS must operate in the same airspace with the 
manned aircrafts. As noted in chapter Two, this categorization may be disruptive 
since the UAS comes in different shapes and may operate in much lower altitudes 
which the aviation airspace was not originally designed to handle. This leads to 
concern over safety issues in entry of UAS into the airspace.  
 
The rule of the air is to reduce the safety risks that may arise. Part 3.6 in particular 
deals with control of air traffic. It specifically provides as follows: 
 
“An air traffic control clearance shall be obtained prior to operating a 
controlled flight, or a portion of a flight as a controlled flight. Such clearance 
shall be requested through the submission of a flight plan to an air traffic 
control unit.” 
 
The import of the word ‘shall’ makes it mandatory for the requisition of the air traffic 
control clearance to be obtained when a person submits an air traffic control plan 
after submission of flight plans by civil aviation operators including operators of UAS. 
Despite the provision, the requirements of ICAO Annex 2 still compellingly direct 
toward two conclusions on implementation challenges. First, some of the 
requirements for flight plans and flight clearance to pilots in command may be 
impracticable for certain uses of UAS. Secondly, the idea of control as stipulated in 
the Chicago Convention and ICAO Annex 2 do not specifically provide for the 
command and control system. Accordingly, it depends on the State resources and 
the design of the UAS to fully implement these provisions that are pivotal for safety 





In order to further cure the challenges that relate to the unmanned traffic 
management in the ICAO Annex 2, ICAO developed Circular No. 328 AN 190. The 
Circular requires pilot-in-command to ensure operation of the aircraft complies with 
rules of the air and punishes those who violate them. The pilot-in-command for 
unmanned aircraft systems is the person controlling it while airborne and has final 
authority over it.115 This applies, whether the pilot is on-board or at a remote location 
in the case of unmanned aircraft systems. Further, it is the responsibility of a pilot 
operating a UAS to undertake a handing over process even where the aircraft is in 
flight.116 Other responsibilities are avoidance of collisions and development of flight 
plans, provision of signals and, obtaining of air traffic control clearances.117 
 
The ICAO has, over the years, developed a series of traffic rights, known as 
Freedoms of the Air, which continue to form the basis of rights exchanged in air 
services negotiations today.118 This study contends, however, that this principle and 
its effect on UAS may present a contradiction since although UAS may interact like 
manned aircraft, there are certain inconsistencies exist in the latter such as non-co-
operation and non-compliance, which may complicate management of air traffic with 
current regulatory challenges.119  
 
The above provisions speak to the general rules on safety and do not specifically 
address the challenge of lack of the sense and avoid technology for some UAS. The 
rule that specifically addresses the issue is the UAS principle of responsibility and 
accountability. Under this principle, it is expected that UAS missions will still need 
persons who are accountable, regardless of whether they are called commander or 
pilot.120 From a legal perspective, action must be taken against persons or legal 
entities responsible for operations, in case of foul play. Particularly, the principle 
                                                          
115 ICAO Annex 2, Paragraph 2.3.1 
116 ICAO Annex 2, Paragraph 2.3.1.  
117 ICAO Annex 2, Paragraph 3.3-3.6.  
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appreciates that the UAS involves novel technologies, hence the need to create 
mechanisms to ensure responsibility and accountability in design, manufacture, 
maintenance and operations, equal to those of manned aircraft, even though the 
person in command is on the ground.121    
 
4.2 International Response to Aviation Security in UAS Regulation  
The overall international commitment to the field of aviation security is deducible 
from the preamble to the Chicago Convention as conceptualised and anchored 
under ICAO Annex 17, which defines security as the act of safeguarding 
international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference.122 As noted in 
chapter Two of this thesis, the security issues that concern the use of UAS arise 
from interference with State sovereignty, cyber-attacks, lack of command controls 
among other factors.  
 
Generally, international air law has, over time, evolved to combat such acts in the 
aviation field, concerning manned aircraft and by extension the UAS. Traditionally, 
State security is assured through protection and affirming of territorial integrity and 
State sovereignty as principles of international relations.123 It is based on sovereign 
equality principle affirmed under Article 2 (1) of the United Nations Charter of 1945. 
It is, therefore, the responsibility of each State to uphold security within her 
jurisdiction.  So pivotal is the principal that State security, also termed as ‘public 
security,’ has been the basis of limitation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the international bill of rights.124 
 
 
                                                          
121 De Garmo Issues Concerning Integration 8. 
122 See ICAO Annex 17. 
123 Chicago Convention, Articles 1 and 2. 
124  See example acrimonious passage of the Kenya security amendment Act No. 19 of 2014. 
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As regards to specific aviation security, the Chicago Convention places security as 
the pivot upon which the regulation of civil aviation is based. This is evident from 
paragraph 1 of the preamble, which recognizes the future power of international 
cooperation in the aviation field in developing friendliness. The same paragraph has 
it that the abuse of the cooperation may be a threat to ‘general security’. The 
preamble to the Chicago Convention, therefore, contemplates a future where civil 
aviation can foster friendship and understanding among nations. At the same time, 
it appreciates threats to security and prohibits acts of unlawful interference against 
orderly civil aviation.125 Thus, whereas it promotes the desire for peaceful co-
existence among nations, it is also alive to the need for overall regulation for 
peaceful co-existence. In the ordinary sense the general security referred to in the 
preamble is broader than the State sovereignty and public security concept in the 
United Nations Charter. This means that the Chicago Convention goes over and 
above the traditional view of State sovereignty and considers global security as a 
serious consideration in the regulation of aviation. 
 
Other than the broad recognition, the Chicago Convention is more specific on the 
activities that need to be taken to avoid the much-feared backlash in global security. 
Article 33 of the Convention provides as follows: 
 
“Certificates of airworthiness and certificates of competency and licenses 
issued or rendered valid by the contracting State in which the aircraft is 
registered, shall be recognized as valid by the other contracting State, 
provided that the requirements under which such certificates or licenses were 
issued or rendered valid are equal to or above the minimum standards which 
may be established from time to time pursuant to this Convention.” 
 
Still on security, Article 33 establishes the basis for the licensing and certification of 
operations of the UAS in the airspace. The Article forms the basis of recognition, 
and a further stipulation that such certificates must be of equal or above minimum 
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standards in another State.126 Article 17 of the Convention that makes requirement 
for nationality marks of the State in which they are registered supplements the 
provision on certification and airworthiness. The Article States that “Aircraft have the 
nationality of the State in which they are registered.” 
  
The security issues can also be ensured through the utilization of partnerships and 
agreements between ICAO and other geographical security organizations.127 
Instructively, Article 64 of the Chicago Convention provides as follows: 
“The Organization may with respect to air matter that are within its 
competence directly affecting the world security by vote of the assembly enter 
into appropriate arrangements with any general organization set up by 
nations of the world to preserve peace.”   
 
The provision enables ICAO to utilize the pre-existing security organization and thus 
save on financial and human capacity when dealing with the security challenges. 
Additionally, dealing with regional organization may be much more efficient in terms 
of enforcement and ease of development of consensus on action based on a pre-
existing agreement, which member States are obliged to adhere to by the principle 
of pacta sunt servanda. 
 
Regarding further development of standards, procedures and regulation in the areas 
of security the Chicago Convention contemplates these areas on airworthiness of 
aircrafts, and registration and identification as falling under the domain of the ICAO 
for adoption and amendment SARPs under Article 37(e) and (f) respectively. True 
to this higher calling, the ICAO adopted the ICAO Annex 17. The Annex regulates 
the security concerns through security programming and requirement of nationality 
marks.128 The nationality of an aircraft has not only become an important part of civil 
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aviation and bilateral air transport agreements, but also the multilateral transit and 
transport agreements.129 It is for this reason that substantial ownership and effective 
control requirements have effectively precluded adoption of the maritime law notion 
of “flags of convenience” into international aviation. Addressing nationality of aircraft 
is thus a key principle of the Chicago Convention.  
  
ICAO Annex 17 also supplements the requirements of nationality marks in Article 
17 of the Convention by its specifications for minimum-security standards for display 
of aircraft marks to indicate appropriate nationality and registration.130 This makes it 
much easier to trace unmanned aircraft systems in the air, especially in 
circumstances where they end up intruding into airspace territories of other States 
without authorization.   
  
Whereas implementation of nationality requirements, especially through 
identification marks and height requirements is easily achievable in manned aircraft, 
this may not necessarily be the case for UAS. For instance, some UAS are too small 
to affix identification marks. Thus, UAS may need alternative modes of complying 
with the provisions of Article 17. This deficiency continues to negatively impact on 
the regulation of security of operation of unmanned aircrafts. Until these alternatives 
are well defined and stipulated, as discussed under the chapter on safety, the 
predicament is likely to persist.  
 
ICAO has lately diversified its role in assistance of States, initiation of policy 
initiatives as well as focusing on conduct of security audits. This has led to further 
development of Aviation Security Manual Doc 8973, and lately, ICAO UAS Circular 
328-AN/190. The ICAO Council first adopted the Aviation Security Manual Doc 8973 
in March 1974. The focus on civil aviation under the Manual and not international 
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aviation is a reflection of aim of ICAO to assist the States at their domestic levels in 
compliance and in taking steps towards the implementation of the security measures 
as a means of building the ultimate consensus at the international level.131 Since 
then, there has been increased focus on the audits, which has led to the 
development of the Universal Security Audit Programmes (USAP) that are managed 
and coordinated by the Aviation Security section within ICAO.132 
 
Under this guidance on the evolving nature of security, States have the responsibility 
for ensuring security of passengers, crew and ground personnel; this means that 
appropriate civil aviation authorities are mandated to develop National Civil Aviation 
Security Committees that will oversee establishment of programmes such as the 
National Civil Aviation Security Programme, National Civil Aviation Security Quality 
Control Programme and National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme.133  
Hence individual member States are obligated to put in place such measures as to 
uphold security within the country and specifically the aerodromes.  
 
The ICAO Circular 328-AN/190, on the other hand, was designed as a guidance 
document for ICAO member States to develop UAS regulations in conformity to 
security.134 It is instructive that the Circular called on States to provide comments, 
particularly with respect to its application and usefulness.135 The Circular, therefore, 
represents an effort to proceed with development of fundamental international 
regulatory framework through SARPs, with supporting procedures for air navigation 
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services and guidance material, to underpin routine operation of UAS throughout 
the world in a safe, harmonized and seamless manner comparable to that of 
manned aircraft operations.  
 
Other than the laws developed under the auspices of the ICAO, the idea of security 
is a key component of the explosive management framework through its 
International Explosives Technical Commission. The Commission is the custodian 
of the Technical Annex to the Convention on the Making of Plastic Explosives 
Convention of 1991.136 Notably, this multilateral anti-terrorism treaty was developed 
for purposes of detection, prohibition, conveyance and prevention of manufacture 
and storage of unmarked plastic explosives. The Convention specifically targets the 
manufacturing of aircrafts and, as such, makes no serious distinctions between 
manned and unmanned aircrafts in its application. The restriction under the 
Convention is limited, however, to restrict plastic explosives to individuals who are 
the current high number of users of UAS. Further, ICAO has stated that cyber-
attacks on air navigation facilities could constitute an offence under the Beijing 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil 
Aviation.137 It illegalizes transport of Biological, Chemical, and Nuclear weapons and 
related materials, which UAS can easily transport, or hijackings and attacks on air 
navigation facilities by coercion or technological means.  
 
Further, the law on security may also draw from the international custom of State 
sovereignty. In this respect, Article 1 of the Chicago Convention states as follows: 
“The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and 
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory”. 
 
According to Brown et al, the principle of State sovereignty provides that every State 
has, to the exclusion of all other States, independent and absolute right to permit or 
                                                          




deny access into the area recognized as its territory, and similar right to control all 
activities within such territory.138  Article 1 of the Chicago Convention is the basis for 
reaffirmation of the principle, which first featured under Article 1 of the Paris 
Convention of 1919. By doing so, the Chicago Convention codified the customary 
international law.  
 
From the overview of the operation of the sovereignty principle and its embodiment 
in the treaty law and international custom, it is evident that application of the principle 
majorly targets very large aircraft systems. Even though it applies to UAS, the 
limitation may be abused. For instance, authorization can be seen as a limitation of 
innocent passage that may sometimes be invoked by a State against an enemy 
State. Such an instance can limit achievement of the provisions of Article 8 that only 
target the removal of all circumstances that obviate danger. The other challenge in 
the application of the principle is sovereignty itself. This arises from a common 
argument that the reasons States adopt national laws to complement ICAO Annexes 
and Circulars on security is to ensure efficient use of airspace, individual States still 
have a responsibility to recognize each other’s right to fly through national air 
territory.  
 
The other duty is to utilize certain areas of national land territories, as well as 
territorial waters, such as landing grounds and harbours. As a result of these 
dynamics, there is a school of thought that argues, and compellingly so, that 
airspace ought to be treated as belonging to humanity without exception and thus 
subject to international regulation. 139 Owing to the logical arguments above, it is 
submitted that leaving all these aspects of authorization to domestic regulation on 
prior authorization processes is self-defeatist and may amount to many UAS being 
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discreetly gunned down by some States in the pretext of maintaining national 
security. 
 
Other than State sovereignty, other international customs relevant to aviation 
security are the right of innocent passage and its exemptions under international law 
of the sea. Under this law, it is the duty of the originating State to ensure aircraft 
exercising the right of transit or passage navigate or fly immediately through or over 
the passage of another State.140 More so, the State given the right of way must 
refrain from any activities, other than those that are incidental to their normal modes 
of continuous and expeditious transit, unless rendered necessary by force majeure 
or necessity.141 
 
Additionally, general principles recognized by the civilized nations also form a 
necessary regulatory framework for aviation security. Particularly relevant is the 
general principle of sovereignty of the airspace, with its limitations. This principle 
has been responsible for provision of requirement of specialized authorization to 
operate UAS in the territory of another State as required under Article 12 of the 
Chicago Convention. The Article, which is a restatement for Article 15 of the Paris 
Convention, limits the right of passage to the airspace above the open sea, a free 
airspace with principles ruling aviation in this space being similar to those applicable 
at sea level. The rule is based on the public law rule that prohibits a State from 
exercising power over another State’s territory. 
 
The overall international legal framework outlined above is useful for the protection 
of the UAS from illegal seizure. It is dependent on States to determine privileges to 
which such aircraft may be entitled, and such States are reciprocally responsible for 
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the international good conduct of such aircraft in ensuring that the manned or 
unmanned aircraft are in good condition or not used to create insecurity.  
 
The mode of implementation and monitoring of the international security mechanism 
may, however, be inefficient in regulation of UAS for three principal reasons. First, 
congruence of the security programmes with airport plans is impossible for most 
UAS that can be launched from remote places. The second challenge is that the 
mechanism for protection under ICAO Annex 17 may be difficult to implement since 
ownership of UAS is increasingly becoming personal, and more so for civil UAS, to 
which the Chicago Convention applies. Even the more expansive amendment to the 
Aviation Security Manual may be limited in application since UAS may not have in-
flight security personnel or passengers as envisaged by the manual. 
 
Additionally, the success of the regulatory mechanism is dependent on the presence 
and efficiency of control and command systems for UAS. To date, however, and as 
discussed in chapter Two of this study, there are outstanding challenges related to 
the control and command systems.142 Though this is the case, the Chicago 
Convention still does not directly address the issue of command and control of the 
UAS. This partly explains why the UAS-specific Circular issued by ICAO recognizes 
that the challenges are inevitable.143 The persistent challenges for lack of system 
cannot, however, be overlooked at the international level owing to real security 
threats that may arise from exercise of freedom of overflight over high seas as 
provided for under Article 87(1) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.144   
 
Thirdly, security challenges could also arise from the right of transit passage, which 
is recognized under Article 38, as read together with Article 3 of the Law of the Sea 
Convention. The right allows exercise of the freedoms of navigation and overflight, 
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exclusively for purposes of continuous and expeditious transit through an 
international strait between one part of the high seas or an Exclusive Economic 
Zone which may pose practical threats to State security as regard the use of UAS, 
when they are abused. 
 
4.3 International Response to Privacy Challenges in UAS Regulation  
As discussed in chapter Two of this thesis, the privacy concerns on use of UAS are 
real and practical. They majorly concern the challenges of potential privacy 
breaches caused by the UAS that may be used for secret traditional photography. 
The threat arises from the fact that UAS have capacity to use global positioning 
system (GPS) technology to take aerial photos owing to their ability to fly above 
residential areas. 
 
At the time of enactment of the Chicago Convention, the contracting parties were 
conscious of possible privacy concerns arising from UAS operations. 
Comparatively, redress of the concern is not as prominent as aviation safety and 
security matters since there is not a single provision that expressly mandates the 
State parties to develop any regulation to reassure the privacy concerns in UAS use. 
The regulation of privacy issues can, however, be inferred by implication from the 
reading of some provisions of the Convention. Indeed, Article 36 of the Convention 
emphatically provides on this issue, albeit from an approach of a right of the State. 
It provides as follows: 
“Each contracting State may prohibit or regulate the use of photographic 
apparatus in aircraft over the territory.” 
 
The reference to possible State regulation of aerial photography in Article 36 of the 
Chicago Convention strongly imputes the regulation of the privacy. The actual 
import of Article 36 of the Convention, however, is not to expressly prohibit the 
traditional photography of operations of aircrafts, including UAS, operating over 
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territories of other States. What the provision does is to grant the obligation on the 
States to develop frameworks for putting this into effect. Again, this means that prior 
to development of the contemplated regulation, the protection of privacy rights may 
not be fully assured without the contemplated domestic regulations to be adopted 
by States as per Article 36 of the Chicago Convention. 
 
Secondly, the approach on protection of privacy through regulation of traditional 
photography seems to be archaic and not in touch with the 21st Century challenges. 
First, the photography is not only targeted at attacking other States. Secondly, other 
than the traditional photography concerns, there are other information and 
communication technologies that can negatively affect the privacy rights which are 
not expressly recognized under Article 36 of the Chicago Convention. For example, 
it does not contemplate the challenge of cyber-attacks, which may target the 
systems of the very UAS, control towers or radars.  
 
It is possible that ICAO has an avenue to overcome the challenges set out above 
through further regulation of the provisional powers to develop standards and 
recommended practices and procedures as well as its organizational objectives for 
promotion of all aspects of aviation under Articles 37 of the Chicago Convention. 
However, a closer reading of the Article evidences what might just be another case 
of the non-dominant position of redress for privacy concerns under the Chicago 
Convention. Article 37 addresses the areas in respect of which ICAO can develop 
international standards and recommended practices. The topical standards and 
recommended practices for which Annexes can be adopted, as listed at Articles 
37(a)-(k) do not prima facie expressly recognize privacy concerns in the use of UAS. 
The only possible means of developing regulations, standards and, procedures on 
privacy is pursuant to the Provision of Article 37 of the Chicago Convention that 




“…To this end the International Civil Aviation Organization shall adopt and 
amend from time to time, as may be necessary, international. Standards and 
recommended practices and procedures dealing with...and such other 
matters concerned with the safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigation 
as may from time to time appear appropriate.” 
 
This means that when ICAO considers developing a standard or recommended 
practice, it can only do so in reliance to its miscellaneous power to do so on ‘such 
other matters concerned with regularity, and efficiency of air navigation as may from 
time to time appear appropriate.’ In so doing, ICAO can further justify a possible 
development of a privacy framework action as moulded on its objectives under 
Article 44(i), which is to ‘promote generally the development of all aspects of 
international civil aeronautics’. 
 
However, hitherto, the ICAO has not developed any Annex to deal with the issue of 
privacy. The activities on regulation of privacy remain largely dormant at the 
international plane. The matters are largely left to be dealt with within the real State 
sovereignty. But even then, the audits which ICAO use to ensure compliance at 
those State levels only target safety and security of aircraft operations and use and 
not privacy compliance .  
 
The scanty framework in the principal international Convention does not, however, 
mean that the victims of breaches or threats of privacy breaches may be without 
distress. Indeed, such actual or potential victims have resort to the international 
human rights discourse for protection and remedies. Particularly relevant are human 
rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,145 and 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).146 Article 17(1) of the 
                                                          
145 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration on Human Rights 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). 
146 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966 
99 UNTS 171. 
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ICCPR is particularly important since ICCPR is a binding Convention. It provides as 
follows: 
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation.” 
 
The import of the above provision, is that except as may otherwise be limited in 
accordance with the applicable laws or derogated as under Article 4 of the 
ICCPR,147 States are under an obligation to among others respect, protect and fulfil 
the freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference with a person’s rights without 
distinction. This is a reaffirmation of the declaration at Article 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 that imposes similar prohibitions against 
interference.  
 
Accordingly, reliance on international human rights treaties is thus pivotal in 
regulation of activities of State aircrafts, which are otherwise excluded from the 
application of the Chicago Convention by virtue of Article 3. The appurtenant 
challenge, however, is the fact that the international human rights discourse 
addresses the States and not UAS operators. It thus relies on the State action to 
develop laws, policies and regulations, aimed at protection of privacy issues. 
Indeed, the challenges are laid bare in literature that shows that the UN member 
States remain sceptical about low levels of adoption of the universal standards.148 
A common thread that cuts across the development in the uses, sizes, functioning 
and history of UAS is the potential challenges associated with sovereignty, 
technological and technical underpinnings. This is evident from the lack of an 
international law convention or Annex on the privacy matters relating to cybercrime 
matters, which have an increasing potential to infringe on privacy rights.   
                                                          
147See UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966 99 UNTS 171, Article 4(2) on the list of articles on non-derogable rights. 
148 Mark E, and Alison LY “Privacy international in the Supreme Court: jurisdiction, the rule of law 




As a result of the scepticism, the regulation of UAS differs from one jurisdiction to 
another and, as such, the international treaties may not achieve uniformity. The 
available prospects of integrating UAS in civil aviation arise from the support 
extended by ICAO to member States in discharging their rights and obligations. 
Subsequently, some countries have taken, or are taking steps in addressing the 
challenges through their domestic legislation and regulations. 
 
5.  Conclusion  
This chapter has addressed the regulatory framework in international air law for UAS 
and in particular, how the international framework addresses safety, security and 
privacy challenges identified in chapter Two of this thesis. It is established that 
international civil aviation law framework under the Chicago Convention, enjoys 
support of 193 States, delineates mandatory application and interpretation of Article 
8 to apply it to UAS. Though the Convention’s provisions were compellingly couched 
to give prominence to regulation of manned aircrafts, they too can be extended 
seamlessly through the principles of fairness and transparency to apply to similar 
safety, security and privacy concerns in their application to the UAS.  Comparatively, 
however, the mention of redress for privacy concerns is scanty and limited to 
traditional photography issues. 
 
The deficiency notwithstanding, it is clear that the regulation of safety and security 
issues have been widely addressed through ICAO’s framework developed by way 
of adoption and amendment of SARPs pursuant to Article 37 of the Chicago 
Convention. Specifically, the ICAO framework targets both proactive and reactive 
regulation of the three aspects of UAS use. Despite the developments, certain 
practical challenges in development of higher standards of compliance for ICAO in 
requirement of autopilot software, management of air traffic, management and 
command control systems for UAS and the little attention given to the privacy 
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concerns in the framework for regulation under the Chicago Convention, 1944 
abound. Despite the challenges, the international human rights discourse has 
significantly shaped the redress for certain UAS concerns for privacy in order to fill 
the existing gap. Accordingly, other than the Chicago Convention, the full and 
effective redress of the safety, security and privacy challenges arising from UAS 
depends on further development of frameworks under ICAO, customary 
international law, and the international human rights discourse. 
 
Chapters Four, Five and Six discuss how specific States have dutifully responded 
to the absence of unified international UAS regulation in dealing with identified 




LEGAL, POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATION OF UAS IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (US) 
1. Introduction  
This chapter examines the regulatory framework of UAS in the US. It analyses how 
the framework addresses safety, security, and privacy challenges inherent in the 
use of UAS. Specifically, it reviews the different safety, security, and privacy 
concerns arising from dirty, dull and dangerous missions of UAS in the US, as 
explained in chapters One and Two of this thesis. The purpose of this chapter is to 
further analyse how, and to what extent, the US jurisdiction has adopted the 
international legal framework detailed in chapter Three, in order to address 
challenges associated with integration of UAS into civil aviation. The chapter 
evaluates the history of UAS regulation in the US, specific UAS guidelines, 
institutional and policy framework provided by the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) as well as the role of courts in harnessing and addressing safety, security, 
and privacy concerns.   
 
2.  History and Background of Regulation of Civil Aviation in the US 
According to Carr, the US is considered one of the most developed States 
technologically and economically, coupled with advanced legislative framework for 
UAS.1 Because of this advancement, UAS has become commonplace in the US 
airspace, and with development in technology, so has been the challenge of 
balancing demands of safety, security and privacy in Federal and State laws, 
regulations and economic interests.2 Given her technological advancement, 
                                                          
1 Carr EB https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog892/sites/www.e-
education.psu.edu.geog892/files/sp-Drones-long-paper.pdf (Date of use: 14 October 
2017). 
2 Carr EB https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog892/sites/www.e-




leadership, and many years’ interactions with UAS, the US can potentially provide 
experiences on integrating UAS into the civil airspace.  
 
The history of regulation of the civil aviation industry in the US commenced in the 
early 19th Century. A host of other countries, such as South Africa and Kenya, were 
beneficiaries of the regulations developed by the US. As Heymann correctly notes, 
the September 11 incident was a turning point in regulation of aircrafts in the US.3 
After the 11 September 2001 disaster, where manned aircraft were used as 
weapons of mass destruction to crash into north and south towers and World Trade 
Centre respectively, such incident has not happened in any other country ever since. 
The US undertook a massive security rearrangement to allow proper information 
sharing among agencies dealing with security, alignment of entities including 
customs, border control, immigration and aviation, which were placed under 
Homeland Security, to address uncoordinated security operations including aviation 
security. These policy changes ultimately led to the passage of the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act4 in 2012, marking the starting point in addressing 
challenges related to aircraft regulations for smooth integration into civilian aviation.5  
 
It is noteworthy that even in the US where development and use of UAS is 
advanced, a most recent and dedicated legislation in the name of Federal Aviation 
Modernization and Reform Act was only enacted in 2012, three years before 
commencement of this study. The Act mandated the Federal Aviation Authority to 
develop and implement comprehensive procedures that would enable UAS 
integration into the national airspace system by September 2015.6  Hitherto, FAA 
was developing such polices, standards, advisory circulars, notices and orders 
                                                          
3 Heymann PB “Civil liberties and human rights in the aftermath of September 11” 2001 HJLPP 441. 
4 FAA Modernization Reform Act of 2012 (Congress Public Law No.112-095) (hereinafter refered to 
as the FAA Modernization Reform Act). 
5 Elias B Pilotless drones: Background and consideration for congress regarding unmanned aircraft 
operations in the national airspace system (Congressional Research Service Washington 
DC 2012) 8. 
6 http://www.FAA.gov (Date of use: 4 July 2017). The National Airspace System (NAS) is the common 
network of U.S. airspace; air navigation facilities, equipment and services, airports or landing 
areas. Included are system components shared jointly with the military. 
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designed to improve airspace safety and this remains work in progress.7  Despite 
its considerable and comparative success, FAA is faced with the challenge 
presented by the dire need to create an environment that would spur technological 
innovation, while at the same time developing a regulatory framework that 
guarantees safety for all aviation stakeholders. This is critical because, whereas the 
integration process is incomplete, operators of recreational UAS continue to use 
distinct rules for model aircraft in violation of the FAA Modernization and Reform 
Act.8   
 
The US has a long history with UAS dating back earlier than the Air Commerce Act.9 
In the pre-1926 regime, the aviation sector took a two-pronged dimension through 
the common law from State and local court decisions, as well as statutory law 
enacted at the State level.10 In the mid-1920s, a view was developed that it was 
necessary for federal law to regulate the aviation industry through adoption of 
statutes and regulations at the federal level.11 Prior to the above development in 
1934, the Department of Commerce renamed the Aeronautics Branch as the Bureau 
of Air Commerce with the objective of underlining the growing significance of 
aviation to the nation.12 Among the aims of the renamed Bureau’s tasks was to 
promulgate all-inclusive federal air commerce rules.13  
 
The drafters of the initial federal law were of the view that the scope of rules should 
encompass all frontages of aviation, that is, the aircraft, the airmen involved in 
aircraft operation (the pilots and mechanics), and the rules of the air.14 The experts 
                                                          
7 FAA “Advisory Circular on Reporting of Laser Illumination of Aircraft” https://www.Faa.gov (Date of 
use: 18 July 2018). 
8  The US Integration of civil UAS in National Airspace System Road Map of 2013. See also 
Secretary of Transportation “Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Compressive Plan: A 
Report on Nation’s UAS Path Forward of September 2013” 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=746317 (Date of use: 1 October 2020). 
9  Air Commerce Act of 1926. 
10 Logan GB “The Present Status and the Development of Aviation Law” (2013) JAL 510.  
11 Logan GB “Present” 510. 
12 https://www.FAA.gov (Date of use: 18 July 2018). 
13 https://www.FAA.gov (Date of use: 18 July 2018). 
14  The US Department of Commerce Information Bullet Number 7. 
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modelled American federal law on the principles itemized in the draft description 
from the Aerial Navigation Convention.15 The Bureau of Air Commerce 
recommended laws requiring that every aircraft shall be provided with:- (a) a 
certificate of registration, (b) a certificate of airworthiness, (c) certificates and 
licenses of the commanding officer, pilots, crew and log books. 
 
Arising from the above development and the fact that aircraft could naturally 
navigate State and national boundaries, a uniform aviation law was ideal compared 
to a patchwork comforter of local laws.16 Uniform regulation at the federal level was 
a logical preference due to the fundamental requisite to standardize aviation for 
military purposes.17 Owing to the failure by the US Constitution to expressly define 
aerial jurisdiction, the government realized that there was an urgent need to legislate 
on it so as not to interfere with the inherent concept of federalism.18 
 
In the aftermath of Congress’ decision not to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, President 
Woodrow Wilson excluded production of the Aerial Navigation Convention to the 
Senate for debate.19 In 1920, the American Bar Association adopted a resolution 
that aeronautics is within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States and should 
be entertained accordingly.20 Upon failure of this proposal, as there was precedence 
that transport by air was distinguishable from transport by sea, the American Bar 
Association sought other means to create federal jurisdiction over the skies. In 1922, 
the American Bar Association mooted an idea of endorsing a constitutional 
amendment.21  
                                                          
15 The Convention Relating to the Regulation on Aerial Navigation of 13 October 1919 (entered into 
force 15 June 1929). 
16  Lee FP “The Air Commerce Act of 1926” 1926 ABAJ 371. 
17 Lee FP “Air Commerce” 376. 
18  Lee FP “Air Commerce” 375. 
19  Lee FP “Air Commerce” 372. 
20 https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/ASIL_1947_study.pdf (Date of use: 1 October 
2020) 




Ultimately, the constitutional amendment was deemed unrealistic and air law was 
divided along two paths - regulatory legislation that was nearly exclusively a federal 
responsibility, and non-regulatory legislation that is primarily a State responsibility.22 
For lack of a decisive federal action, the Uniform Law Commission, also known as 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,23 undertook 
consideration of the necessities for durable State-level aviation law.24 Set up in 
1892, the Uniform Law Commission was tasked with providing States with non-
partisan professional advice, with the Commission conceiving well-drafted 
legislation to bring clarity and stability to critical areas of State statutory law. This 
was a State-supported body that represented true worth for States providing 
services that most of them could not otherwise afford or duplicate.25 To conform to 
values of federalism, each State willingly adopted a uniform State law for 
aeronautics which explicitly barred navigation of any aircraft otherwise than in 
conformity with the federal traffic rules.26 The legislative step was thus a key 
assurance of safety and security concerns that would ordinarily arise from use of 
aircraft. 
 
Practically, beginning in 1926, the United States enjoyed a uniform aviation law 
system with federal laws such as the Air Commerce Act27 being applicable to flying, 
commercial, non-commercial, intra-State and inter-State.28 Specifically, the 
objective of the Air Commerce Act was to establish federal regulations regarding 
aircraft, aviators, navigation facilities and establishment of aircraft regulations 
together with the Commerce Department's related rules. The uniform aviation law 
system was, however, donned with a serious setback since the time of its formation 
fell within the era of Lochner v New York.29 This was an era of Commerce Clause 
                                                          
22 Lee FP “Air Commerce” 372. 
23 The Commission is also called National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
24 MacCracken WF “The Growth of Aeronautical Law in America” 1930 IJAL 418. 
25 http://www.uniformlaws.org (Date of use: 18 August 2018). 
26  http://www.uniformlaws.org (Date of use: 18 August 2018). 
27 Air Commerce Act of 1926. 
28 Lee FP “Air Commerce” 418. 
29 See generally Lochner v. New York 1905 US 198 (SC) [45]. 
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jurisprudence when the Supreme Court of the US made it a common practice to 
strike down economic regulations.30 Despite this era ending in 1937, judicial activism 
played a key role in the development of the uniform aviation law system. The courts 
did this through application of liberal interpretation of the constitutionality and 
applicability of the Air Commerce Act, with a view to harnessing its objective of 
ensuring aviation safety. In addition, cardinal to the judicial activism during the 
Lochner period is the expansion of otherwise narrow interpretation in order to protect 
personal liberty, which had a bearing on both security and protection of privacy 
rights. 
 
Beginning with the Air Commerce Act, the federal government preserved the 
concept that the basic privilege to fly be limited only by the fitness of the aircraft and 
operating personnel in the interest of safety to those participating in aeronautics and 
to persons on the ground.31 This is a compelling indication that the adoption of the 
Air Commerce Act was underpinned with the overall intention of ensuring safety in 
all flights. The Act provided for the means of ensuring safety, which is by issuance 
of certificates of airworthiness and licenses to competent pilots and flights. It is, 
however, possible that the safety requirements could be potentially abused owing 
to the much discretion granted to States in granting the flights as privileges.32   
 
After the passage of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, efforts were made to establish 
air procedures.33 The Air Commerce Regulations of 1928 represent an inclusive set 
of rules developed shortly thereafter to ensure high-quality elementary engineering, 
manufacturing, repairs, and operation of aircraft.34 All these requirements focused 
on safety of operation of UAS. Subsequently, the US Congress passed the Civil 
                                                          
30 For more information on how the period represented constitutional crisis, see Choudhry S “The 
Lochner era and comparative constitutionalism” 2004 IJCL 2. 
31 Fang FD “Legal Basis of the Civil Air Regulations” JALC 9.  
32 Fang FD “Legal Basis” 9. 
33 Fang FD “Legal Basis” 12. 
34 Fang FD “Legal Basis” 12. 
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Aeronautics Act,35 the Federal Aviation Act,36 and the Department of Transportation 
Act.37 These statutes organizationally streamlined the Bureau of Air Commerce into 
Civil Aeronautics, the Federal Aviation Agency, and eventually the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). These federal provisions continued to apply with no 
discrimination between the commercial and non-commercial utility in design of 
aircraft.38 The efforts have since culminated into development of the Federal 
Aviation Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. 
 
3.  The Current Framework for US’ Response to Regulation of UAS  
The US has embraced the international approach through which it was involved in 
discussions that culminated to the adoption of the Chicago Convention and the 
ICAO framework.39 It did actively participate in the development of the framework 
through its invitation of 55 States, out of which 54 attended. The conference, 
approved the Chicago Convention, signed by 52 States as it ended on 7 December 
1944.40  
 
Under the international legal framework, the US is a party to the Chicago 
Convention, meaning that the US is mandatorily obliged to follow the binding rule of 
the air contained in both Article 12 and Annex 2 on Rules of the Air, In addition, it 
has to adhere to civil aviation security and safety as provided in ICAO Annexes 17 
and 19 respectively.41 Additionally, the US is party to the Convention relating to 
                                                          
35 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. 
36 Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 
37 Department of Transportation Act of 1966. 
38 See US Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, § 23 on Airworthiness Standards: Normal, Utility, 
Acrobatic, and Commuter Category Airplanes and § The US Code of Federal Regulations, 
Title 14, § 25 on Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes). 
39 https://www.icao.int/about-icao/History/Pages/default.aspx (Date of use: 28 December 2019). 
40 https://www.icao.int/about-icao/History/Pages/default.aspx (Date of use: 28 December 2019). 
41 https://www.icao.int/about-icao/History/Pages/default.aspx (Date of use: 28 December 2019). 
Specifically, the US Signed Chicago Convention on December 7, 1944 consented to be 




Unification for Rules relating to International Carriage by Air, also the known as 
Warsaw Convention among other relevant treaties.42   
 
At the domestic level, the Constitution is the supreme law of the US. It addresses 
myriad matters that form the basis for the regulation of safety, security and privacy 
in UAS operation albeit at a high level. The US has a unique experience with UAS 
regulation as its constitutional structure as a federal State means that regulation and 
management of UAS is dealt with at four levels – two at the federal level and two at 
the State level. 
 
Under 49 U.S. Code § 106, the administrator who is the head of FAA, has authority 
under the Act to make additional rules, regulations, circulars and bulletins. 
Particularly this power is recognized at section 2 (A) (iii) of the Code provides that:  
“except as otherwise provided in paragraph (3), the administrator has power 
of promulgation of regulations, rules, orders, circulars, bulletins, and other 
official publications of the administration.”  
 
The import of the above provision of 49 U.S. Code § 106 is that the issuing circulars 
towards operation of UAS are meant to be legally binding to the operators unless 
there are contrary intentions or provisions for the same.  
 
Under the constitutional framework, another relevant statute of relevance to this 
study as already mentioned is the Federal Aviation Modernization and Reform Act. 
This Act was enacted after a raft of amendments to the aviation safety provision 
through the Public Law 112-95 of 14 February, 2012 by the US Congress. The Acts 
                                                          




make provision for regulation of civil aviation. Specifically, sub-title B of Title III of 
the Act makes provision for regulation of UAS. 
 
The FAA Modernization Reform Act defines an aircraft as any contrivance invented, 
used, or designed to navigate or fly in the air.43 This definition is also confirmed 
under the FAA Regulations, where an aircraft is defined as a device that is used or 
intended to be used for flight in the air.44 Specifically, the Act also defines unmanned 
aircraft as follows: 
“an aircraft that is operated without the possibility of direct human intervention 
from within or on the aircraft.”45   
 
The UAS fits into the above definitions by virtue of being a device to be used for 
flying in the air. The regulatory approach is even much more definitive since the Act 
differentiates the small-unmanned aircraft and public unmanned aircrafts systems 
depending on their weight and use. 
 
 It is noteworthy that in 2014, the National Transportation Safety Board pronounced 
itself on a decision, which brought UAS within the ambit of aircrafts, affirming the 
already established definition.46 The decision affirmed the grip and jurisdiction of 
FAA over UAS.47 The affirmation of the applicability of the definition is a big plus for 
the pragmatic approach that the US has taken in implementing the spirit of Article 
15 of the Paris Convention as later contained in Article 8 of the Chicago Convention. 
 
                                                          
43 US Code of Regulations, Title 49, § 40102(a) (6). 
44 US Code of Regulations, Title 14, § 1.1. 
45 The FAA Modernization Reform Act, Section 331(8). 
46 https://www.lmc.org/resources/drones-municipal-use-and-regulation/ (Date of use: 1 October 
2020). 




Lastly, the Community-based Guidelines on Safety of Operations and Safety Code 
that have been published by the Academy of Model Aeronautics are also important 
in complementing the efforts of FAA in regulation of safety issues regarding use and 
operation of UAS. 
  
4.  Overview of Federal Aviation Administration  
The overall mandate of integrating UAS into the US national airspace is bestowed 
upon the FAA as the national civil aviation authority under48 the Federal Aviation 
Administration Act of 1958.49 FAA as an administration is part of the US Department 
of Transportation Security Administration that established FAA.50 Accordingly, the 
control of activities and personnel of the FAA is done by the Secretary of 
Transportation pursuant to section 106(f)(1) of Title 49 U.S Code.  
 
FAA has the overall statutory mandate to ensure the safety and security of the 
national airspace.51 It undertakes this solemn obligation through the regulation of all 
matters pertaining to aircraft, airmen, most categories of airline employees, 
commercial or common carrier operations, airports, and, more prominently, use of 
national airspace. The mandate extends to promotion of safe flight of civil aircraft in 
the airspace. 
  
4.1 FAA Organs 
The Administrator and Deputy Administrator, who are citizens of the United States 
and are appointees of the US President with an experience in the field of civil 
aviation, to head FAA.52 The officers are independent and coordinate with the office 
                                                          
48 The FAA Modernization Reform Act, Sections 331-313. 
49 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (Congress Public Law Number 85-726). 
50  https://www.faa.gov (Date of use: 27 April 2017). 
51 The US Code of Regulations, Title 49, §§ 40101(a) (1), 40103(b), 44701(a) (2012). 
52 The US Code of Regulations, Title 49, §§ 106. 
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of Secretary of Transportation together with the respective staff to regulate and 
enforce the aviation issues in the US. 
 
In pursuance of its mandate, FAA has created a UAS Integration Office.53 The 
mandate of the institution is set forth in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act. The 
UAS Integration Office established six UAS test sites, published the Integration of 
Civil UAS in the National Airspace System Roadmap, expanded use of small UAS 
in the implementation plan and the UAS comprehensive plan, and simplified the 
certificate of waiver or authorization process.  
 
The UAS Integration Office was mandated to achieve integration of UAS by 2015. 
Accordingly, by December 2015, FAA announced that all UAS weighing more than 
250 grams, flown for any purpose, must be registered with FAA. However, the focus 
is not on full integration, but rather on safe integration. There is the realization that 
such a process will have to be incremental, and not drastic, to give room for its 
effectiveness hence the development of the integration roadmap.  This approach 
seems to be well thought out since it appreciates the unique circumstances of the 
UAS as opposed to taking an over-ambitious step of full integration.  
 
The integration of UAS into the civil airspace which is envisaged under section 332 
of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act is aimed at uniting the following entities: 
the UAS Integration Office, Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration and the MITRE Corporation to work closely in achieving the 
integration. The UAS Integration Office continues to perfect processes of collecting 
safety data while the six test sites provide data collected during operations. The 
development of safety management documents is aimed at facilitating 
understanding and mitigate hazards that could arise from integration.  
                                                          




Another critical organ of the FAA is the Office of the Rule-making. This office is the 
repository for the published regulatory documents by FAA. The office also provides 
the avenue for public participation in the rule-making processes undertaken by 
FAA.54 Further, regarding the small UAS, there is in place a Small UAS Aviation 
Rulemaking Committee that was established to formulate rules aimed at facilitating 
integration of UAS into the national airspace, in a controlled manner.55 
 
4.2 Rule-making by FAA 
Of all the regulatory tools adopted by FAA, the rule-making stands out and has 
power to formulate proposals that are critical to integration of UAS into civilian 
airspace for effective management of airspace use, aviation experience, climate, 
geography and location of ground infrastructure, research needs, risk, and safety.56 
FAA’s jurisdiction and rulemaking powers are derived from Title 49 of the United 
States Code.57  Particularly, the Administrator of the FAA is mandated to: 
“…the promulgation of regulations, rules, orders, circulars, bulletins, and 
other official publications of the Administration;” 
 
Henceforth, FAA embarked on the task of creating policy statements, orders, 
notices, handbooks and manuals, and directives.58 Particularly, pursuant to the 
above cited mandate, FAA, as through its Office of Rulemaking, sought to take other 
statutory roles to achieve a countrywide geographic and climatic  diversity by 
developing regulatory and operational procedures and standards that would not only 
guide integration of UAS technology as well.59 Such procedures and standards 
                                                          
54 https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/ (Date of use: 15 September 2020). 
55  https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/ (Date of use: 15 September 2020). 
56 Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau “Research Brief on Unmanned Aircraft Vehicles” 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/Publications/ResearchBriefs/UAS.pdf (Date 
of use: 1 October 2020) 
57 US Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, § 44702 (a) and § 40103 (b). 
58 https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/ (Date of use: 15 September 2020). 
59 https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/ (Date of use: 15 September 2020). 
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include Advisory Circulars (AC) published by FAA as binding documents that 
provide guidance for conducting UAS operation in the US national airspace, since 
the US government has exclusive sovereignty over her airspace.60 
 
Further, FAA develops aviation policies and regulations that form the basis for safety 
and security through development of guidance systems, personnel and skill 
development, operations, and procedures.61 Through the regulations, all aircrafts 
are now required to meet the regulatory requirements for air navigation facilities, 
equipment and services, airports or landing areas, aeronautical charts, information 
and services, rules, and processes, technical data, workers, and materials.  
 
Another critical tool is the development of advisory opinion and airworthiness 
directives by the FAA.62 A technical standard could be created to address a technical 
problem emanating from the attention of FAA advisory circulars to advise the 
aviation committee on issues of regulation. Airworthiness Directives, on the other 
hand, are legally enforceable.63  
 
The Circulars that are developed to give effect to the Federal Aviation Regulations 
are generally non-regulatory in nature and therefore non-binding in the strict sense, 
they only provide guidance and precautions on issues.64 The decision of the court 
in the case of FAA v. Raphael Pirker,65 demonstrates this position. This was a 
motion of appeal filed by the respondent (Pirker), a US citizen challenging an earlier 
order for a civil penalty in the sum of $10,000 in favour of the FAA. The device in 
                                                          
60 US Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, § 40103. 
61 US Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace System Roadmap of 
2013. 
62 An example is The US Department of Transportation and Federation Aviation Administration 
Airworthiness Directive 2014. 
63 https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/airworthiness_directives/ (Date of use: 29 December 
2019). 
64 https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/airworthiness_directives/ (Date of use: 29 December 
2019). 
65 FAA v Raphael Pirker 2013 EA-5730 (NTBS).  
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question was a commercial Ritewing Zephyr powered glider aircraft’ in the vicinity 
of the University of Virginia. According to the FAA, the device was a UAS within the 
definition of the US laws and regulations. Since it was operating for commercial 
purposes, it came under the purview of FAA regulations. However, the respondent 
contended that FAA, the complainant, did not have jurisdiction and regulatory 
authority over model aircraft operators hence the decision ought to have been 
dismissed. While agreeing the with respondent’s motion, the Board, cited among 
others that model aircrafts operation by the respondent was only subject to FAA 
voluntary compliance with Safety Guidelines in FAA Advisory Circular on Model 
Aircraft Operating Standards.66 Secondly, the Board noted that at the time of the 
respondent’s model aircraft operation, there was no enforceable FAA rule 
classifying model aircraft. 
 
The above stated position does not, however, mean that the Advisory Circulars may 
be ignored with impunity. Indeed, the historical timelines when the Raphael Pirker 
case (supra) was decided is significant. First, it was a period before the enactment 
of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act. It is provided under Section 336 of the 
Act that exemption of model UAS operators be determined by adherence to 
conditions attached to model UAS aircraft, the most important one being for 
recreational or purposes of hobby.67 From this thesis’ analysis, it would appear that 
if the Raphael Pirker case was decided after 2012, the respondent would have been 
found in violation of Section 336 of the Act, which was not in existence at the time 
of the judgment. The exemption envisaged in the Act is, however, not absolute. For 
instance, when the model of UAS changes its use to commercial purposes, it shifts 
status to a civil UAS, and therefore requires a special authorization certificate in 
experimental category.68 
 
                                                          
66 FAA Advisory Circular on Model Aircraft Operating Standards No. 91-57. 
67 Henshon M “Case notes: FAA v. Pirke” 2014 SL 26. 
68 The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, § 21.175(b).  
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In the same vein, the FAA issues advisory tools known as policy statements 
touching on UAS.69 These policy statements have the full force of the law.70 Of 
relevance to this study are statements on the UAS. Notable among the statements 
is the ‘UAS statement 05-01,71 whose aim is to clarify a statement that was carried 
in the Federal Register on 6 February, 2007 titled, ’unmanned aircraft operations in 
the national airspace system’72 and ‘interim operational approach guidance 08-01.’73 
 
Apart from the use of policy statements, FAA has also been able to utilize the use 
of notices. Other than road notices and statements, is a mandate to publish 
roadmaps. It has published roadmaps, wherein it has consistently asserted that it 
has overall mandate to regulate national airspace and aviation in general. There is 
diverse opinion that there is little difference between published roadmaps74 and 
policy statements. However, a roadmap is more practical and has timelines in the 
redress of UAS security and safety concerns compared to policy statements. From 
the wording alone, roadmaps are more coordinated, distinguishable, and therefore 
important in the regulation of aviation. It provides, inter alia, broad timelines, tasks 
and considerations needed to enable UAS integration into the national aviation 
system for the planning purposes of the expanded UAS community. The roadmap 
has built a basis for the national aviation airspace transition from UAS 
accommodation to UAS integration. It has also provided a strategy to align proposed 
agency actions with the Congressional mandate in the FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act of 2012. The roadmap too has a unique provision that tasks FAA to 
consider incorporating lessons and related findings in successive periodicals to 
                                                          
69 The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, § 21.175(b). 
70 Gonczy ST Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness certification for ceramic matrix 
composite components in civil aircraft systems (MATEC Web of Conferences 2015) 2. 
71https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Notice/N_JO_7210.889_Unmanned_Aircraft_Operati
ons_in_the_NAS.pdf (Date of use: 1 October 2020). 
72https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Notice/N_JO_7210.889_Unmanned_Aircraft_Operati
ons_in_the_NAS.pdf (Date of use: 1 October 2020). 
73 FAA, Aviation Safety Unmanned Aircraft Program Office Interim Operational Approval Guidance 
No 08-01 of 2008. 
74 The US Integration of Civil UAS in the NAS Roadmap of 2013. 
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include further refined goals, metrics, and target dates to address the ever-changing 
UAS technological landscape.75   
 
Other than the roadmap example, after 2007, the FAA published various notices 
such as the “inspection and maintenance programme requirements for 
airworthiness certification of unmanned aircraft operating under 55 pounds,76 
aviation-related videos or other electronic media on the internet;77 and sporting 
event temporary flight restrictions.78 Other notices are on “education, compliance 
and enforcement of unauthorized UAS operators,79 at least seven orders80 two 
additional advisory circulars,81 three guidance documents82 four legal 
interpretations83 and one special rules on interpretation.84 
 
4.3 Partnerships by ICAO 
Generally, under section 220 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, the 
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration is mandated to enter into 
partnerships on regulation of civil aviation with regard to Nextgen technologies. 
Currently FAA recognizes its partnership with ICAO. Particularly, FAA is an active 
participant of the ICAO Dangerous Goods Panel meetings. Accordingly, it also 
participates in the revision and updating of the Technical instructions for the Safe 
Transport of Dangerous Goods. The latter expressly admits that FAA is a pivotal 
partner in the area of regulation of civil aviation.85 It, trains small and middle-sized 
                                                          
75 Integration of Civil UAS in the NAS Roadmap, Section 2.2.1.  
76 http://www.faa.gov Notice/N_8900.291.pdf (accessed 3 July 2017). 
77 http://www.faa.gov Notice/N_8900.291.pdf (accessed 3 July 2017). 
78 US Department of Transport “Federal Aviation Administration FDC. NOTAM 4/3621, Sporting 
Event Temp. Flight Restriction” https://www.faa.gov/uas/regulations (Date of use: 2 July 
2017). 
79 http://www.faa.gov (Date of use: 4 July 2017). 
80 http://www.faa.gov. (Date of use: 4 July 2017). 
81 US Department of Transport “Identification and Registration Marking” http://www.Faa.gov (Date of 
use: 2 July 2017). 
82 https://www.FAA.gov/uas/regulations policies (Date of use: 2 July 2017). 
83 https://www.Faa.gov/ (Date of use: 2 July 2017). 
84 https://www.FAA.gov/uas (Date of use: 2 July 2017). 
85 https://www.icao.int/safety/RunwaySafety/GRSS2011/Pages/PartnersandSupporters.aspx (Date 
of use: 15 September 2020). 
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enterprises, and makes contribution towards the success of the ICAO’s Safety 
Oversight System Project. It also contributes towards the success of the ICAO’s 
programme for regional technical cooperation, called the Multi-regional Civil Aviation 
Assistance Program.86 The partnership, among others, supports the collaborative 
approach that the FAA takes towards its integration efforts in respect of the UAS 
into the national aviation system.87 
 
5. US’ Domestic Response to Safety, Security and Privacy Concerns of UAS 
After a brief discussion of the domestic legal framework and institutional mechanism 
of FAA, the following part turns to the substantive issues and responses to 
challenges experienced in operation of UAS, namely: safety, security and privacy 
as identified in chapter Two of this thesis.  
 
5.1 The US Response to Safety Concerns of UAS  
As discussed in chapter Two, aviation safety is one of the challenges to integration 
of UAS into civil aviation. Even the US has recognized that safety issues in the use 
of UAS abound. Statics by the US Accountability Office reports indicate that since 
2014, over 6,000 cases of unsafe use of UAS have been recorded.88  It is against 
this backdrop that the US leverages on its active participation in and membership of 
ICAO to ensure compliance with safety requirements under the Chicago Convention 
and ICAO Annex 19.89  
 
                                                          
86 https://www.icao.int/WACAF/Documents/APIRG/APIRG%2022/WPs%20-
%20FINAL%20ENG/WP%2051%20-%20%20U.S%20UAS%20Integration%20Update%20-
%20FAA.pdf (Date of use: 15 September 2020). 
87 ICAO “Update on US. Unmanned aircraft systems integration activities” (Paper presented to the 
Twenty-Second Meeting of the AFI Planning and Implementation Regional Group 29 July- 2 
August 2019 Accra) 3. 
88US Government Accountability Office “Unmanned Aircraft Systems” 
https://www.gao.gov/key_issues/unmanned_aerial_systems/issue_summary (Date of use: 9 
February 2020). 
89 See chapter Three, section 4.1 on exposition of the specific safety requirements. 
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The subsequent part details how the US legal framework responds to these live 
safety challenges associated with the operation of UAS.  The principal framework is 
provided under the FAA Modernization and Reform Act and the US Code of Federal 
Regulation. The framework is also complemented by the FAA Advisory Circulars. 
The application of the framework to the UAS generally has been affirmed by court 
in Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co v Hollycal Production Inc et al90 where the 
Supreme Court noted the fact that a drone is unmanned does not make it less of an 
aircraft which can be subject of regulation.91 The import of this judgment for the 
purpose of safety is that safety precaution applicable to manned aircraft should be 
applicable to UAS as well.   
 
Section 335 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act is instructive of general safety 
considerations regarding the integration of UAS into the national civil aviation 
airspace of the US. The section provides as follows: 
“The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall carry out all 
safety studies necessary to support the integration of unmanned aircraft 
systems into the national airspace system”92 
 
The import of this rule is that the general safety consideration must be made in a 
prospective manner considering the level of development in technology regarding 
the use and operation of UAS at any given time. Part 5 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations is more elaborate on how the safety goals can be achieved. The Code 
creates mandatory obligations for development of safety management system as 
being prerequisite for grant of operator certificates. Part 5.51 provides in this regard 
as follows: 
“A certificate holder must apply safety risk management to the following: (a) 
Implementation of new systems. (b) Revision of existing systems. (c) 
Development of operational procedures. (d) Identification of hazards or 
                                                          
90 Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co v Hollycal Production Inc et al 18-768 SA (2018) 7 (SC) [4]. 
91Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co v Hollycal Production Inc et al 18-768 SA (2018) 7 (SC) [4].  
92 FAA Modernization and Reform Act, Section 335. 
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ineffective risk controls through the safety assurance processes in subpart D 
of this part.” 
 
The formulation of rule 5.51 is couched in mandatory terms. Secondly, the avenues 
for the use of the system is expansive and futuristic since it is not allowed for revision 
in event of change in circumstances.  Further, the FAA has made strides, through 
rule-making, to further this general assurance of aviation safety in the area of the 
mandates of the service providers. It has done so through issuance of Advisory 
Circulars. These Advisory Circulars generally provide guidance materials but are 
not strictly binding on the public.93 For the purposes of standardization and 
complementariness of the principal statute, it is a compelling communication of the 
best practices of operations.94  
 
Of particular relevance is FAA Advisory Circular on Safety Management Systems 
for Aviation Service Providers,95 air carriers are obligated to apply SMS founded on 
Part 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations.96 Explicitly, this Advisory Circular offers 
an account of governing requirements, guidance, and approaches of developing and 
executing Safety Management Systems. Chapter Three of the Circular provides the 
minimum contents of the management systems to conclude regulatory 
requirements, summary of process, setting out of safety objectives and scalability. 
Part 3.3 mandates the service providers to develop a safety policy that provides for 
among others accountability and authority responsible for safety risks. Under this 
part, FAA requires aviation organizations to adopt policies that reflect the safety 
culture, open reporting, vigilance, information sharing and risk reduction. Also 
relevant are the requirements under Part 3.4 of the Circular, which imposes an 
                                                          
93https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/d
ocumentID/74299 (Date of use: 22 July 2020). See paragraph 3 on explanation of AC 
systems. 
94  ht tps:/ /www.thebalancecareers.com/what -s-an-advisory-c ircular-and-why-should-
youcare282774#:~:text=Advisory%20circulars%20can%20be%20directional,Standardizatio
n % 2 0 i s % 2 0 o n e % 2 0 c o m m o n % 2 0 r e a s o n  ( D a t e  o f  u s e :  2 2  J u l y  2 0 2 0 ) . 
95 FAA Advisory Circular on Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers No. 120-
92B. 




obligation on service providers to develop a system for safety risk management 
including the maintenance of the risk register to be used in monitoring aviation safety 
risks.  
 
The passage of the Advisory Circular is an effort that reflects that adoption of safety 
risk management and assurance goals and domestication of international guidance 
material developed by ICAO as set in the chapter Two of ICAO Circular No. 328-
AN/190. The safety provisions are very elaborate and easy to understand. They take 
a step-by step approach to highlight the would-be contents of a safety policy in a 
more robust manner than is provided for in section 2.19 of the ICAO Circular No. 
328-AN/190. 
 
The framework in the Circular recognizes that the recreational UAS can enjoy the 
statutory exemption from the safety management systems, a requirement that may 
pose safety challenges. In this respect, the FAA Advisory Circular on Model Aircraft 
Operation97 that was cancelled in 2015 represented efforts of the FAA to adopt 
provisions of ICAO Circular No. 328-AN/190. It will be recalled that this Circular is 
discussed in chapter Three of this thesis, and addresses safety concerns through 
regulation of operations, personnel licencing, provision of rules of the air, 
certification and surveillance, among others.98 The FAA Advisory Circular, now 
amended and replaced with Advisory Circular on Exemption for Limited 
Recreational Operations for Unmanned Aircraft,99 offers a non-binding guidance to 
operators of UAS used for recreational purposes. Generally, the Circular 
pronounces its aim of ensuring safety of operators through offering of interim safety 
                                                          
97 FAA Advisory Circular on Model Aircraft Operating 91-57. 
98 See chapter Three, section 4.1 of this thesis. 
99 The FAA Advisory Circular now amended and replaced with Advisory Circular on Exemption for 
Limited Recreational Operations for Unmanned Aircraft No. 91-57B of 2019 (hereinafter 
refered to as the AC 91-57B). 
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guidance to such operators.100 Principally, paragraphs 7(1) of the Circular states in 
part that: 
“FAA assumes owners and operators of unmanned aircraft are generally 
concerned about safety and willing to exercise good judgment when flying 
their aircraft. However, basic aeronautical knowledge and awareness of 
responsibilities in shared airspace are not common knowledge” 
 
The import of the regulation is to recognize that even the recreational flyers of UAS 
must be conscious of the safety concerns arising from the UAS operations. The 
guidance further includes the need to fly strictly for recreation, following safety 
guidelines, keeping UAS in line of sight, providing a way to manned aircrafts and 
avoiding controlled airspace.101 The Circular supports ICAO’s initiatives and the US 
legal framework as described in section 44809 of Title 14 to the Code of Federal 
Regulation providing exception for limited recreational operations of UAS.  
 
The model UAS flyers and recreational flyers subject to the FAA Advisory Circular 
on Exemption for Limited Recreational Operations for Unmanned Aircraft102 in the 
second scenario, are subject to a complementary regulatory framework created 
under the Safety Code.103 The Safety Code as established by the Academy of Model 
Aeronautics is relevant with regard to setting up of actual safety standards that must 
be met for flyers who are members of the Academy.104 Instructively, at the first 
                                                          
100 The AC 91-57B, Section 1 and The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, § 44809. 
101 Advisory Circular 91-57B, section 7.1.3 provides that Aircraft is flown within the Visual Line of 
Sight (VLOS) of the Person Operating the Aircraft or a Visual Observer Co-Located and in 
direct communication with the operator. This means that either the recreational flyer or the 
visual observer must have eyes on the aircraft at all times to ensure it is not a collision hazard 
to other aircraft or people on the ground. The assistance of a visual observer is generally 
optional but is helpful in ensuring the recreational flyer is able to check instruments for 
extended periods. The assistance of a visual observer is necessary if the recreational flyer 
wants to use first person view (FPV) devices that allow a limited view of the surrounding area 
from the perspective of a camera aboard the aircraft. See also FAA AC 91-57B, sections 
7.1.4 – 7.1.8. 
102 FAA Advisory Circular on Exemption for Limited Recreational Operations for Unmanned Aircraft 
No. 91-57B of 2019.  
103 The Academy of Model Aeronautics Safety Code of 2018. 
104 Academy of Model Aeronautics (AMA) is a nationwide organization representing model aircraft 
enthusiasts with its headquarters in Muncie and that was established in 1936. 
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paragraph of the Code is an affirmation by members not to ‘fly a model aircraft in a 
careless or reckless manner.’ Further, an operator of a small UAS would also be 
required to maintain and inspect it before each flight to guarantee safety of the 
operation.105 
 
Further, the FAA Advisory Circular on Aviation Safety Action Programme,106 also 
establishes safety rules that mandate reporting of safety information by employees. 
These rules are applicable to the UAS regulation, just like manned aircrafts, 
repairers and controlling pilots or persons who launch them. These categories of 
persons, including operators of chase aircrafts, may be at prime positions to 
undertake the reporting obligation imposed by the Circular. The requirement under 
the Circular is an integral part of the safety management envisaged by chapter Two 
of the ICAO Circular No. 328-AN/190. For instance, information obtained would be 
critical for risk management and as a preventive measure to avoid accidents. Since 
the Circular envisages that the programmes will be voluntary between carriers and 
UAS operators, the rate of compliance is likely to be higher. However, the 
voluntariness of the programmes may be a challenge since it means that carriers 
could opt not to negotiate or agree on a programme. One such implementation 
challenge would be an increase in UAS that can be launched from any place and 
thus, in the event of investigation, tasks provided under Section 6(4) of the Circular 
may overstretch the capacity of the FAA.  
 
Other specific safety standards relate to the visual line of sight requirements. 
Particularly, section 333(b) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act, 2012 that 
makes provisions for rules governing UAS sets, among others, the following as a 
parameter for assessment of UAS: 
                                                          
105 The Code of Federal Regulation, Title 14, section 107.15 (a) & (b). 
106 FAA Advisory Circular on Aviation Safety Action Programme (ASAP) No. 120-66B. It replaced 
ASAP AC NO. 120-66 and 120-66A. 
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“…operation within visual line of sight do not create a hazard to users of the 
national airspace system or the public or pose a threat to national security.” 
 
The provision of the Act, however, has a lacuna for its non-definition of the visual 
line of sight. Part 107.31 of the US Code of Federal Regulations  fills this lacuna by 
not only recognizing but also defining a  visual line of sight as  capability of vision 
that is unaided by any device other than corrective lenses, the remote pilot in 
command, the visual observer (if one is used), and the person manipulating the 
flight control of the small unmanned aircraft system must be able to see 
the unmanned aircraft throughout the entire flight. 
 
Regarding the model UAS, the Safety Code of 2018 established by the Academy of 
Model Aeronautics makes provision for model aircrafts to operate within the line of 
sight of the operator, as already indicated above. Other associated requirements 
are operation five miles away from the airport, remaining clear of people or stadiums 
and 400 feet above the ground. The last parameter is repeated as a requirement for 
model aircrafts available in Section 336 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act, 
2012. Lastly, the members of the Academy of Model Aeronautics solemnly affirm in 
the code in personal terms expressly that:  
 
“I will not operate any model aircraft while I am under the influence of alcohol 
or any drug that could adversely affect my ability to safely control the 
model.”107 
 
The safety conditions provided above are all aimed at achieving safety requirements 
and are in tandem with Part 2.21 of the UAS Circular No. 328 by ICAO, which 
requires safety rule making, policy development and oversight. It is notable, 
however, that the requirement for non-operation 400 feet above the sea level is well 
                                                          
107 The Academy of Model Aeronautics Safety Code of 2018, Paragraph 3. 
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justified for safety reasons but, it seems to be insufficient, since it does not address 
issues of visibility. Even the FAA Advisory Circular on Surface Movement Guidance 
and Control System regarding that could have addressed the visibility issues but 
only addresses safety issues at the airports and is therefore inapplicable to UAS. 
Further, the need to maintain a visual line of sight, though well intentioned, may 
continue to inhibit full integration efforts since the technologies may be a recipe for 
segregation.108 For the requirement of visual line of sight by FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act to be achieved, an accompanying “chase” aircraft must maintain visual 
contact with the UAS. Though the intention of the chase aircraft is plausible that is, 
to serve as its ‘eyes’ when operating outside airspace that is restricted from other 
users, it does not seem to make practical sense given that UAS can be launched 
from anywhere and not designated airports as is the case with manned aircrafts. 
 
The other standards relate to the sense and avoid technology. It may be recalled 
that this is the technology, which enables the UAS to detect and give way to the 
manned aircrafts to avoid safety challenges that may arise from collisions with other 
aircrafts or things.  Already the analysis of the international framework on the 
provision of sense and avoid facilities in paragraph 5.2 of the ICAO Circular No. 328-
AN/190, shows that sense and avoid is not limited to other aircrafts. The rules also 
envisage collision avoidance from other things and hazards. Fulfilling the 
requirement for UAS against other hazards including bird strikes, or attacks by 
eagles on hunting mission, might however be an uphill task unless given the 
deficiency in the regulatory framework and systems capability.109  
 
The provisions of section 336 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act, 2012 are 
instructive. They require model aircrafts to fly safely and ensure no interference with 
manned aircrafts. Subsection 336(4) and (5) of the FAA Modernization and Reform 
                                                          
108 ICAO Circular No 328328-AN/190, Paragraph 3.15. 
109 The rationale is that the framework on recognition of hazards that are contained in Advisory 
Circulars on Hazardous Mountain Winds and Their Visual Indicators, Generic Glideslope 
Indicators, Maintenance of Airport Visual Facilities, Visual Flight Rules and Runway Visual 
Range all target manned aircrafts and not UAS. 
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Act, 2012 both of which appear to be mutually dependent provide the following as 
parameters for recognition and regulation of model aircrafts: 
“the aircraft is operated in a manner that does not interfere with and gives 
way to any manned aircraft; and (5) when flown within 5 miles of an airport, 
the operator of the aircraft provides the airport operator and the airport air 
traffic control tower (when an air traffic facility is located at the airport) with 
prior notice of the operation (model aircraft operators flying from a permanent 
location within 5 miles of an airport should establish a mutually-agreed upon 
operating procedure with the airport operator and the airport air traffic control 
tower (when an air traffic facility is located at the airport.” 
 
The Safety Code established by the Academy of Model Aeronautics is also relevant 
for its requirement that all Academy of Model Aeronautics must ‘not interfere with 
and will yield the right of way to all human-carrying aircraft using AMA’s See and 
Avoid Guidance and a spotter when appropriate’. Since failure to give way to 
manned aircrafts is actionable under the FAA Modernization and Reform Act, the 
salient provisions set out above are authoritative representation of the requirements 
by ICAO Circular No 328-AN/190. Specifically, the requirements resonate with the 
spirit of paragraphs 2.9 and 2.15 of the ICAO Circular No 328-AN/190 and which 
require development of regulatory framework that requires UAS to have systems 
and facilities that ensure detection and avoidance of collisions. 
 
Certification of small UAS weighing below 55 pounds: a proprietor is allowed to 
apply for a Certificate of Waiver, which allows the small UAS to deviate from certain 
operating rules if the FAA is satisfied that the proposed operation is permissible 
under the rule. The exclusion of Small UAS regarding the model aircrafts, however, 
obviously seems to be limiting on mandate of FAA, at least from the plain reading 
of the Act. This resonates with the FAA’s argument that if the exclusion clause were 
broadly applied, it would diminish or limit its statutory mandate of ensuring safety 
and security in the aviation sector. However, when looked at in the bigger picture, 
model operators are excluded from the reach of FAA to the extent that they remain 
within narrow limits of hobby users, the careless and reckless ones would pose 
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grave danger to all airspace users, as well as those on the ground.110 The exclusion 
of the small UAS, therefore, is justified.  
 
There is an existing technological challenge since consensus is yet to be reached 
by the FAA on standards of technology that would enable UAS to detect and avoid 
other aircraft and maintain a link between airports and the UAS.111 Secondly, though 
UAS pilots require constant link to ground aircraft control crew, the UAS in the US 
lack technology to prevent ‘lost link.’ As a result, disruptions created between the 
ground operator and the UAS become serious safety concerns. Even the learned 
judges in the case laws referred in this chapter were not able to agree regarding 
UAS’ emerging technologies, which need to be accepted and addressed as 
globalization takes centre stage.112  
 
Another notable regulatory issue with safety underpinnings is airworthiness in civil 
aviation. It shall be recalled that as discussed in chapter Two of this thesis. An 
aircraft is said to be airworthy only when its conditioning and design support safe 
operation. The existing challenges in this area as appertains to UAS was the design 
challenges, which often compromise efficiency of regulation of safety during 
operation. In respect of these challenges, the ICAO developed ICAO Annex 8 on 
Airworthiness of Aircraft that, among others, require, maintenance of safety and 
survival equipment to support the system software. This section now proceeds to 
describe how the US addresses the airworthiness issues. 
 
 
                                                          
110 FAA Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft Federal Register of 2014. 
111 U.S. Department of Transportation 
https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Oversight%20of%20Unmanned%20Aircr
aft%20Systems%5E6-26-14.pdf (Date of use: 2 October 2020). 




The airworthiness issues are dealt with under Sections 303 and 333 of the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act. The regulatory framework under this principal 
legislation is complemented by the Circular on Propeller Instructions for Continued 
Airworthiness, and Circular on Instruction for Continued Airworthiness Academy of 
Model Aeronautics’ Safety Code. 
 
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act makes provision for regulation of design 
and production or aircrafts through a certification system provided in section 303 of 
the FAA Modernization and Reform Act. The certification done under the authority 
of the Administrator targets to certify compliance with minimum requirements for 
aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and appliances with the requirements and 
minimum standards prescribed in section 44701(a) of the Act.  
 
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act, is also committal on providing further 
design specifications for the model aircrafts. As per, Section 333(3) of the FAA Act, 
a model aircraft is limited to not more than 55 pounds unless otherwise certified 
through a design, construction, inspection, flight test, and operational safety 
program administered by a community-based organization. For model aircraft flying 
that are within provision of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act, are 
complemented by Safety Code, of 2018 established by the Academy of Model 
Aeronautics they further commit to ‘only fly models weighing more than 55 pounds, 
including fuel, if certified through AMA’s Large Model Airplane Program.’113 
 
The most relevant Circular that complements the provision on the FAA Circular on 
Propeller Instructions for Continued Airworthiness114 generally provides that any 
operation within controlled airspace would require permission of an air traffic 
                                                          
113 The Academy of Model Aeronautics Safety Code of 2018, Paragraph 7. 
114 FAA Advisory Circular on Propeller Instructions for Continued Airworthiness No 35.4-1 
(hereinafter referred to as the FAA AC No. 33.4-1). In addition, Civil UAS are currently 
accommodated with experimental certificates under FAA Order on Airworthiness and 
Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Optionally Piloted Aircraft No 8130.34D. 
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controller. However, due to lack of training, air traffic controllers lack the tools that 
allow them to safely manage the airspace, just as they do with manned aircraft. This 
has potential negative consequences as air traffic controllers are forced to 
segregate UAS from manned aircraft due to lack of sufficient information particularly 
on speed, capacity and rates of climb on the UAS.115 The situation may even be 
worsened by the fact that air traffic controllers lack training on how to address this 
lost link.116 
 
The other relevant Circular is the Circular on Instruction for Continued 
Airworthiness.117 Part 5 of the Circular provides for the general provision that 
requires the holders of approvals for aircraft designs to furnish their instructions on 
continued airworthiness to the owners of the aircraft either when it is delivered or 
when the certificate of airworthiness is issued. The import of this obligation is to 
ensure that the airworthiness is not only ensured through design approvals at 
manufacture and design stages, but also continued during the subsequent period of 
use by the aircraft’s operators.  
 
Additionally, the Circular on Instruction for Continued Airworthiness118 limits the 
discretion of the applicants for the certification processes. It creates a layer of 
approval of the certification programs by the FAA in respect of the applications for 
the design approvals and type certification. Furthermore, FAA issues special 
                                                          
115  FAA Order on Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) No N JO 
7210.846 
116 The Air Traffic Safety Action Program is a voluntary safety reporting program for air traffic 
personnel that enable them to report air traffic safety events and retain confidentiality. 
117 FAA AC No. 33.4-1. Also see The US Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14 on Airworthiness 
standards for existing aircraft are codified with processes described for FAA type certification 
in FAA Order 8110.4 and airworthiness certification in FAA Order 8130.2. The FAA has the 
authority and regulations in place to tailor the design standards to specific UAS applications, 
and plans to use this authority until further experience is obtained in addressing the design 
issues that are unique to UAS. Generally, the FAA cannot issue an exemption from specific 
statutory mandates such as requiring airworthiness certificates. The statutory provision in 49 
U.S.C. 44807, sets aside that prohibition. This allows the FAA to grant relief to a petitioner 
from the requirement to hold an airworthiness certificate for the UAS when certain criteria 
are met. 
118 FAA AC No. 33.4-1. 
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airworthiness certificates to community operators on a case-by-case basis for 
experimental or certain restricted categories. These are particularly issued to UAS 
manufacturers and researchers. The basis of this issuance is to enable research 
and development, flight-testing, crew training, market surveys, product 
demonstration as well as other commercial applications under the purview of 
Section 333 exemptions.  
 
Other than the certification requirements, the US also utilizes the licensing and 
authorization mechanism as a means for enforcement of safety of UAS. Part 11 of 
Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations and FAA Modernization and Reform Act 
mainly provides for authorization and certification of flying. Under these provisions, 
the FAA authorizes non-hobby or recreational UAS operations.119  In the US, the 
UAS flights are required to be operated by authorized aircraft (certified or 
exempted), validly registered, with a certified pilot, in addition to FAA authorization 
(Certificate of Waiver or Authorization).120 Again, these terms are envisaged by 
Article 8 of the Chicago Convention to be within the jurisdiction of the sovereign. 
The first category of operators of UAS comprise the Government and public 
bodies.121 The FAA allows such operators to be granted authority to operate 
aircrafts, for as long as a Certificate of Authorization has been issued to them.122   
 
Further, under the provisions of Section 333 of the FAA Modernization and Reform 
Act, operations by petition can only be guaranteed upon satisfaction by FAA that the 
flight will be safe,123 including weighing less than 55 pounds, flying below 200 feet 
above the ground, and being far from airports, in compliance with the Certificate of 
Authorization can only guarantee operations by partnership. Other commercial UAS 
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operating under the proposed rules are allowed to fly if they operate between 
sunrise and sunset when visibility is possible or within 3 miles.124 Under the 
proposals, UAS would fly below 500 feet above the ground with a maximum speed 
of 100 kilometres per hour. 
 
Public aviation operators are required to be licensed pilots. Operators who make 
applications for public UAS are taken through a process of review to ensure the 
intended operation in the interest of the public, they are safe and do not endanger 
the safety of other traffic, or persons on the ground. Issuance of a Certificate of 
Authorization is limited to 60 business days. Though Article 3 of the Chicago 
Convention limits its operation to State aircrafts, the functional definition seems to 
be pegged on ownership and not use. This approach enables the regulation of public 
operators of UAS even in cases where public operators lease the UAS from private 
individuals.  
 
The framework adopts slightly different rules regarding authorization of commercial 
UAS.125 These individuals are issued with a short-term certificate placed under 
experimental category in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations.126 Under these 
provisions, it is the experimental category requirements that tick the safety issues. 
This category is important because one of the key parameters for passing it is safety 
before the individuals can obtain a Special Authorization Certificate to operate the 
second category. It also appears to be the notable difference with the UAS public 
operator’s authorization that only requires pilots to be licenced without imputing the 
categories. The difference is underlined by a presumption that safety issues are 
more prevalent in civil and commercial uses as opposed to public uses. Though the 
presumption may be debatable, it is worth noting that the experimental airworthiness 
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certificate means that the UAS should not be used to carry passengers, cargo, or 
even for hire, according to the FAA Order 8130.34B.  
 
Under these provisions, the regulations governing commercial authorization of UAS 
fall into three categories, namely: those that are solely operated for recreational 
purposes; small UAS that weigh less than 55 pounds and used for purposes other 
than recreation; and UAS weighing over 55 pounds, which require an exemption 
under Section 333 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act. The authorization 
draws from, the provisions of Article 8 of the Chicago Convention, which place the 
special authorization mandate on the sovereign States.  
 
Further, the framework adopts unique rules for authorization of model aircrafts for 
purely recreational or hobby utilities.127 Though they essentially do not require FAA 
authorization, they must comply with strict rules, pursuant to FAA Advisory Circular 
91-57. Unlike public and civil UAS that require FAA approval to operate, model 
aircraft do not require any such approval. They are, however, required to operate in 
a manner that is safe and within the confines of the law as stipulated in Section 336 
of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act.  The provision requires the model UAS 
to be capable of being sustained in the atmosphere and to ensure that they are 
strictly flown for hobby or recreational purposes, in accordance with society safety 
rules, and in compliance with giving way to manned aircrafts. 
 
It is possible that periods for seeking of waivers and permissions may not be 
convenient, owing to the increasing uses of UAS in the airspace, which may 
sometime require emergency response. It could still be argued that the matters may 
as well be best left to planning by the FAA. To such a school of thought, 
categorization of the UAS as highlighted is, therefore, convenient for planning 
purposes. Such division in thinking has the capacity to derail achievement of 
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minimum requirements needed for safe operation of UAS as envisaged in Part 2.3 
of the ICAO UAS Circular 328 of 2011. 
 
The framework for regulation under the FAA Modernization and Reform Act, 2012 
is complemented by FAA Advisory Circular on Reporting Laser Illumination of 
Aircraft, FAA Orders128 that make provisions for prohibition of directing a laser 
pointer at an aircraft by unauthorized individuals addressing aviation safety and 
security challenge of possible attacks on aircraft.  The FAA Advisory Circular on 
Reporting Laser Illumination of Aircraft, requires reporting of incidents of 
unauthorized illumination. Aircrew are required to report illumination incidents with 
details of colour, altitude, among others. The crew are also required to mitigate the 
incidents through reporting, filling FAA Laser Beam Exposure Questionnaire and 
deviating from flight paths with prior clearance. The framework is also the basis of 
initiatives to ensure both safety and security of aircraft.  
 
The framework for regulation of safety is further boosted by the provision by 
Community-based Guidelines on Safety of Operations and Safety Code published 
by the Academy of Model Aeronautics. The Code generally stipulates guidelines on 
safety in flights including those of UAS.129 The FAA appears cognizant of the non-
binding nature of the guidelines. As such, it has used them as a basis for its 
collaboration with some community-based organizations for recreational purposes 
and recognized them as having force of law within that domain, purpose and area.130 
These guidelines enable development of rules at the community level for owners of 
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the model UAS weighing less than 55 pounds to support the FAA framework.131 
Larger or heavier UAS are also covered so long as their design, construction, 
inspection, flight-testing and operational safety programs are administered under 
the rubric of community-based organizations.132  
 
The guidelines play an important role in creating the distinction between aircraft 
models based on use and capability. This is effective in the regulation of model 
aircrafts, since it is clear that the distinguishing feature of a model aircraft is not size 
but its use and capabilities. The use of community-based organization is the basis 
of the public and community involvement. The Safety Code published by the 
Academy of Model Aeronautics further bolsters effectiveness of such initiatives. The 
Code requires creation of awareness, education and participation of the public in 
safety matters as a means of addressing the safety challenges associated with UAS 
operation. 
 
From the foregoing discussion, it suffices to conclude that FAA has made legislative 
steps towards an effective and express regulatory framework and standardization 
for safe UAS operation in areas of certification, standards of air traffic procedures 
for safe management of UAS with manned aircraft or even adequate air traffic 
control-training programme for UAS. Despite these accolades, authors such as 
Jiang et al observe that one challenge that stands out in respect of all the promising 
efforts is the fact that format of reporting to UAS regional inspectors on authorization 
and overseeing operations has not been clarified.133 This leads to the conclusion 
that FAA’s effectiveness in managing oversight is wanting. Unless the FAA 
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addresses these barriers, integration of UAS into civil aviation will continue to be 
slow and with low safety standards.134 
 
5. 2 The US Response to Security Concerns of UAS 
It will be recalled that the security challenges of UAS at the international plane were 
regarded to arise from the possible use of the UAS in activities that cause unlawful 
interference, including spying and attacks to aviation infrastructure that threaten the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of another State.135 While the challenge is real 
owing to the development in UAS technology and uses, the traditional means of 
achieving security in aviation through arming of pilots, use of sniffer dogs and data 
management and storage are largely inapplicable to most UAS. This explains why 
the analysis in chapter Two of this thesis rationalized the need for UAS specific 
security measures and regulations.136 
 
It was noted that against the backdrop of such challenges, the Chicago Convention 
made robust albeit general provisions of ensuring aviation security as a whole. In 
recognition of its dynamism, it donated the powers to the ICAO to develop standards 
relating to security, which ICAO did through promulgation of the general standards 
through ICAO Annex 17 and Aviation Security Manual Doc (8973). Additionally, 
ICAO No. 328328-AN/190 makes specific provision on security applications and 
surveillance of UAS.  
 
This part discusses how the US domestic framework responds to these security 
challenges. Generally, the US regulatory framework requires UAS to comply with 
general security requirements prescribed by the FAA.137 The framework is provided 
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under Title 49 of the US Code of Federal Regulations, FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act as complemented by the FAA Advisory Circulars, Orders and Guidance 
Materials. 
 
Under Title 49 of the US Code, FAA has the overall responsibility of protecting 
aircrafts in the airspace. Section 40103(a) of the Code states that the US has the 
exclusive sovereignty of its territorial airspace. 
 
Accordingly, this provision affirms the spirit of Article 1 of the Chicago Convention 
thus forming the basis for control and exclusion of UAS activities that can cause 
unlawful interference. Further, in order to assure UAS security surveillance by the 
FAA officers, section 40108 of the Code provides for the power of the Administrator 
of the FAA to operate schools for the training of officers and staff.138 
 
FAA Modernization and Reform Act provides security as key regulation of UAS. 
Specifically, section 33(b) of the Act provides for the general rules for certain 
unmanned aircraft systems. It recognizes that in making an assessment of the UAS, 
the Secretary of Transportation must consider if the UAS poses a threat to national 
security. Section 333(b) (1) goes further to list the factors that form the basis for this 
assessment such as operations capability, or proximity to airports or populated 
areas. It is only after the UAS is assessed as not to pose national threat that 
certificate of operation can be issued unless otherwise excluded from the process 
of application for reasons of statutory waiver or recreational nature of the operation. 
Additionally, the framework of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act on 
certification and authorization discussed in the section on safety is crosscutting and 
aids in planning and design of aviation security.  
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The, FAA Modernization and Reform Act, 2012, recognizes the role that is played 
by the United States Department of Homeland Security. This boosts the support to 
deal with evolving security measures with the rise in cases of international terrorism. 
The role of the department specifically comes in handy by providing screening of 
devices and enforcement of security protocols.139 The department has put in place 
more heightened surveillance to ensure creation of a baseline for aviation security. 
  
The provisions of the FAA Advisory Circular on Foreign Air Carrier Security, 1982, 
complement the framework under the FAA Modernization and Reform Act, 2012. 
Generally, the Circular stipulates conditions to be met by foreign carriers in the 
US.140 The provisions require submission of Security Program that apply to 
operations of aircrafts. The Circular also prohibits dangerous and deadly weapons 
aboard aircrafts. Part 6 of the Circular specifically provides as follows: 
“Although foreign air carriers are not required to submit their security 
programs, the Administrator for approval, each such carrier is required to 
submit, upon his request and in accordance with applicable law, information 
in with respect to the security program applicable to its operations and the 
implementation thereof…”141 
 
The provision does not make it necessary to submit the security programme. 
However, that the Administrator may require the submission of the security 
programs at any time he imputes an obligation of the carriers to maintain the security 
programmes. Further, as the scope is such that the requirement applies to all foreign 
carriers with requisite permit, no distinction is made between State or civil or manned 
or unmanned aircrafts. The provision on screening, however, majorly applies to 
manned aircrafts, reason being that they land at designated airports where 
passengers, cargo and baggage are screened at the terminals unlike UAS which 
land in remote places that have no screening facilities unless such UAS are 
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scheduled to specifically land at an airport, this is not always the case.142 UAS 
Circular’s requirements act as response mechanism for bomb and piracy threats 
arising from aircrafts through security inspections, the countermeasures such as 
bomb disposal facilities, sniffer dogs, expert search are challenging and not easily 
available in all places where UAS operate, launched or land.  
 
The FAA Guidance on Recommended Trainings and Advisory Circular on Foreign 
Air Carrier Security further complement the FAA Advisory Circular on Foreign Air 
Carrier Security.143 This Guidance material generally addresses the security 
concerns through preventive trainings. Specifically, it stipulates the requirement of 
training for members of the crew who operate aircrafts. The trainings target areas 
such as anti-hijack. The FAA Guide further harnesses the training requirement for 
private flyers.144 The integration of the trainings is also achieved through the Circular 
on Pilots Schools, Certification and Compliance. The provision of the Act requires 
maintenance of training records of students, and harmonization of training syllabus. 
Requirements such as training on ground control are relevant to UAS. Since training 
is a preventative approach to security threats, the Guidance material serves to 
complement the basic security knowledge imparted in schools. The uniformity in 
trainings is laudable, since it makes compliance with security regulations much 
easier.145 
 
Additionally, the FAA passed the Small UAS Regulations, 2016. Under these 
Regulations, an operator of small UAS with a certificate is required to undergo 
refresher courses that entail passing a recurrent knowledge exam after every 24 
months.146 Operators with visible physical and mental handicap likely to affect safety 
or security are not allowed to operate a UAS, although a medical certificate is not a 
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mandatory requirement. Further, under the Regulations, should one choose to use 
operator or observers, they would be restricted to flying or observing one UAS at a 
time.147 
 
Lastly, the security assurance is also evident through the development of the 
National Strategy for Aviation Security in December 2018 after a revision of the 
previous 2007 version.148 The Strategy provides that the development of and the 
need to keep up with the UAS technologies is a key motivating factor for its 
development.149 The material documents two main strategies: one, the protection of 
the vital United States National Interest, which covers the protection of the 
homeland, American people, American way of life as well as its prosperity. The 
second strategy is achievement of the desired End-State, which is a secure aviation 
ecosystem through proper coordination and integration planning.150 
 
The security assurance recognizes the need to protect the US and its global interest 
in aviation ecosystem, through detecting deterrence and prevention of terrorist, 
criminal and hostile acts whether by physical, spectrum or cyber means.151 This 
means that the strategy guides the stakeholders to combat the acts of illegal 
interference. Other security-related aims of the strategy are to maximize aviation 
ecosystem security provision of high security standards implemented an efficient 
manner balanced with safe efficient movement of cargo and people. Thirdly, it seeks 
to enhance, resilience, mitigate damage and expedite recovery to mitigate damage 
and expedite recovery from an attack on aviation ecosystem, and fourthly, to 
effectively engage international, domestic and private sector partners to ensure 
safety and security receives active engagement among agencies, the private sector 
and international stakeholders.  
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From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that the regulation of UAS through the 
frameworks for approval, security programmes and trainings play a key role in 
ensuring security of the UAS in the US. These arrangements mirror the spirit of 
ICAO Annex 17 and the ICAO Guidance in its Security Manual by focusing on 
mitigating security risks from a preventive angle. Despite its most likely robust 
systems, the US’ response to aviation security, in general, has been termed as 
inadequate especially after the failed and attempted terrorist attacks such as the 
September 11 incident. This limits full achievement of the need to consider 
technological solutions as provided in SARPs, ICAO Annex 17 and ICAO Global 
Aviation Security Plan. Ron particularly identifies the major issues that run across 
attacks to be the inability by institutions to develop machinery necessary to deal with 
new technological development in the aviation sector.152 This has been witnessed 
especially, after the September 11 attacks. 
 
The following section highlights the extent of the privacy challenge and steps that 
have been taken by the US in addressing them. 
 
5.3 The US Response to Privacy Concerns of UAS 
It shall be recalled that chapter Two of this thesis identified that a major privacy 
challenge in the international plane as regards the UAS use is its potential to cause, 
or be used as a tool of aerial photography and thus potentially cause intrusion to 
privacy.153 It was further explained that the potential arises from UAS’ ability to be 
overflown over people or private property.  Notably also, the international law 
response depended heavily on international human discourse through enforcement 
of relevant State obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the rights under international 
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instruments have among them being the ICCPR.154 This part discusses how the 
domestic framework in US addresses these privacy concerns. 
 
At the domestic level, the US is no stranger to privacy concerns relating to UAS. A 
specific concern for the public in the US is the ability of law enforcement agencies, 
especially the FBI, to spy on members of the public, and in the process violate the 
right to protection from unreasonable search and seizures. Other concerns arise 
from potential and actual threats or breaches to the right to privacy for persons who 
are likely to be affected by searches and seizures. This danger also exists from 
neighbours and other civilians who may capture video and steal photos for 
unauthorized use owing to the increased use of the UAS for civilian purposes in the 
US.  
 
In order to avert the challenges, the US Constitution is the most superior law that 
sets the stage for the general protection of the privacy rights. The Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution provides as follows: 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things…” 
 
The import of the Constitutional provision is not only to recognize the right to privacy 
but also to create the mandatory due processes to be followed before the right to 
privacy is limited through legal means and in deserving cases only. Secondly, the 
provision makes approach of prohibiting the acts whose effect is to interference with 
the security of privacy. The probable breach from use of UAS is thus one such act 
which is prohibited in the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution. That the 
Constitution is the supreme law means that anyone can resort to it in terms of 
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interpreting federal laws or overriding the provisions of a State law on privacy issues 
in cases of any inconsistency.  
 
Under Title 49 of the US Code of Regulations, the Secretary of Transportation has 
powers to make Regulations to prevent unwarranted invasion of personal privacy 
during the process of the security activities of an aircraft use.155 These and concerns 
for privacy were, however, couched around regulation of passenger records 
obtained through screening and other means to protect the passengers on board 
aircrafts and had little relevance to the privacy concerns of UAS use. 
 
The privacy protection underpinnings are also provided under the FAA 
Modernization Reform Act, 2012. AS held by some authors, it is worth noting that 
even then, Title III, Part B, which is dedicated to addressing the provisions on privacy 
protection, has no specific express provision on assurance against privacy 
invasion.156 The rules may only be implied from a not so farfetched provision such 
as Section 336 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act. Specifically, Section 
336(a) provides that:  
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law relating to the incorporation of 
unmanned aircraft systems into Federal Aviation Administration plans and 
policies, including this subtitle, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
Administration may not promulgate any rule or regulation regarding a model 
aircraft, or an aircraft being developed as a model aircraft, if the aircraft is 
flown strictly for hobby or recreational use;” 
 
The above requirement for strict adherence to purpose of flight can be interpreted 
to mean that they cannot be used for other purposes such as intrusive surveillance. 
However, even if the application by implication were possible, it suffers the limitation 
of being applicable to model aircrafts alone. The upshot of the foregoing is that the 
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US principal framework under the law in Title 49 of the US Code as amended by the 
FAA Modernization and Reform Act, 2012 has not sufficiently addressed the 
challenge of privacy restrictions related to use of UAS. The challenge of inadequacy, 
therefore, reflects similar inadequacy in the Chicago Convention that, as discussed 
in chapter Three of this thesis, only apply to the privacy assurance in the most 
marginal form. 
 
The Academy of Model Aeronautics Safety Code of 2018 attempts to cure the 
regulatory inadequacy set out above by providing guidance on how the members of 
the Academy can ensure protection of the privacy of others during operation of 
model aircrafts. Under Paragraph 4 of the Code, the members solemnly affirm to 
avoid flying directly over unprotected people, moving vehicles, and occupied 
structures. Other relevant affirmation reads as follows: 
“I will not fly a powered model outdoors closer than 25 feet to any individual, 
except for myself or my helper(s) located at the flight line, unless I am taking 
off and landing, or as otherwise provided in AMA’s Competition 
Regulation.”157 
 
Though the complementary regulation under the Safety Code, 2018 is express, it 
suffers from a lack of binding effect. However, having been developed in 2018, some 
6 years after the FAA Modernization and Reform Act, 2012 was enacted, it is a 
representation of the current recognition of the need for regulation of the privacy 
concerns of UAS.  
 
Overall, the lack of binding aviation-specific instruments at the federal level may be 
attributed to the existence of divided opinion among law enforcers and the public on 
extent of regulation of privacy.158 This is elucidated by the sharp distinction in 
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opinion and approaches by parties to a case in which the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center filed a brief for amicus stating that intrusion of the privacy of 
iPhone users was necessary to prevent crime.159 On its part, Apple contested the 
order by court stating that forming a software to access a locked iPhone was 
unlawful and unconstitutional, and would in itself be undermining the security of the 
people, and hence create a bad precedent for the American people.160 A notable 
impact of the continuing tension regarding the UAS-specific federal protection of 
privacy rights is that focus has been put on regulation at the States’ level.  
 
Some States in the US have taken measures to address uses of UAS with impact 
on privacy.161 Georgia and Louisiana are among the States with laws that prohibit 
people from peeping into others private activities or lives through windows or doors 
for purposes of spying upon or invading that privacy. The Official Code of Georgia162 
provides that a person violates privacy rules when they go about undertaking 
surveillance upon the premises of another.163 Since the UAS can be deployed for 
surveillance purposes, the Code directly applies to regulation of UAS activities. This 
is confirmations that the US has statutory laws aimed at safeguarding individuals’ 
privacy. 
 
The State of Virginia, on its part, has a statute that criminalizes creation of photos 
and video images of non-consenting persons who have reasonable expectation of 
privacy.164  Mississippi State also has a statute that criminalizes photographing, 
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taping or filming a person against his or her expectation of privacy.165  These laws 
form part of the framework for regulation of UAS use and operation, since UAS have 
the capacity to invade private spaces and capture images.  Therefore, these statutes 
could be inferred to cover images taken by UAS. Of importance from these 
legislations is express prohibition of acts that limit enjoyment of the right to privacy. 
They also uniformly seem to set the standard that a person is worthy of protection if 
he has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Of course, such a test would require 
analysis on a case-by-case basis.  
 
Even in the light of the constitutional protection, the State-level laws are equally 
important since they entail unique directions taken by States in creating a delicate 
balance between protection of privacy and enhancement of security from crime as 
well as social violence. Another importance of the State laws on privacy protection 
is the particularity of how State laws would operate and their exemptions. This is 
however, not without challenges owing to the possibility of multiplicity of laws and 
hence a huge potential for conflict between the laws that make goals of 
harmonization and integration of UAS into the national system more challenging. 
 
Regarding the implementation of the existing legal framework, the US federal and 
State courts have made remarkable judicial steps towards the recognition of the 
protection of the privacy rights. The steps that are discussed shortly, are indicative 
of promising prospects of overcoming the practical challenges arising from scanty 
federal provisions on privacy protection in respect of UAS in the US.  
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In the State of Georgia, the Court, addressed itself to the privacy concerns in the 
case of Smith v State.166 In this case, Donald Smith was found guilty of being a 
peeping tom and the finding affirmed by the Court of Appeal of Georgia. Under the 
Georgian Code, a peeping tom was a person who invaded privacy by peeping 
through a door or window. The facts of the case were that police officers were 
dispatched to an apartment complex in response to a suspicious call. They found 
Smith standing in a secluded dark patio, three feet away from the window to an 
apartment, looking at two people he did not know.  He was arrested and tried with 
compelling witness accounts of similar conduct previously.  Although the Smith case 
did not concern UAS, it is relevant to violation of privacy by advanced technology of 
UAS. If the use of normal eyes to peep by a peeping tom can be determined as 
breach of privacy, it follows, therefore, that in the era of technological advancement, 
the UAS that has eyes from the sky should, due to the use of progressive 
technology, infringe on the right to privacy. Therefore, given the sophistication of 
today’s UAS, it could be peeping tom, or the tool used by peeping toms. The 
principle, in this case, is still relevant regarding violation of people’s privacy from a 
vantage point with aid of innovative equipment, such as use of UAS.   
 
At the federal level, the US Supreme Court has addressed specific concerns 
regarding the right to privacy.167  From the Court’s decisions, an emerging trend has 
been laid out in determining whether UAS observations and impact on privacy are 
constitutional or not. Case law suggests that the court considers a number of factors 
which help to assess whether the use of a UAS raises constitutional questions. The 
first factor is whether UAS is in manageable airspace. Others are whether there is 
undue disturbance on the ground below, in terms of noise or wind; whether imaging 
systems used on the UAS can be taken from inside the home; whether violation was 
excessive; and whether the plaintiff has reasonable expectation of privacy.168 These 
factors play a big role in determining whether a court can find that the use of a UAS 
actually or potentially violates civil liberties, and privacy in particular to an extent 
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warranting the protection by the Constitution of the US. These are demonstrated by 
the cases below. 
 
5.3.1. Dow Chemical, Ciraolo, and Riley 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986) 
Dow Chemical v the United States169 concerned the action by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to observe a chemical plant from the sky above. When 
Dow Chemical denied EPA physical access to inspect the plant, the agency hired a 
commercial photographer to take pictures from the sky, but within lawfully navigable 
airspace,170 as there were barriers that blocked observation of the vegetation from 
the ground. The surveillance took place within the concealment of structures, until a 
chemical plant was eventually discovered.171 When the matter went to court, the 
Supreme Court held that shooting photos above the ground of a developed vegetal 
convoluted from navigable airspace was not a search forbidden by the Fourth 
Amendment.172  
 
In its verdict, the Supreme Court deliberated on the superiority of features exposed 
in the photos,173 the technology used, and the place that was surveyed. The Court 
recognized hypothetical limits by stating, “Surveillance of private property by using 
vastly sophisticated reconnaissance kit, not commonly obtainable to the public, such 
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172 Dow Chemicals v the United States 1986 476 US 227 (SC) [239]. 
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An analysis of this quotation shows that the majority opinion held the view that 
ordinary photography was not a Fourth Amendment search because it was not 
complemented by a physical trespass and the equipment used was not the most 
sophisticated form of technology available to the Government. The majority's 
reasoning has been rightly criticized for being capable of abandoning Katz 
principles. The principles which originated form the Supreme Court ruling in the case 
of Katz v United States,175 expanded the Fourth Amendment on protection of people 
against unreasonable search making a redefinition of what constitutes searches and 
seizures with regard to the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the US 
Constitution. The decision in the Dow case premised its conclusion on the technique 
of search rather than the latitude of the right being safeguarded. It is not a surprising 
that this was the basis of Justice Powell’s dissension, contending that its justification 
would lead to the wearing away of the right to privacy.176 The authority in the 
dissension shows that use of physical trespass would not be mandatory when 
determining if objects, including UAS, have committed breach of privacy rights. 
Secondly, since UAS utilize complex technology, the sophistication concept 
discussed by the majority opinion justifies its regulation to prevent privacy breaches. 
 
5.3.2 Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) v. FAA  
Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) v FAA177  arose out of FAA’s rule 
promulgated under the FAA Modernization and Reform Act, in which Congress 
directed FAA to consider whether certain UAS could be safely integrated into the 
national airspace and to establish prerequisites for their safe operation. EPIC, who 
petitioned the FAA to create privacy safeguards prior to deployment of commercial 
UAS in the US in 2014, opposed this directive. The FAA responded to EPIC's 
petition, arguing that UAS privacy implications did not raise instant safety concerns. 
The FAA further stated that privacy concerns would be considered part of the 
project, and not prior to it as suggested by EPIC. By 2015, when the FAA announced 
rulemaking on commercial UAS, they stated that privacy issues were beyond the 
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scope of the rulemaking. EPIC promptly filed a suit against the FAA challenging its 
denial of EPIC’s appeal and the FAA’s failure to embrace privacy in the small UAS 
rulemaking. 
 
The D.C Circuit dismissed EPIC’s petition on the technicality that EPIC had failed to 
establish standing on the matter, as well as technicalities in the drafting of the 
affidavits. The FAA finalized the Small Drone Rulemaking in 2016, unfettered, and 
EPIC filed another suit challenging the FAA’s failure to address privacy in the Small 
Drone Rulemaking.178 Technically, the court lost a prime opportunity to pronounce 
itself on the place of privacy issues on regulation of UAS. Since the opportunity had 
availed itself, this was the proper forum for the court to pronounce itself on issues 
such as FAA’s administrative role to regulate use of cameras and other sensors 
extraneous to self-operation of the UAS. Despite the lost opportunity, it remains to 
be recognized that it is significant for the courts to consider capabilities of cameras 
attached to UAS as prohibited by Article 36 of the Chicago Convention to help 
protect right to privacy, which is fundamental to all citizens. 
 
5.3.3 Carpenter v. the United States 
The Carpenter v the United States179 was an appeal from the Sixth Circuit Court. It 
related to the cell-site location information, which is generated automatically or 
intentionally by phone users. The police had used data from the cellphone of a 
confessing accused person. The purpose was to obtain additional information on 
the call logs to pin down other members of an organized robbery gang. Usually, 
such usage was sanctioned by provisions of the Stored Communication Act. The 
Act, which generally protects private content and related information, also provides 
for an exception where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the material is 
the subject of criminal investigations. This position had been affirmed in previously 
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decided cases, which affirmed exception to the general rule. One thing was clear 
from the previous jurisprudence that the police did not require any warrant to obtain 
such information, even if it involved a third party. In that spirit, the police requested 
for information from the telecommunication company on the site locations of the 
persons. 
 
The issue for determination was whether the police required the telecommunication 
companies to generate a warrant to access geological information of cell phone 
users. This issue would be resolved with a determination of a sub-issue on whether 
the search as per Section 2703(d) orders are searches within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The trial magistrates ruled that the 
search was not unconstitutional. The same was affirmed on appeal, where the Sixth 
Circuit Court stated that cell-site location information was business data not within 
the Fourth Amendment definition of search. The appellant was dissatisfied with the 
finding and appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking an order of certiorari. 
 
The majority of the learned judges considered the origin and importance of the 
Fourth Amendment and noted that the influence of new technology on privacy rights 
through intrusive monitoring has redefined obtaining data on site-location. For 
instance, phone details are now so detailed that conveying them amounts to 
significant features of almost Global Positioning System (GPS)-like intrusion to the 
human anatomy since it keeps tabs on a person’s every movement. All these issues 
were seemingly beyond the previous decisions in the United States v Mille180 and 
Smith v. Maryland.181 
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The principles in the case are relevant to the regulation and integration of UAS into 
civil aviation, owing to the use of modern technology. It is instructive, for example, 
to note that the court distinguished the current matter with other previous cases 
involving articles in cars and banknotes, as well as traditional history of writs and 
subpoenas. The dissenting opinion was majorly based on classification of the cell-
site location information as a business record by the dissenting justices and 
affirmation of the traditional third-party principle. The dissenting judges feared that 
the approach by the majority would water down surveillance as a governmental 
administrative tool. 
 
Though the Supreme Court was non-committal on time, it did hold that a seven-day 
intrusion was enough to be intrusive and thus fall within the ambit of the Fourth 
Amendment Search. The Court held that a warrant is required for obtaining Section 
2703(d) orders, unless in deserving emergency cases, and consequently issued a 
request for certiorari. This is the most recent case dealing with digital privacy to 
which the use of UAS, though not explicitly addressed, fits very well. It is possible 
that even at the time that the courts had used the Smith case, there was an emerging 
opinion in the United States that aggregation of information, which is more intrusive, 
infringes on the privacy guarantees under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. Perhaps this is the thread of reasoning that inspired the Supreme 
Court. The majority decision was made on a 5-4 basis by the learned justices. That 
shows that the issues on digital privacy, though laid to rest, are still heavily 
contested. It is doubtful the decision can be applied to specific issues in the 
regulation of privacy issues in UAS, given the decision of Roberts, CJ that the court 
was not disturbing the previous case laws or even disrupting surveillance by the 
State.  It is apparent, however, that the middle ground taken by the majority was 




The restriction in UAS usage is a reflection of the regulatory framework in the US 
being in infancy stage.182 These rules allow FAA to make informed assessment of 
technical development of UAS to facilitate emergence of regulatory frameworks that 
ensure a secure national airspace system.183 The FAA is alive to the State of 
manufacture and maintenance of UAS that are not at par with manned aircraft and, 
therefore, amount to security and safety risks while operating in the air without 
proper monitoring. Despite the requirements, there is a practical challenge, since 
most UAS pilots are neither trained nor certified and are unfamiliar with rules of the 
air that should ensure safety and security for all users of the national airspace 
system.184 
 
6. Other Cross-Cutting Challenges in Integration of UAS into Civil Aviation  
6.1 Challenges of Enforcement of Safety and Security Regulations  
The FAA has the mandate to promote voluntary compliance with its regulations by 
educating individual operators on how to ensure safe operation under existing 
laws.185 It uses a number of tools in the enforcement process such as cautionary 
warnings, letters of correction as well as civil penalties.186 The FAA is empowered 
to take enforcement measures against any unauthorized UAS user who endangers 
the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS).187 The role of the State and local 
rule enforcement agencies cannot be underestimated since they are usually the first 
to detect, deter, investigate and, as appropriate, enforce conduct that amounts to 
unauthorized UAS operations.188 
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In terms of the actual inspections, the FAA aviation safety inspectors are foot 
soldiers who make follow-up on unauthorized UAS operations.189 However, the 
inspections are not without challenges. As Byrnes and Kalas note, these inspectors 
are hampered by lack of capacity in terms of numbers, underfunding and inability to 
cover very long distances.190 From the outset, activities of the FAA could very well 
fall within the ambit of criminal law enforcement, in which case, the FAA needs to 
be cautious so as not to mix the two issues.191 It should instead serve public interest 
through co-ordination, mutual understanding, and co-operation between 
government agencies that operate under the umbrella of law enforcement.  
 
From the analysis in this thesis, it appears that many violations of the FAA’s 
regulations could be addressed by administrative enforcement, which even the FAA 
agrees with and rationalizes by the fact that some federal criminal statutes are 
implicated by UAS operators.192 Similar to any criminal and civil action, success in 
enforcement would depend on clear appreciation of the facts and the event. To the 
extent that the FAA is thin on the ground, development of an accurate factual report 
that is contemporaneous with the event is impossible under the current set up. The 
remedy is in using other law enforcement officers who may be first responders in 
the event of an unauthorized UAS usage. Although they are not experts like aviation 
safety inspectors, they can provide valuable assistance to the FAA through 
identification of witnesses, interviews and documentation. The information given to 
safety inspectors can be used to, among other things, contact witnesses on any 
investigative action taken by the FAA. 
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Apart from the FAA, other law enforcement agencies are equally well placed to 
identify suspected operators of UAS, participants and support personnel.193 Their 
involvement has been rationalized by their potential ability to view and record the 
location of the event by taking pictures at close range. The pictures may be helpful 
in describing the lighting, weather pattern, any damage, identity sensitive locations, 
events or activities that help the FAA protect sensitive and restricted airspaces. 
Practically, the US has been using local area enforcement officers who work closely 
with the FAA regional officers and any such officers who are close to the event and 
witnesses it, may notify one of the FAA Regional Operation Centres to facilitate 
initiation of investigations.194 All this data can be presented as evidence in any future 
investigation of a UAS safety requirement violation.  
 
Local enforcement officers may likewise help in identifying and preserving public or 
private security systems that provide photographic evidence of UAS activity 
including video and still pictures. These systems do not store data permanently and 
may need to be reset automatically to erase such data.  Law enforcement can 
interfere with resetting and in the process preserve the data that can be used as 
evidence. To the extent that all these items are within reach of law enforcement, 
officers’ toolbox is a positive sign. This does not, however, paint the full picture. For 
example, whereas the FAA has enforcement mandate, its capacity to execute is 
limited. This is partly due to reliance on other government agencies to gather 
evidence. When unauthorized UAS activity occurs in remote places where real 
evidence is hard to get, it undermines the process of gathering evidence. 
 
6.2. General Design Challenges  
Although design of UAS identified in chapter Two of this thesis, is a safety challenge, 
the extent under which they are designed, can cause both safety and security 
challenge. In the US, design approval holders, modifiers, and civil aviation 
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authorities are required to regulate chemical oxygen installations. Provisions of 
Section 25.795 of the Code of Federal Regulations and the Advisory Circular on the 
Chemical Oxygen Generator require that design of aircraft’s chemical oxygen 
generators must be tamper proof. Such designs must be secure to prevent misuse 
of the chemical gas that can be used to cause unlawful interference against civil 
aviation. Designers of aircrafts including UAS are required to install tamper-evident 
features for ease of detecting tampering with the installation as a security counter 
measure.195  
 
These cross-cutting challenges of both safety and security requirements mirror the 
provisions of Part 5.33 of the ICAO UAS Circular that requires tamper proof in the 
design of UAS. It is noted, however, that regulations can only be effectively 
implemented with a multi-agency approach that includes the FBI, Department of 
Homeland Security, and Transportation Security Administration. The dependence 
on these government agencies may prove to be a challenge when the UAS in 
question is publicly operated. Secondly, though the requirements on chemical 
oxygen generation may be considered at the design and manufacturing stages, 
implementation, that requires human intervention, may be challenging since most 
UAS are pilotless. 
 
6.3 Other Challenges of Integration of UAS into Civil Aviation 
Overall, the process of integrating UAS into civil aviation has made great progress 
in the US. The passage of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act in 2012 gave 
impetus to this process by granting the FAA broad mandate to publish a 5-year 
roadmap, establish six test ranges and to integrate UAS into the national airspace 
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system by September 2015, which was not achieved as anticipated. The FAA was 
also required to mitigate safety research to facilitate the integration process, and 
eventually address challenges of UAS requirements that are highlighted in the Act.  
 
In its mission, the FAA has encountered other practical technological, regulatory and 
management barriers in its endeavour to integrate UAS in a safe and secure 
manner.196 One regulatory barrier relates to inefficiencies in framework for data 
collection, analysis and sharing. In particular, it has been reported that the FAA does 
not even access data held by the Department of Defence due to concerns of its 
sensitivity.197 These outlines the difficulties encountered by the FAA and how its 
efforts are undermined. Therefore, the FAA has not been effective in collecting and 
analysing UAS safety data that would enable identification of risks. This is partly due 
to failure by the FAA to develop procedures that would ensure all UAS incidents are 
not only reported but tracked and processed for data sharing with the US 
Department of Defense, which is the largest user of UAS. 
 
Secondly, it relates to the delay in schedule of integration. As set out above, the 
deadline had been set for September 2015. To accomplish this, the FAA issued a 
roadmap to guide the integration process for a period of 5 years. To the extent that 
the agency is behind schedule, it has implications for unresolved safety, security 
and privacy issues. Seventeen UAS-related provisions were cited in the Act, 
whereas the FAA has met deadlines for nine provisions, 8 provisions critical for the 
integration are yet to be fully implemented. Deadlines that have been met relate to: 
UAS Test Sites, publication of a UAS Roadmap, submission of a comprehensive 
UAS plan, simplified certificate of authorization process and the Arctic Plan.198 Of 
the remaining eight provisions, the FAA has encountered delays on the issue of a 
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final rule on “Small UAS” that was to be delivered by August 2014 and safe 
integration of civil UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS) whose set deadline 
was by September 2015 but not attained. 
 
Lastly, is the challenge of conflict between State and local laws. State, local and 
municipal jurisdictions could have different requirements on standards for UAS such 
as overflights, which may lead to conflict. This calls for the different levels to work 
together. Other areas in which State and local laws need to work together include 
limitations of UAS on flight altitude, flight paths, operational bans, and regulation of 
navigable airspace.199 In areas where there have been gaps, federal courts have 
stepped in to regulate some of these issues.200 For instance, the court had an 
opportunity to intervene in the case of Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines.201 In this case, the 
9th Circuit Court cited City of Burbank v Lockheed Air Terminal Inc202 with approval 
and held that due to “the interdependence of these factors” what Congress enacted 
in respect of these was “a uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation.”203  
 
Other than the judicial intervention, consultation is also critical in harmonizing 
equipment and training to support UAS aviation safety measures, such as geo-
fencing.204  State and police power in land use, zoning, privacy, trespass, law 
enforcement, and operations however remain constant and thus not subject to 
federal regulation.205 In order to ensure uniformity on these areas, in respect of the 
Montalvo case, is inapplicable. The FAA has identified certain common laws that 
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are permissible at both State and local levels with respect to obligation for police to 
obtain a warrant prior to using a UAS for surveillance. These common laws specify 
that UAS may not be used for voyeurism, hunting or fishing, interfere with or harass 




The US has its unique and long interaction with UAS, which makes its inclusion in 
this study meaningful. After enactment of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, its first 
commitment to UAS regulation at an international level was demonstrated in 1944 
when it galvanized support for adoption of the Chicago Convention within the 
American soil. Since then, the US has had experience in development of the 
regulation, institutional frameworks and providing integration of UAS into civil 
aviation, with its turning point being in 2012. Series of legal enactments and 
deliberate amendments to cover the UAS framework have further reshaped the 
ability of its framework to respond to safety, security and privacy concerns in the 
use of UAS. Also instrumental is the active FAA whose regulatory framework, 
including advisory opinions and circulars, have incrementally improved the depth 
and width of UAS regulation. Its provisions on airworthiness, visual line of sight, 
safety standards and safety management systems have enabled effective safety 
and security systems in UAS regulation. The security programmes and trainings 
under its framework also largely mirror the ICAO-based framework. UAS regulation 
is further, strengthened, by involvement of stakeholders through community-based 
organizations. Self-regulation is a lesson that African countries can learn in their 
pursuance of integration of UAS into civil aviation.  
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The safety, security and privacy assurances, though in place, have had a setback 
regarding two principal issues. First, is the lack of UAS-specificity in privacy 
regulation for UAS has to some extent been addressed by judicial activism which 
further strengthens the existing UAS framework. The second challenge is due to 
elusive Sense and Avoid technology, which still occurs to some UAS, despite 
America’s comparatively advanced technology. Other challenges that affect the full 
potential for safety, security and privacy assurance are: understaffing of aviation 
safety inspection; certain conflicts on regulatory framework between State laws and 
the federal law; and ineffective data collection and sharing. These challenges inhibit 
the UAS legal and policy frameworks in the US from speaking to the current needs 




LEGAL, POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATION OF UAS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
1. Introduction  
This chapter provides an analysis of the regulatory framework for regulation of the 
UAS in South Africa. Specifically, it examines how the framework has been effective 
in addressing safety, security and privacy concerns arising from use of UAS as 
discussed in chapter Two of this thesis. The chapter approaches the analysis by 
providing a brief background, overview of the legal and institutional legal framework 
principally under the South African Civil Aviation Act, 13 of 2009 and under South 
African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) respectively. It then critically analyses 
salient regulatory provisions vis-à-vis their efficacy in addressing safety, security 
and privacy concerns, before finally providing a conclusion on observations made 
through the chapter. 
 
2. Background of Regulation of UAS in South Africa 
It has been said that South Africa has used RPAs for military and civilian 
applications, which include the Denel Aerospace for surveillance missions and high-
speed target practice, Advanced Technologies and Engineering for artillery fire 
correction missions.1 It is in civilian application that remotely piloted aircraft continue 
to grow, for instance, in election monitoring, crime prevention and weather 
forecasting.2 Growing demands have also been recorded in firefighting, health, 
disaster management, pollution control, radio broadcasts and regulation of 
poaching. 3 
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This growth has presented South Africa with challenges, with respect to the need to 
ensure that remotely piloted aircraft are operated safely, without harming the public 
and affecting national security, and in a way that would protect areas of national, 
historical, or natural importance.4 Some of these challenges arise from the fact that 
the UAS has to operate in a national airspace, which has previously been dominated 
by manned aircraft regulation.5  Other challenges, such as privacy concerns arise 
from the use, structure and formation of the UAS. 
 
The shift towards civilian applications, being a recent phenomenon in South Africa 
and its present challenges have had an impact on the regulatory framework. At 
some point in early 2015 during development of the proposal for this thesis, there 
was the challenge of absence of UAS regulatory framework though efforts were in 
place to establish the regulations. This had a negative impact on integration efforts. 
Later on, South Africa started to develop UAS regulations. Generally, regulation of 
UAS lagged behind because it lacked the like history that had so much shaped 
regulation of manned aircraft. Despite this setback, there has been the realization 
that the integration of the UAS into the national airspace is inevitable given its 
ubiquity and increase in uses. 
 
Development of specific regulation in South Africa of unmanned aircraft systems 
began, albeit mildly, when the Air Traffic and Navigation Services came up with a 
guidance document to regulate UAS movements in 2002.6  Two years later, the 
South Africa Joint Aviation Authority Committee and its counterpart, the 
EUROCONTROL UAS Taskforce developed guiding principles for development of 
such concepts as it did in 2002.7 Since the report’s principles were developed by 
the Taskforce in 2004 just around the same year when the Guidance Document was 
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developed, it influenced development of the concept that had been commenced by 
South Africa. In a nutshell, the Taskforce recommended that development  of UAS 
had to be guided by the laid down applicable principles of UAS regulations, as 
espoused in chapter Three of this thesis, that guide in regulations for integrating 
UAS into civil aviation, including fairness, equivalence, responsibility and 
accountability, and transparency.8 The benefit of applying the principles in drafting 
UAS regulations is that once agreed upon, they aid in ensuring that the UAS are 
airworthy and operate efficiently in terms of sharing of responsibilities and improving 
overall chances of safety and security in use and operation.9  
 
A roadmap to UAS integration and regulation started in earnest in 2006, building on 
the works commenced in 2002 as pointed out above, when the SACAA established 
a Co-ordination Committee.10 The Committee brought together stakeholders in the 
UAS sector (air traffic controllers, manufacturers, academia and operators) to 
provide input in formulating UAS regulatory framework.  
 
Currently, the regulatory framework arises from regulations adopted by the spheres 
of national, provincial and local governments established by the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa.11 The three spheres, though separate entities, are distinct. 
That is, distinctive and interdependent. Just as Goitom correctly notes, the functions 
of the distinct governments is interdependent since conduct both legislative and 
executive functions.12 Accordingly, regulation of UAS is within command of the 
national government but with some delegated authority.  
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3. Overview of Current South African Framework for Regulation of UAS  
From analysis of available literature, it is evident that South Africa is a very active 
participant in the international scene, as far as regulation of UAS is concerned.13  
The pace with which the country acted in ratification and domestication of the 
Chicago Convention demonstrates its commitment to the framework of laws 
provided by the Convention and Agreement to be guided by the subsequent 
framework envisaged to be developed under the ICAO framework. 
 
Notably, South Africa is a member of the ICAO. Arising from this membership, South 
Africa was appointed to the Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Panel, established 
by ICAO in 2014.14 The duties of the panel include to coordinate, develop standards, 
recommend practices, support air navigation services, and guidance materials, and 
facilitate a safe, secure and efficient integration of UAS into the civilian airspace.15 
South Africa has also, in the past, been appointed Chair  the ICAO Aviation Security 
Panel. This appointment too is demonstration of its deep levels of commitment in as 
far as integration of the UAS into its civil airspace is concerned. By being part of the 
panel that coordinates and develops SARPs and Procedures on safety, security and 
integration, South Africa has a moral obligation imposed on it to comply with 
developing UAS regulation for the purpose of integrating them into civil aviation.   
 
The effect of the outlined membership is that the international legal framework 
provided by the Chicago Convention and the SARPs developed by ICAO through 
Annexes and Circulars apply to South Africa to the extent of their varying degrees 
of binding nature, as discussed in chapters Two and Three of this thesis. The 
international framework, therefore, imposes on South Africa the obligation to 
domesticate international conventions into its own national law. Further, bilateral 
                                                          
13 South Africa is a state party to the Chicago Convention, having appended her signature in 1 March 
1947, about a month after the convention’s inception on 4 April 1947. 
14 Goitom https://www.loc.gov/law/help/regulation-of-drones/south-africa.php (Date of use: 2 January 
2019). 




and multilateral trade agreements are binding documents among member States. 
South Africa is a signatory to, among others, the Convention for Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,16 and the Cape Town Convention 
of 16 November 2001.17   
 
Emanating from the aforementioned international legal regime, there was need for 
specific measures to address emerging challenges of UAS. The objective of the 
Cape Town Convention was to offer international protection to all member States 
against dangers associated with airspace.18 The Convention gave effect to 
international standards in certain categories relating to mobile equipment and the 
associated rights, which include flying equipment, such as UAS.19  
 
At the sub-regional level, SADC member States are yet to develop a specialised 
agency to deal with security and safety of civil aviation in the region.20 Although 
SADC was not part of the focus of the study, it is established that each SADC 
member State is left do develop her own local regulations, based on the framework 
provided by ICAO. The outlines of international conventions and treaty provisions 
apply to South Africa by virtue of its ratification; thus, such Conventions apply and 
are domesticated as a source of law.  
 
In terms of South Africa’s domestic legislative framework, the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa of 1996 is the supreme law, which outlines functions of 
several bodies with legislative authority such as parliament, provincial and local 
                                                          
16 Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Convention relating to Unlawful Acts 
Relating to International Civil Aviation of 10 September 2010 (entered into force 1 July 2018). 
17 Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment of 16 November 2001 
(entered into force 1 March 2006). 
18 Goode R “From acorn to oak tree: the development of the Cape Town Convention and Protocols” 
2012 ULR 599.  
19 Goode R “From Acorn” 599. 
20 Abeyratne R “The future of African civil aviation” 1998 JATWW 30-49. 
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governments or general spheres.21 All these bodies while making, applying and 
interpreting aviation laws, must do so in accordance with the constitutional 
principles. Other than the validation, the Constitution also provides for fundamental 
human rights, which UAS regulation must not overlook.22  For example, it provides 
that everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have (a) their 
person or home searched, (b) have their property searched, (c) have their 
possessions seized, or (d) have the privacy of their communications infringed.23  
This means that while undertaking regulation for integration of UAS into civil 
aviation, the South African Parliament, in addition to performing its legislative role, 
must take cognizant of this Bill of Rights. 
 
The South African UAS legal framework is generally designed to address safety, 
security and privacy in the aviation industry. The overall legislative framework is the 
Civil Aviation Act,24 which evidences the legislative commitment to safety and 
security.25 The Act allows for enactment of regulations and other subsidiary 
legislation to supplement and provide more details on implementation of the Act. In 
particular, Section 163 of the Civil Aviation Act is the legal basis for the SACAA to 
develop technical standards and rules for civil aviation in a manner that provides 
opportunities for UAS to operate in a safe and responsible environment. The 
operators would, however, need to convince the SACAA, using their manuals and 
other documents, of their capacities. The regulations are introduced to pilots of the 
remotely piloted aircraft, who have to be trained and familiarized with aviation rules 
and regulations and to the theoretical framework of remotely piloted aircrafts and all 
practical training.26  
 
                                                          
21 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, chapters 4 and 6 on the role of Parliament and 
of local Government respectively. 
22 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 14. 
23 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 14. 
24 Civil Aviation Act 13 of 2009 (hereinafter referred to in this chapter as the Civil Aviation Act). 
25 Civil Aviation Act, Section 72(1). 
26 Civil Aviation Act, Section 163. 
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Principally, the Civil Aviation Act of 2009, as amended from time to time, makes 
provisions for aviation safety, accidents and investigations procedures, approvals of 
land rights for reconnaissance, establishment of the institutional frameworks, among 
others. The Act further mandates the Minister responsible for aviation to make 
provisions regarding qualifications of operators, designation of functions to bodies, 
restriction of airspace, and institutions, classification, identification and development 
of appropriate technical, safety, security and development standards.27 An initial 
overview of the Act reveals that it does not have provisions that are UAS specific. 
This is so, despite the clamour for UAS integration, having kicked off seven years 
before the Civil Aviation Act was enacted.  
 
However, it is worth noting the definition of aircraft under Section 1 of the Civil 
Aviation Act refers to: 
“any machine, which can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions 
of the air.” 
 
The above cited definition includes any UAS, at least by implication. Such a 
conclusion for inclusion of UAS in the definition is supported by circumstances 
surrounding the Amendment Act. Since the Act was subsequent to efforts of the 
development of Guidance Document in 2002, Principles of the Taskforce Report in 
2004 and subsequent development of a roadmap for integration in 2006, was 
certain, therefore, that the drafters of the Act had in mind regulation of the UAS in 
mind when drafting the definition of aircraft.28 Its approach, therefore, was to spell 
the general rules that would be applied with necessary modifications.  
 
                                                          
27  SACAA Act, s. 163. 
28 See Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations in the RSA – Guidance, ATNS/HO/UAV WF, 
Johannesburg, 2002 and South African Civil Aviation Authority UAV Task Force Final Report 
of 11 May 2004 already provided in the prior historical analysis. 
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Overall, the commitments under the Amendment Act reflect the international 
framework since it seeks to achieve the objectives in the Standards and 
Recommended Practices of the ICAO, whilst considering the local context. It is safe 
to conclude, therefore, that the mandate of SACAA relates to aviation safety, 
security and by extension privacy during oversight of airspace, airports, operations 
and personnel.  
 
4.  Institutional Framework of South Africa Civil Aviation Authority and Other 
Institutions 
The South African Civil Aviation Act29 established the SACAA. When the Act was 
amended in 2009, the Civil Aviation Act made provisions for the institution and 
specifically recognized it under its Section 71. The institution has mandate to draft 
civil aviation regulations, technical standards for airworthiness and operation of non-
type certified aircraft. It is clear from the preamble of the Civil Aviation Act that it 
targeted expansion of the mandate of the SACAA, as far as safety and security 
oversight functions are concerned. These functions are handled at policymaking 
level, as well as day–to-day functioning of the SACCA that rests in the office of the 
Director General and staff of SACAA.30 Whereas the Director General answers to 
the Minister of Transport on matters of civil aviation, safety and security, the officer 
also answers to the Board on matters within the jurisdiction of the Board.31 The 





                                                          
29 South African Civil Aviation Authority Act 40 of 1998 (hereinafter in this chapter referred to as Civil 
Aviation Authority Act). 
30 Civil Aviation Act, Section 85. 
31 Civil Aviation Act, Sections 86 (3) (a) and (b). 
32 Civil Aviation Act, Sections 73(4) and Sec 87 (a)-(f). 
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The SACAA also contributes to overall regulation of South Africa’s domestic air law 
through development of UAS regulatory requirements in the form of Aeronautical 
Information Circulars, Technical Standards, coming up with strategies, licencing, 
and oversight of flight inspections and conducting regular reviews.  
 
The regulatory requirements, standards, procedures and strategies enumerated in 
Section 73 of the Civil Aviation Act, form the basis of implementation of provisions 
of the South Africa Civil Aviation Act as progressively amended. The, SACAA takes 
a critical position in the overall implementation of the aviation law as far as it relates 
to UAS.  Through the regulatory requirements, it can do what the law cannot do: 
that is, providing specifics on the regulation for practical application.  Specifically, 
they provide an avenue for the South African domestic regulatory framework to 
redeem itself by having a differential approach from the general approach adopted 
by the Civil Aviation Act, 2009 in which no UAS-specific provisions on safety, 
security and privacy have been made. In establishing these regulatory 
requirements, SACAA collaborates with other institutions with international best 
practices, particularly the FAA and the European Union (EU).33 
 
SACAA has a further mandate of conducting comprehensive aviation industry audits 
and surveillance, such as assessment of safety and security-related decisions taken 
by industry management at all levels for their impact on aviation safety and 
security.34 This very important mandate is complemented with the monitoring role, 
as well as implementation and enforcement of aviation policies such as the National 
Aviation Security Programme, which is discussed below.35  Additionally, the SACAA 
is involved in conducting regular and timely assessment of international safety and 
                                                          
33 https://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/pages/ICAO_EU.aspx (Date of use: 4 October 
2020). 
34Civil Aviation Authority Act, Section 73(1)(d). 
35 Civil Aviation Act, Section.73(1)(f). 
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security trends and developments, as well as ensuring compliance with ICAO 
Annexes and Rules.36 
 
Other than providing oversight on safety and security of remotely piloted aircraft 
(UAS) and the national enforcement, as a regulatory agency of the UAS under the 
Civil Aviation Act, SACAA37 has the legal responsibility of ensuring enforcement of 
the binding nature of regulation in relation to safety and security operations in the 
process of integrating UAS into the national airspace, in line with ICAO Guidelines. 
One of the most important roles is development of enforcement mechanisms that 
ensure compliance with existing international and country laws, guidelines, orders, 
circulars and other standards. 
 
From the ministerial level, a principal regulation, which is relevant to the study, is 
the Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Regulations.38 The regulations were 
developed in May 2015 through the Ministry of Transport, which issued regulations 
governing UAS. These were implemented on 1 July 2015.39 No doubt, the same 
was a product of the consultative structures of the SACAA as envisaged by Section 
156 of the Civil Aviation Act after successful amendments to the South Africa’s Civil 
Aviation Regulations40  that had deficiencies as the Civil Aviation Act in as far as 
specificity in regulation of UAS was concerned. The regulations make provisions 
that border on safety, security and privacy concerns of UAS operation. It prescribes 
where the UAS can be operated, prohibited places, the operational weight and 
distance above the earth’s surface.  
 
                                                          
36 Civil Aviation Act, Section 72.  
37 Civil Aviation Act, Section 73(1) (b). 
38 Eighth Amendment of the Civil Aviation Regulations of 2015, Government Notice R444/2015 of 
May 27, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment). 
39 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Part 101.  
40 South Africa Civil Aviation Regulations of 2011 (effective June 2012) (hereinafter referred to as 
Civil Aviation Regulations). 
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The development of the RPAs Regulations through the Civil Aviation Regulation 
(Eighth Amendment), in conjunction with the Ministry of Transport, shows that 
SACAA has taken the driver’s seat and was undeterred by the then lacuna, in the 
development of UAS legal frameworks. With this achievement, the only challenge 
that seems to stare at the framework is the ubiquity of number and uses that, has 
led to creation of toy aircrafts. These past strides, led to universal recognition, and 
it is almost predictable that South Africa is up to the task in tackling inherent 
challenges. 
 
Other than development of regulations, SACAA has the mandate to make requisite 
proposals before forwarding them to Parliament, the arm responsible for making 
laws.41 This role requires the SACAA to be very effective in development of the law 
through investment in research and studies, as well as drafting. The SACAA 
employs an inclusive approach when dealing with issues appertaining to UAS. Such 
initiatives include involvement of local stakeholders42 such as State organs, the 
military, airport operators, universities, research institutions, UAS manufacturers, 
UAS associations and prospective operators in general.43  
 
All these mandates are expansive and is reflective of the role played by ICAO in 
providing international framework for aviation regulation. SACAA is, therefore, the 
backbone of formulation, adoption, implementation and monitoring of UAS-specific 
laws in South Africa. As a consequence of its and other concerted efforts, South 
Africa has been posting good reports on corporate governance that translates to 
prudent financial performance in compliance with the requirements of Section 71 of 
the Civil Aviation Act. The SACAA act is credited with the rise in the South Africa’s 
                                                          
41 Civil Aviation Act, Sections 42 (1) (a) & (b), 42 (2), 43 & 44.  
42 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Sections 118 and 152 (e). It provides for Local 
Government structure and States that local communities and community organization need 
to be encouraged to be involved in matters of local government.  
43https://www.icao.int/Meetings/RPAS/RPASSymposiumPresentation/Day%202%20Workshop%20
6%20National%20Regulations%20Sam%20Twala%20%20South%20African%20Civil%20
%20Aviation%20Authority%20(SACAA).pdf> (Date of use: 8 November 2019). 
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level of compliance with the international framework as urged by scholars before the 
development of the Civil Aviation Act.44  
 
Other than SACAA, there are other governmental institutions created under the Civil 
Aviation Act to implement and enforce South Africa’s legal framework on civil 
aviation, and UAS in particular. They include the Department of Transport, and the 
Civil Aviation Authority Board, with mandate provided by the SACAA.45  
 
These institutions work together, especially through issuance of regulations, 
technical standards and circulars. Section 73 of the Civil Aviation Act mandates the 
Department of Transport and the Civil Aviation Authority to develop regulations, 
technical standards, guidance materials and circulars with import to govern UAS, 
Under Section 163 of the Civil Aviation Act and Part 101 of the Civil Aviation 
Regulations, the Director of Civil Aviation is mandated to provide other technical 
standards on UAS known as the South African Civil Aviation Technical Standards 
(SA-CATS)46 that took legal effect in July 2015.47  The Director of Civil Aviation also 
provides a number of Aeronautical Circulars that relate to remote pilot licensing, 
requirements for application of remote pilot licenses, training and aviation 
examinations applicable to UAS.48 These instruments make it possible for regulation 
of operation by private, commercial, corporate and non-profit operators.   
 
Also complementing these other bodies are provincial and local governments that 
regulate the use of public areas by UAS and ensure safety of citizens. This is 
achieved through enactment of local laws touching on safety and other aspects of 
the UAS. One major area of the contribution is development of regulation on 
                                                          
44 Ingham LA Considerations 45. 
45 Civil Aviation Act, Section 75.  
46 South Africa Civil Aviation Technical Standards 101 (SA-CATS 101) of 1 July 2015 (hereinafter 
referred to as SA-CATS 101). 
47 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eighth Amendment), Section 5. 
48 http://www.caa.co.za/RPAS%20AICs/AIC%20007-2015 (Date of use: 10 September 2018). 
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permission to operate. UAS operators are required to comply with provincial and 
local authority laws pertaining to permission to operate.49  It is however expected 
that the provisions of the permissive laws shall not violate the framework provided 
by SACAA.  
  
In the build-up to the appreciation of the safety, security and privacy prospects and 
challenges in UAS regulation in South Africa, the next part introduces the 
classification of various UAS currently in use and recognized in the country. 
 
5.  Classification of UAS  
The classification of unmanned aircraft systems in South Africa takes the form of 
commercial, corporate and non-profit UAS operations. The impact of the difference 
is subjection to different standard of regulation of safety, security and privacy. 
Notwithstanding the safety, security and privacy challenges, the South Africa’s 
regulatory framework envisages minimum regulatory frameworks as discussed 
below.  
 
5.1 Commercial, Corporate and Non-profit Operators 
When the use of a UAS is concerned with commercial outcome, interest or gain, it 
becomes a commercial operation. Corporate operations are by firms. Non-profit use 
can be for no economic gains, whether by individual or by corporate body50 Whereas 
private operators of UAS are in a class of their own, the commercial, corporate and 
non-profit UAS are on the other hand exposed to stricter regulations. The three 
operators share certain rules and restrictions but some technical and operational 
requirements depend on the type of operation as shown in Table 6 below.51  
                                                          
49 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, chapters 6 and 7 establishes provincial and 
local levels of government respectively. 
50 Ingham LA Considerations 45. 




5.2 Private Operations 
The Civil Aviation Regulations define private operations as “the use of remotely 
piloted aircrafts for an individual’s personal and private use, where there is no 
commercial outcome, interest or gain.”52 There are additional restrictions under the 
regulation including private operations only being conducted with class 1A or class 
1B.  Class 1A is defined as UAS that is less than 1.5kgs in weight, while class 1B is 
a UAS that is not more than 7kgs in weight.53  Both classes 1A and 1B are required 
by the Civil Aviation Act and UAS regulations (SA-CATS 101) to fly at a height less 
than 400 metres. 
 
To facilitate regulation, South Africa has further classified the UAS in terms of 
weight, impact, energy, operational height above the ground, rules of flight and 
areas of operation.54 UAS regulation in South Africa classifies UAS operatives under 
operators, pilots and persons who maintain them.55 These classifications reflect the 
classifications provided in chapter Two of the thesis and is for regulatory efficiency. 
 
                                                          
52 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Section 101.01.5. 
53 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Section 101.01.5. 
54  Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Section 101.01.5. The classification criterion of 
UAS is defined in the South Africa categories. 
55 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eighth Amendment), Section 101.01.1. 
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Operation of Commercial, Corporate and Non-profit UAS 
 Commercial Corporate Non-Profit 
Air Service License (ASL)       X      _          _ 
RPAS Operator Certificate 
(ROC) 
      X     X          X 
RPA Letter of Approval (RLA)       X     X          X 
RPA Certificate of Registration 
(CoR) 
      X     X          X 
Remote Pilot License (RPL)      X     X          X 
 
Table 6: Source of diagram 2015 SACAA RAPS Regulation 
 
CLASS                               UAS CLASSIFICATION 
 LINE-OF-SIGHT ENERGY(KJ) HEIGHT (FT) MTOM (KG) 
Class 1A Restricted visual line of 
sight/ visual line-of-sight  
Less than-15 Less than-400 Less than-1.5 
Class 1B Restricted visual line of 
sight / visual line-of-sight  
Less than-15 Less than-400 Less than-7 
Class 1C Visual line-of-sight/ 
extended visual line-of-
sight 
Less than-34 Less than-400 Less than- 20 





Less than-400 Less than-20 
Class 2B EXPERIMENTAL/RESEARCH 
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Less than- 400 Less than-150 
Class 3B Visual line-of-sight/ 
extended visual line-of-
sight 
Any Less than-400 Less than- 150 
Class 4A Beyond visual line-of-
sight  
Any Less than-400 Less than-150 
Class 4B Any Any Any Less than-150 
 
The following part of this chapter trains its focus on substantive issues of safety, 
security and privacy in use of UAS as identified in chapter Two of this thesis, and 
how they are redressed under South Africa’s legal, policy and institutional 
framework. 
 
6. Responses to Challenges Identified as Safety, Security and Privacy   
6.1 South Africa’s Response to Safety Concerns of UAS 
Aviation safety as provided for under ICAO Annex 19 and Safety Management 
Manual (Doc 9859) arise from the design as well as the capability challenges 
regarding sense and avoid technology hence the need to mitigate safety risks. 
Generally, the safety of aircraft and people on the ground is considered an important 
attribute of civil aviation in South Africa, through myriad provisions of laws including 
Part 101 of the Civil Aviation Regulations inserted through the Civil Aviation 
Regulations as (Eighth Amendment) and other SACAA Circulars and Standards.56 
                                                          
56 Timothy R “A comparative global analysis of drone laws: best practices and policies.” in the future 
of drone Use (TMC Asser Press Hague 2016) 302. 
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The regulatory framework for operation of UAS aims at managing them in the civilian 
airspace with emphasis on safety and training.57  
 
The regulatory framework envisages ensuring the safety of UAS use through 
licensing of remote pilots. Under the Civil Aviation Regulations (Eighth Amendment), 
any person who desires to operate a commercial, corporate or non-profit UAS is 
required to have a valid remote piloting license.58 A remote piloting license falls into 
three categories, namely: remote pilot license (airplane), remote pilot license 
(helicopter) and remote pilot license (multi-rotor).59 The remote pilot license is further 
rated in three ways depending on the mode and nature of operations. These 
categories are as follows: visual line-of-sight operations; extended visual line-of-
sight60 operations and beyond visual line-of-sight operations.61 These categories of 
UAS in the pilot system ensure that the regulatory system is able to respond to the 
unique safety issues arising from the different categories of classifications of UAS 
operations.  
 
Other than the regulation under the wide categorization, the general rules that apply 
for one to be granted a licence have certain safety underpinnings. For example, 
according to SACAA, it is required that the applicant must be 18 years, have 
requisite training from an approved school, whether local or approved and validated 
foreign training.62 The validation of foreign training is a critical to ensure 
harmonization of skills and competencies to licenced pilots of UAS. The South 
African system has put in place a Recognition for Prior Learning (RPL) Assessment, 
                                                          
57 Hofmeyr CD “Here is why South Africa’s new drone regulations are ridiculous” 
https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/92072/here-is-why-south-africas-drone-
regulations-are-ridiculous/ (Date of use: 8 July 2017). 
58 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eighth Amendment), Section 101.03.1. 
59 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eighth Amendment), Section 101.03.1. 
60 SA-CATS, Section 101.01.1 defines an extended visual line of sight as an operation below 400 
feet above ground level in which an observer maintains direct and unaided visual contact 
with the remotely piloted aircraft at a distance not exceeding 1,000 meters from the pilot. 
61   SA-CATS, Section 101.03.1. 
62 SACAA “Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems: Pilot Licensing and Instructor Rating” 




which aids in determining whether the applicants have the requisite qualifications.63 
These assessments are viewed as very essential given the UAS are likely to attract 
a number of users who have training from foreign aviation schools. UAS licensing 
for commercial operations are issued under three categories: airplane, helicopter 
and multi-rotor.64 Additional rating may also be endorsed on a license just like in 
manned aircraft in terms of visual line of sight operations, extended visual line of 
sight operations and beyond visual line of sight operations. 
 
Also inherent to the safety is requirements bordering on communication. The 
regulations premise remote pilot licencing on satisfaction by an applicant of the 
requirement for radiotelephony communication as well as English proficiency of 
other levels.65 Indeed, the communication requirements are vital, since 
communication is an essential part of aviation safety both for manned and 
unmanned aircraft systems. For instance, Krivonos, citing previous literature notes 
that the overall objective of communication is to prevent aviation accidents from 
taking place by ensuring free and efficient flow of correct and ideal aviation 
information.   
 
It is evident that apart from recognition of the importance of communication, the 
requirements were formulated against a backdrop of reports that most aviation 
accidents arose from communication mismatches.66 Accordingly, the South African 
framework adopted a similar regulatory approach to ICAO’s when it introduced 
English Proficiency tests in March 2011 through Advisory Circular 153AN/56. Such 
                                                          
63 SACAA “Remotely piloted aircraft systems: pilot licensing and instructor rating” 
http://www.caa.co.za/Pages/RPAS/RPAS%20pilot%20licensing.aspx (Date of use: 7 
September 2020). 
64 SACAA http://www.caa.co.za/Pages/RPAS/RPAS%20pilot%20licensing.aspx (Date of use: 7 
September 2020). 
65 See SACATS, Section 101.03.2 on Remote pilot license: training, examination and application for 
RPL requirements. 
66http://aviationenglishway.com/2019/03/31/the-importance-of-an-effective-communication-in-
aviation/> (Date of use: 4 January 2020). 
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emulation is important since there are no crew members in UAS and as such, the 
communication is pegged on the remote pilot. 
 
Also relevant for effective monitoring is the periodicity of the UAS pilot license. The 
licence is issued for a period of two years for commercial operators. For private 
operators, the period is one year.67 The differentiation recognizes bureaucracies to 
obtain the licence for the former. If one wishes to extend the deviation, there is a 
requirement to re-submit the application for purposes of renewal.68 Other than this, 
ordinary renewals are done on an annual basis. During such renewals, applicants 
are required to take refresher courses. No doubt, such courses aid the pilots to be 
conversant with changes introduced by SACAA. The refresher courses are, 
however, not centralised and can be offered by various training centres. The 
refresher course training strategy helps in preserving the capacity of SACAA for 
other important regulatory mandates since the training schools are already 
regulated through a proper certification process. The regulatory approaches to 
licencing remote pilots is a good step towards achievement of the safety of 
navigation obligations under Article 3(3) of the Chicago Convention. 
 
The licencing requirements are further supported by provisions on trainings. Overall, 
the institutions created under the Act and the general framework are pivotal in aiding 
the South African framework to reflect the approach envisaged by the ICAO Circular 
No. 328-AN/190 and ICAO Annex 1, which all view training as  part of the larger 
licencing and thus important for aviation safety.69 The Civil Aviation Act gives more 
prominence to the need for training as a means of achieving the overall aim of safety 
in South Africa. Under Section 31(9) of the Civil Aviation Act, staff of the Aviation 
Safety Board are required to be trained in order to achieve objective investigation of 
                                                          
67 https://www.droneitsa.co.za/remote-pilots-licence-rpl/ (Date of use: 7 September 2020). 
68 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eighth Amendment), Section 101.03.6. 
69 See Burger CR and Jones T “Adapting existing training standards for unmanned aircraft: finding 
ways to train staff for unmanned aircraft operations” (Paper presented to the International 




accidents and making of safety recommendations among other key functions 
outlined in Section 30 of the Civil Aviation Act.   
 
Part 101 of the Regulations introduced by the Civil Aviation Regulations (Eighth 
Amendment) requires actual implementation and training to be conducted by 
recognized institution. An analysis of the training standards and requirements shows 
that they are aligned to include aeronautical information and operational 
components, as envisaged under Part 7.9 of the ICAO Circular No. 328-AN/190. 
Specifically, SACAA Aeronautical Information Circular makes provisions for aviation 
training organizations that engage in conducting UAS training. It prescribes the 
scope of procedure manuals for such institutions, training curricula and extends it to 
apply to UAS with necessary modifications.70 These requirements are monitored 
through approval systems for any extension beyond the scope of approval. Other 
than the trainings, the test centres are only those approved by the Director of 
SACAA.71   
 
Other than the pilots, also pivotal is the training of the observers. Under the Civil 
Aviation Act, an observer is defined as “a trained and competent person designated 
by the operator who, by visual observation of the remotely piloted aircraft, assists 
the remote pilot in the safe conduct of the flight.”72Accordingly, the training 
requirements and extension of use of flight curricular in the Advisory Circular 
008/2015 is a step in the right direction in harmonization of the flights or manned 
and unmanned aircrafts systems as envisaged by Part 2.12 of the ICAO Circular 
No. 328-AN/190. However, despite such significant strides, the extension for the 
curriculum does not seem to take cognizance of the differential training needs for 
operators of UAS. Perhaps for expediency, the framework should adopt the spirit of 
                                                          
70 SACAA Aeronautical Information Circular No 008/2015 of 23 July 2015 (hereinafter referd to as 
the AIC 008/2015), Paragraph 2. 
71 South Africa Civil Aviation Act, Section 88 (5). 
72 Civil Aviation Act, Section 2 (g). 
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Part 7.4 of the ICAO Circular No. 328-AN/190 where the training for UAS operators 
is done on a need basis, which is not the case currently.  
 
The third aspect of safety regulation in South Africa is certification of the UAS. From 
the reading of the meaning accorded to the word ‘operator’ in the Civil Aviation Act, 
it is clear that it includes a remote pilot and other persons involved in air services. 
For UAS, certification is to be granted to operators, whether individually or by 
artificial entities. The Regulations require that any person who operates a 
commercial, corporate or non-profit UAS should have a UAS operator certificate.73 
An analysis of the previous tables evidences that operating a UAS in South Africa 
is heavily restricted because one would first need to be registered, receive a number 
of licenses, approvals and certificates to be allowed into the airspace.  
 
For commercial operators, the requirements for certification are more stringent since 
a prospective operator would be required to apply for and obtain air service license 
from the Air Service Licence Council as a pre-condition for obtaining an UAS 
operator certificate.74 This requirement, however, does not apply to corporate and 
non-profit operators. The application for the UAS operator certificate is a five-step 
process similar to that followed by ICAO and involves pre-application, formal 
application, document evaluation, demonstration and inspection, and certification. 
Compliance with the safety and security issues are monitored through a renewal 
process. For instance, the UAS operator certificate is issued for a period of one year.  
Again, as Dalamagkidis, Valavanis and Piegl observe, the annual yearly period 
appears to be the standard for renewal of most licences for ease of planning by the 
State.75 
 
                                                          
73 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eighth Amendment), Section 101.04.1. 
74 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eighth Amendment), Section 101.04.1. 
75 Dalamagkidis K, Kimon PV and Piegl LA On integrating unmanned aircraft systems into the 
national airspace system: issues, challenges, operational restrictions, certification, and 
recommendations (Springer science & Business Media 2011) 2. 
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While the certification regulation for commercial operations are more stringent, 
implementation of these measures has come under scrutiny in the recent past.  For 
instance, in July 2018, Ragongo and Caboz, questioned whether the Drones’ 
Fireworks that was organized by Absa and Intel had the requisite permission from 
SACAA.76 Questions arose from the public who viewed the fireworks consisting of 
300 drones were incongruent with twenty licences that had been issued to 
commercial operators in 2018. This was so since strictly speaking, in order to 
achieve the goals of safety, it is envisaged that each drone for commercial purpose 
should be individually licenced prior to certification.77 The instance led to a 
realization that the certification process could be abused by a possibly liberal 
approach, which could peg certification on an operator and not the number of 
drones.  
 
Other than the requirement for certification, the conditions in the certification 
exercise have safety underpinning. First, it is the responsibility of the holder of UAS 
operator certificate to develop an operator’s manual, which is then forwarded to the 
Director of Civil Aviation for approval.78 The regulations go further to state what 
ought to be included in the manual. These include type and scope of operations, 
including the manner in which each type of UAS and operation will be safely 
conducted. Such operators are required to strictly comply with changes only 
implemented with approval of the Director General of SACAA. Compliance with the 
manual provisions is to be complemented with development of commensurate 
safety management system. These safety standards and requirements are to form 
the basic minimum guide for the staff of the UAS operators. It focuses on the basic 
operator level promises and gives a wider utilization of the manuals by respective 
staff of the operators. These prospects are, however, dimmed by bureaucracies in 
the application and approval processes. For instance, O’Connell, who owns a drone 
company called Timeslice, has been quoted to say that obtaining a letter of approval 
                                                          
76 Ragongo T and Caboz J “Was Absa’s drone show illegal” https://myofficemagazine.co.za/was-
absas-drone-show-illegal/ (Date of use: 7 September 2020). 
77 Ragongo T and Caboz J https://myofficemagazine.co.za/was-absas-drone-show-illegal/ (Date of 
use: 7 September 2020). 
78 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eighth Amendment), Section 101.04.5. 
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took the company nearly two years.79 Such delays cause timelines of non-
certification, which may open avenues for non-compliance with the safety 
requirements. 
 
The regulations appear to recognize different types of entities and complexity of 
their operations and require that the safety programme system should reflect such 
complexities. From an analytical point of view, the regulations would be much more 
effective if the safety management is based on the type of UAS, as opposed to the 
size of the operator. Such a system would ensure assurance of identification of 
potential safety hazards and risks, appropriateness, and effectiveness in safety 
management activities as envisaged by ICAO Circular No. 328-AN/190 and ICAO 
Air Safety Manual AN/959.80 
 
The fourth issue related to UAS safety is registration for certified private UAS 
operators wishing to engage in commercial, corporate non-profit operation, the Civil 
Aviation Regulations require an application for, and approval by the Director of Civil 
Aviation Authority, a letter of approval and certificate of registration.81 The operator 
who applies for a letter of approval is required to submit the following documents: 
standard design, safety level documentation and demonstration of the safety 
systems. The operator, who wishes to apply for approval to operate UAS, is required 
to submit the UAS manufacturers’ operating manual to the Director of Civil 
Aviation.82 For UAS in Classes 1 and 2, it is mandatory to provide information on 
UAS type, structure, composition, flight envelope capability, UAS 
dimensions/measurements and mass, together with drawings, mass and balance, 
payloads (specific or generic), use of frequencies, remote pilot station, ground 
support equipment and flight recovery system.83  As Mashinini correctly observes, 
                                                          
79 https://www.businessinsider.co.za/absa-has-been-breaking-sa-drone-laws-and-is-about-to-put-
on-an-illegal-spectacular-for-its-big-reveal-today-2018-7 (Date of use: 4 October 2020) 
80 See chapter Three, section 4.1 of this thesis on analysis of these instruments regarding safety n 
UAS use. 
81 SA-CATS, Sections 101.02.1 and 101.02.4. 
82 SA-CATS, Sections 101. 
83 SA-CATS, Sections 101.02.2. 
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these levels of documentation mean that when the change of use takes place, the 
major consideration for the Director should be the safety that the shift in use has on 
identifiable group of people and the general public.84 
 
The requirements are so thorough that even at the time of submitting the above 
documentation, information pertaining to actual performance of the UAS should be 
submitted as well. These information include  maximum altitude, maximum 
endurance, maximum range, airspeed (take-off, cruise, landing, stall, maximum), 
maximum rate of climb, maximum rate of descent, maximum bank angle, turn rate 
limits, propulsion system (such as engine/motor, fuel, electrical, hydraulic, 
pneumatic, gas, solar).85 The thorough approach helps in discouraging change of 
use from the original design from a regulatory approach. 
 
The fifth issue relating to safety is the regulation of UAS operation to the line of sight 
of the remote pilot or underground flight manager. A visual line of sight is a straight 
line within which an operator of UAS has and can maintain a clear human or 
mechanical view of the UAS operating in the airspace. Maintaining the UAS within 
the visual line of sight ensures optimal safety by reduction of cases of accidents and 
collisions with other aircrafts. On the other hand, when UAS operates outside the 
prescribed visual range, it is said to be beyond visual line of sight. This second 
phenomenon presents safety challenges but require proper legal framework to 
manage to maintain a critical balance between the safety interests and the need for 
autonomy of operation of UAS. 
 
 
                                                          
84 Mashinini N “The processing of personal information using remotely piloted aircraft systems in 
South Africa” 2020 DJLJ 140-158. 
85Mashinini N “The processing” 142. 
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A remote pilot is expected to maintain direct unaided visual contact with the UAS to 
manage the flight and satisfy separation and collision avoidance requirements.86 
Under Section 2 (i) of the Civil Aviation Act, a restricted visual line-of-sight means 
an operation within 500 metres of the remote pilot and below the height of the 
highest obstacle within 300 metres of the UAS, in which the remote pilot maintains 
direct unaided visual contact with the UAS to manage its flight and meet separation 
and collision avoidance responsibilities”.87 
 
The Civil Aviation Act, 2009 does not, however, define the term Beyond the Visual 
Line-of-Sight in its interpretation section.88 The definition was addressed in the 2015 
Regulation after the Eight Amendment.89 The interpretation section was amended 
by inserting the definition of Beyond Visual-Line of-Sight to mean an operation in 
which the remote pilot cannot maintain direct unaided visual contact with the UAS 
to manage its flight and to meet separation and collision avoidance responsibilities 
visually. The Amendment Regulation also extended visual line of sight to mean 
operation below 400 feet above ground level in which an observer maintains direct 
and unaided visual contact with the remotely piloted aircrafts at a distance not 
exceeding 1000 metres from the pilot.90   
 
It is a legal requirement that private operations are carried out in restricted Visual-
Line of-Sight.91 An operation within the restricted Visual-Line-of-Sight is an 
operation conducted within 500 metres of the UAS pilot and below the height of the 
highest obstacle within 300 metres of the UAS. As Linchant et al observes, the 
purpose of this restriction is to minimise chances of air crashes amongst unmanned 
aircraft or with the manned aircraft. The requirement is thus intended to ensure 
                                                          
86 Mashinini N “The processing” 144. 
87 See also Mashinini N “The processing” 143. 
88 Civil Aviation Act, Section 2. 
89 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment). 
90 Civil Aviation Regulations, Regulation 2(f). 
91 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eighth Amendment), Section 101.01.  
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safety of the airspace.92 In more specific terms “within 500 metres of the remote pilot 
and below the height of the highest obstacle within 300 metres of the UAS, in which 
the remote pilot maintains direct unaided visual contact with the UAS to manage its 
flight and meet separation and collision avoidance responsibilities.”93  
 
The import of the provisions is that a UAS that operates beyond the Visual-Line-of-
Sight may cause air accidents with manned aircraft using the same flight path. As 
such, operations are prohibited, unless conducted within controlled airspace that 
does not have other flying aircraft. It is for this reason that Section 101.05.11 (1) of 
the South Africa Civil Aviation Technical Standards prohibits UAS operation beyond 
Visual-Line-of-Sight unless the holder has UAS operator certificate and gets 
approval of the Director. The Director has powers to approve beyond Visual-Line-
of-Sight operation, subject to meeting the RPAs operations requirements under 
Subpart 5 of the South Africa Civil Aviation Regulations on Technical Standards.94  
 
Specifically, Section 101.05.11 (3) of Regulation 101, provides that persons who are 
approved by the Director to operate beyond Visual-Line-of-Sight should only 
conduct their activities below 400 feet above surface level. At this level, they are 
noticeable and easy to control, and thus prevent accidents and collisions. The 
operator is expected to operate within strict compliance of the height allowed unless 
otherwise approved by the Director. All these express limitations and restrictions 
operate to ensure that there is no abuse of power by the Director, which can pose 
a threat to the safety of the people.  
 
 
                                                          
92 Linchant J et al “Are unmanned aircraft systems (UAS s) the future of wildlife monitoring? A review 
of accomplishments and challenges” 2015 Mammal Review 239-252. 
93 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eighth Amendment), Section 101.01. 
94 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eighth Amendment), Section 101.05.11 (2). 
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Despite the requirement for licencing, certification, training, approvals and caution 
through visual line of sight, the South African legal framework recognizes the 
inevitability of accidents and collisions. As such, it imposes insurance obligations on 
the UAS operators. Under the framework, a UAS operator certificate holder should 
carry third party liability insurance to enable him/her pay compensation for any 
damage caused to a third party.95 The insurance is an assurance against security 
risks that may arise from the use of UAS. 
 
Other than the specific considerations for safety, there are also other threads of 
general safety considerations that run through the web of regulatory framework in 
South Africa. Accordingly, and flowing from the jurisdiction of SACAA to develop 
technical standards provided under Section 163 of the Civil Aviation Act, 2009, the 
SACAA has developed standards on safety.96 These standards address issues on 
who can operate a UAS, how and when. Specifically, under this framework, persons 
who operate UAS should ensure that it is in a fit-to-fly condition, and the pilot should 
be a holder of a license.97 The fitness to fly for UAS is much different from manned 
aircrafts, since it does not have crew and neither does it have a cockpit. The fitness 
to fly here would mean considering the planned travel vis-à-vis how far the UAS can 
fly, ability to return home, ability to fly with low fuel or power as well as the status of 
inbuilt software for the UAS.  
 
Other external considerations that influence the fitness to fly include weather 
conditions, the guarantee of compatibility and only one pilot should control 
interoperability with which the aircraft is connected to in all phases of flight, and 
remotely piloted aircrafts at any given moment.98 Interoperability is the ability to 
communicate with diverse types of UAS within the airspace and air traffic control 
systems for manned aircrafts. This requirement is a significant step towards the 
                                                          
95 South Africa Civil Aviation Technical Standards (SA-CATS), Section 101.04.12. 
96 SA-CATS, Section 101.04.12. 
97 SA-CATS, Section 101.04.12. 
98 SA-CATS, Section 101.05.9(1). 
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integration and harmonization calls in the ICAO UAS Circular since it gears towards 
creation of a singular unmanned aircraft system traffic management (UTM) with that 
of manned aircrafts. While these requirements are evidently aimed at addressing 
safety measures as per the requirement of ICAO Annex 19, they also address the 
challenges associated with aviation security as provided for under ICAO Annex 17 
to curb acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation or criminal activities,99 to be 
discussed separately. 
 
The other factor is the language of the air training and education. Radio 
communication use is an important safety requirement for UAS operations, bearing 
in mind that communication and information are key to aviation safety. The type of 
operation being undertaken by the UAS operator determines the restrictions relating 
to radio communication. Except for restricted Visual-Line-of-Sight operations, no 
UAS shall be operated unless the pilot has a functioning air-band radio in his or her 
possession, tuned to the frequency or frequencies applicable to the air traffic service 
unit providing services or controlling such area or airspace or to aircraft in such area 
or airspace.100 The entire operation of the UAS is required to be conducted using a 
radio line of sight,101 which, is a direct electronic, point-to-point contact between a 
transmitter and a receiver.  
 
Other requirements are necessitated by the prevailing circumstances of the 
operation.102 Section 101.05.16 (2) of the Regulation requires that the air-band radio 
has the required output and be configured in such a way that the range, strength of 
transmission and quality of communication extends beyond the furthest likely 
position of the UAS from the pilot.103 For Visual-Line-of-Sight, Extended Visual-Line-
                                                          
99 See chapter Three, section 4.2 of this thesis on the analysis of the ICAO Annex 17. It may be 
recalled that Section 2.1.2 of the Annex provide that provides that each contracting State 
shall establish an organization and develop and implement regulations, practices and 
procedures to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference taking into 
account the safety, regularity and efficiency of flights. 
100 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Section 101.05.16 (1).  
101 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Section 101.05.16 (1). 
102 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Section 101.05.16 (1). 
103 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Section 101.05.16 (2). 
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of-Sight and Beyond Visual-Line-of-Sight operations, the pilot is obligated during the 
registration of the UAS as a call-sign, to make the required radio calls, indicating the 
altitude, location and intended operation of the UAS in that area and at such intervals 
as are required in order to ensure adequate separation from other aircraft is 
maintained.104 
 
In addition to the above general considerations in safety precautions for operation 
of different categories of UAS, the regulatory framework in South Africa 
encompasses certain prohibitions. UAS-related activities that are prohibited include 
using unmanned aircraft systems to tow other aircraft; performance of acrobatic 
displays, and flying in formations.105 Operators of private UAS are further restricted 
from using them for certain purposes that would endanger the public.106 They are 
also prohibited from flying within 10 kilometres of an airfield or restricted airspace 
(sensitive areas such as nuclear power stations, police stations, crime scenes or 
courts of law).107 Other restrictions are with respect to releasing, dropping, delivering 
or deploying of objects. On analysis however, due to advancement in technology, 
UAS are likely to be used for delivery of many items including drugs and foodstuffs 
to remote areas, hence prohibition on delivery to fall falling short of the intended 
legislative purpose. 
 
If outside a controlled airspace, the operator should comply with the technical 
requirements for operation using command inputs, ability to remain clear from 
obstacles or any other hazards, and take appropriate action to execute collision 
avoidance from such obstacles or other aircraft wherever necessary. These are vital 
precautions aimed at reducing air crashes and civil liabilities to the owners who 
could be at fault, if the area is void of other air traffic or the operation occurs in 
specifically segregated airspace; or measures to mitigate other aircraft, obstacles or 
                                                          
104 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Section 101.05.16 (2). 
105 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Section 101.05.10. 
106 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Section 101.05.10. 
107 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Section 101.05.10. 
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hazards. In addition, the Director of Civil Aviation can command and control data 
link frequency appropriate for effective operation and data gathering.108  
 
Further, the framework prohibits a commercial, corporate and non-profit UAS from 
using a public road or public grounds as take-off or landing grounds. An UAS can 
be allowed to operate within 50 metres of a public road so long as the operator is 
an UAS operator’s certificate holder with permission of the Director General.109 In 
South Africa, it is prohibited to operate (UAS) overhead or at a lateral distance of 50 
metres from any person, unless one is a qualified UAS operator with a valid 
certificate.110 Lastly, a UAS operator must show operational capabilities, ability to 
command the UAS, to control airspace that follows a predetermined course or group 
of waypoint inputs.111 These are the assurances that limit chances of causing 
accidents. The efficacy of these provisions is left to implementation of the institutions 
created under the framework. 
 
Generally, no person is allowed to operate an UAS over a public road, along the 
length of a public road or at a distance of less than 50 metres from a public road. 
There are three exceptions to this rule. Such a person should be a holder of an UAS 
operator’s certificate; the operation should have been approved by the Director in 
the operator's operations manual; in the case of operations over a public road, such 
road is closed for public use and reasonable care taken to ensure the safety of road 
users and pedestrians in the event of loss of control of the UAS. It appears that the 
regulatory limitation is generally a safety and security measure aimed at 
safeguarding the lives of road users. 
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All the above mentioned general regulatory prohibitions and relaxations, have safety 
and by extension security underpinnings. A review of the prohibition in other 
countries and States, such as Nevada, shows that they are considered to have 
effect to the public. This explains why all these prohibitions can only be relaxed 
when a UAS operator certificate holder receives approval of the Director of Civil 
Aviation. In approving these operations or granting waivers, the requirements reflect 
the international regulations of drones, which prevent use of UAS in highly populated 
areas. In South Africa, therefore, the Director of Civil Aviation is guided by certain 
requirements determined by whether the operation takes place in a controlled or 
uncontrolled airspace.112  
 
Also relevant are standards relating to the regulation of night operations. UAS 
operations at night refer to operations conducted between 15 minutes after sunset 
and 15 minutes before sunrise, as provided in the publication Times of sunrise, 
sunset and local apparent noon of the South African Astronomical Observatory or a 
similar publication issued by a recognized astronomical observatory.113 The general 
rule is that UAS may not be operated at night except in restricted Visual-Line-of-
Sight operation or by a qualified person who is a holder of UAS operator’s certificate, 
and as approved by the Director in terms of sub-regulation 101.05.12 (1).114 At the 
very minimum, a holder of an UAS operator certificate intending to operate at night, 
shall, only do so subject to compliance with the requirements prescribed in the South 
Africa Civil Aviation Technical Standards.115 Section 101.05.12 (2) of the 
Regulations specifically provide that “An UAS may not be operated at night in 
controlled airspace except as approved by the Director as prescribed in Regulation 
101.05.3.”116 
 
                                                          
112Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Section 101.05.11.  
113 https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/grad/solcalc/ (Date of use: 4 October 2020). 
114 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Section 101.05.12 (1). 
115 Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Section 101.05.12 (2). 
116Civil Aviation Regulations (Eight Amendment), Section 101.05.12 (2). 
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The UAS can operate in airfield and controlled zone under the following condition: 
fitted with transponder that is capable of displaying the unique code issued to them, 
unless otherwise exempted by the Director of Civil Aviation. For ease of monitoring 
compliance with conditions of waiver, it is a requirement that the UAS should be 
fitted with an altimeter, capable of displaying to the operator, the UAS altitude above 
ground level. It should also be fitted with functioning lights, installed in such a way 
that they are visible from both below and above the UAS.117 The components 
referred to above should at all times be “serviceable and functioning” and failure to 
meet one of these standards can lead to cancellation of the operation.118 
 
In spite of the foregoing general prohibitions in controlled spaces, some authors 
such as Percy, have correctly noted that certain exceptions to the rule enumerated 
above exist.119 For example, it is not a requirement that private operations get 
approval and registration. Many people in South Africa are in possession of UAS 
that are not registered and they use them for recreational purposes. Similarly, they 
do not hold a personal licensing operator certificate and maintenance requirements. 
The category of private UAS is also exempted from rules that regulate conveyance 
of dangerous goods as well as other safety requirements. For instance, they do not 
have to be in a "fit to fly’ condition.120 Other exceptions are extended to the 
regulations and reporting of flight time, use of flight logbooks, power services, first 
aid kit and fire extinguishers. 
 
Operation in controlled airspace refers to designated dimensions with an air traffic 
control service provided to UAS pilots in accordance with the airspace classification 
in the Civil Aviation Regulations.121 The regulations prohibit operations in controlled 
airspaces where sensitive installations are situated122 such as military bases, 
                                                          
117 SA-CATS, Section 101.05.3. 
118 SA-CATS, Section 101.05.3. 
119 Percy S Regulating the private security industry (Routledge 2013). 
120 Mashinini N “Processing” 142. 
121 SA-CATS, Section 101.05.3 (1). 
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airports, police stations and State Houses.123 The prohibition does not, however, rip 
off powers of the Director of Civil Aviation to waive any requirement in some 
circumstances.124 The power of the Director of Civil Aviation to exempt as provided 
under the Act is meant to aid in efficient and effective operations of UAS on case-
by-case basis. This model is like the US one, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
The power to exercise this limited mandate is available where there is a visual 
meteorological condition, airfields traffic and controlled zones that are not more than 
400 feet.  
 
6.2 South Africa’s Response to Security Concerns of UAS 
Regarding UAS, aviation security deals with the protection from possible use in 
conducting acts that cause unlawful interference to the State or even to the UAS 
system itself. In this regard, as Abeyrante observes, security in use of UAS remains 
a challenge in South Africa even as the country devises measure of integration of 
UAS into civil aviation.125 This part principally analyses Part 5 of the Civil Aviation 
Act of 2009 to determine how the South Africa’s requirements for the nationality 
marks, registration and certification of RPAs pilots, training and approval systems 
and framework of development of programmes aim at addressing the issues of 
actual and potential interferences.  
 
Generally, aviation security is defined as safeguarding civil aviation against acts of 
unlawful interference. This is reflective of the approach taken by international air law 
specifically ICAO Annex 17 and ICAO Doc 8973. The framework upholds the 
principles of State sovereignty and territorial integrity under Articles 1 and 2 of the 
Chicago Convention through its requirement that all aircrafts must have nationality 
marks for easy identification and registration.126   
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South Africa’s regulatory frameworks recognize the need for aviation security by 
taking several regulatory approaches. First, it regulates registration of national 
marks of the UAS to address the challenge of unlawful interference identified in 
chapter Two of this thesis. At the outset, all UAS registered in South Africa are 
considered to have the nationality of South Africa.127 The regulations require that an 
identification plate should be ingrained on the UAS, comprising the registration and 
nationality marks.128 Other than being ingrained, the regulations require displaying 
of marks, with the correct colours and fonts, location, allocation and specification. It 
is only after the ingraining and displaying of the marks that an aircraft passing over 
the Republic of South Africa can be certified to operate.129 The regulations, 
therefore, directly underpin the Rules of the Air provisions under Article 8 of the 
Chicago Convention, which makes the nationality marks very crucial in 
implementation of the Rules of the Air provisions. The requirement is, therefore, a 
positive move towards compliance with the binding provisions of the Rules of the Air 
contained in ICAO Annex 2 to address both security issues.  
 
The subsequent sub-section addresses the civilian UAS operators who use the 
South African airspace and are regulated by the Civil Aviation Act and 
Regulations.130 The scope of the Civil Aviation Regulations extends to Classes One 
and Two, as demonstrated in the tables already provided in this chapter i.e. those 
measuring less than 20 kilogrammes, UAS, owners, operators, pilots and those, 
which maintain them.131 These fall into three categories, namely: private operators, 
commercial, corporate and non-profit operators. However, it does not extend to 
autonomous unmanned aircraft,132 unmanned free balloons and their operations, or 
other types of aircraft that cannot be managed on a real-time basis during flight. This 
                                                          
127  This is compliance with Section 101.02.4. 
128 SA-CATS, Section 101.02.4. 
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includes aircraft operated in terms of Part 94 of the Civil Aviation Regulations, which 
addresses the operation of “non-type certificated aircraft”,133 model aircraft,134 and 
toy aircraft.135 
 
Equally, training and authorization are important security measures in South Africa. 
The 2015 Regulations prohibit flying of UAS 10 kilometres close to vital strategic 
installations such as military base without permission from the Director of SACAA.136 
This rule prevents the possibility of use of the UAS to compromise the security of 
the State.  
 
Instructively, the SACAA has a Certification and Training arm as well as a training 
department. The training department sets standards, and regulates all trainings, as 
well as providing adequate oversight. For instance, under the standards, the training 
and training centres are required to focus on aviation security procedures and 
processes.137 The training packages are tailored to ensure planning, coordination 
and conducting procedures under ICAO Annex 17. The design of courses pursuant 
to Parts 109 and 110 of the Civil Aviation Regulations are aimed at integrating ICAO 
SARPs to curb unlawful interferences within the meaning of ICAO Aviation Security 
Manual.138 
 
                                                          
133A non-type certificated aircraft is any aircraft that does not qualify for the issue of a certificate of 
airworthiness in terms of Part 21 and shall include any type of certificated aircraft that has 
been scrapped, of which the original identification plate should have to be removed and 
returned to the applicable aviation authority and is rebuilt as a full-scale replica. 
134Civil Aviation Regulations, Section 1.01.1 defines a model aircraft” as a heavier-than-air aircraft of 
limited dimensions, with or without a propulsion device, unable to carry a human being and 
to be used for competition, sport or recreational purposes rather than UAV developed for 
commercial or governmental, scientific, research or military purposes, and not exceeding the 
specifications as set by the federation. 
135Toy aircraft is a product falling under the definition of aircraft, which is designed or intended, for 
use in play by children. 
136 Civil Aviation Regulation (Eight Amendment), Section 101.05.10 (3) (a)-(d).   
137 Civil Aviation Act, Sections 75 (m) (i), 103 (j), 155 (e) (i-v), f (i- iv). Also see SA-CATS, Regulation 
101.03.3 (1-4), 101.03.4 (1-4), 101.03.5 (1-4) and 101.04.1 (i)  
138 Civil Aviation Act, Section 155 p (iii). 
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On its part, the certification department undertakes the noble role of standard 
setting, reviewing of regulation and certification of screening. Just as is the case 
with the screening processes developed under the US framework, the screening 
may not be effective for the regulation of UAS operations. The review mandate is 
relevant in order to ensure that the law tries, as much as possible, to keep up with 
technological development. Of relevance to security is that a holder of an UAS 
operator certificate has additional mandate to take security measures in use of an 
UAS. The specific mandate includes conduct of background and periodic criminal 
record checks on persons working with UAS.139  
 
Registration is also a pivotal security measure put in place by South Africa. Part 101 
of the Civil Aviation Regulations introduced by the Civil Aviation Regulations (Eighth 
Amendment) recognizes security challenges that may be caused by proliferation of 
UAS into the airspace. It thus provides for registration of imported UAS. Under these 
Regulations, in case the UAS leave the airspace, they have to be re-registered.140 
The conditions of the re-registration are geared towards meeting security standards 
by accounting for UAS that re-enter the airspace of South Africa. Secondly, the UAS 
can only be registered when it is not already registered in another State. In my view, 
this condition is well calculated to prevent the susceptibility of the airspace of the 
Republic of South Africa to instances of espionage.  
 
Notably, ownership of the UAS is a critical element during registration. This is an 
important security measure to ensure that the UAS are not used to commit crime 
anonymously and enables ease of tracking for accountability by owners should such 
criminal activities actually take place. Further, it makes it possible that a person with 
a criminal record may be restricted under the laws for the country’s security. Further, 
Part 101 of the Civil Aviation Regulations, 2015 approaches the security issue from 
a responsibility point of view in cases of corporate ownership of UAS operations. 
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For instance, the Regulations require disclosure of directors and resolutions or 
founding statements for a company or a closed operation to acquire an UAS 
respectively. In respect of according responsibility of security to an identifiable 
group, renewals of registration certificates require proof trusteeship granted by the 
High Court.  
 
Related to cooperate ownership of UAS also, the firms must produce South African 
identity to be allowed to own an UAS. That means than a foreign national, save for 
one who owns a pilot licence, cannot be part of the directorship of a company that 
owns a licence. This restrictive approach is meant to weed out instances of foreign 
ownership that may compromise the security of the State.  
 
While this is a plausible approach especially against the backdrop of the September 
11 attacks in the US, the restrictive security approach may seem to be imbalanced 
with the development objectives of regulation of UAS that, as Nonnecke observes, 
are equally vital objectives of UAS regulations.141 The limitation may also conflict 
with the practice since the nature of the UAS is such that it is more likely to be owned 
by foreigners, either individually or as a firm, than nationals are.  
 
Another security measure is inspection of UAS as per Part 101.04.9 of the Civil 
Aviation Regulations (Eighth Amendment). Under this framework, the UAS are 
required to undergo tight inspections to ensure that there are no armaments that 
threaten the security or sovereignty of the State. It is obvious that such inspections 
are heightened depending on the relationship with a country and the times of peace 
or war. All these are prerogatives of the Republic that are granted to it by virtue of 
Article 8 of the Chicago Convention. 
                                                          
141 Nonnecke BM “Hitting or Missing African UAS Objectives? An Evaluation of Universal Access and 




Additional effort in ensuring security is a long-term requirement for carriers, 
operators, providers of traffic and navigation services in the aviation sector to 
develop their aviation security programmes.142 The role of the Civil Aviation Security 
Department of SACAA is critical in ensuring that there is harmony in the provisions 
through its consideration and approval of the participants’ security program. 
 
Other than the participants’ security programmes developed under Section 111 of 
the Civil Aviation Act, South Africa has developed a comprehensive National 
Security Programme. The programme maps out training and certification issues and 
ensures that instances of unlawful interference with the aircrafts, including UAS, are 
weeded out. The programme provides the basis for coordination of actions of 
international organizations, government departments and involvement of private 
actors, such as carriers in aviation security. The programme also provides for 
effective communication between bodies for effective regulation.143 The 
coordination basis of the programme is pivotal in arresting threats of terror attacks 
that require multi-role playing. The approach is the surest way of dealing with current 
security challenges that entail technological sophistication.  
 
Further, the South African framework achieves the security objectives through 
certain general geographical restrictions and functional requirements regarding 
operation of the UAS. In order to comply with security measures, the regulations 
prohibit operations in controlled airspaces; controlled airspaces are grounds where 
sensitive installations are situated144 such as adjacent to or above nuclear plants, 
prisons, military bases, airports, police stations, crime scenes, courts of law, State 
                                                          
142 SA-CATS, Section 101.04.5. 
143South African Civil Aviation Authority “National Security Programme 
http://www.caa.co.za/Pages/Aviation%20Security/National-AVSEC-programme.aspx (Date 
of use: 9 February 2020). 
144  Civil Aviation Régulations (Eight Amendement), Section 101.05.3. 
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Houses and national key points of strategic installation.145 These are areas that deal 
with matters touching on the territorial integrity of the State. 
 
Although the Civil Aviation regulations prohibit UAS operations in controlled 
airspaces, the Director of Civil Aviation may waive this requirement in some 
circumstances.146 The power of the Director of Civil Aviation to exempt as provided 
under the Act is meant to aid in the efficient and effective operations of UAS only. 
This means that the discretion is obviously limited if it can impact on compromising 
the aviation security, which explains why the exemption is done on case-by-case 
basis. The intention to limit the discretion by the Director is evidenced by the express 
provision of instances to which it can be exercised as visual meteorological 
condition, airfields traffic and control zones that is not more than 400 feet. Further, 
even if the Director’’ discretion is exercised in respect to the three areas, the 
permission  to operate in airfields and controlled zones is still subjected to statutory 
limitations requiring that the UAS be fitted with transponder that is capable of 
displaying the unique code issued to them, unless otherwise exempted by the 
Director of Civil Aviation.147 The restriction on the controlled airspaces and in the 
exercise of discretion to allow under this framework follows the model of regulation 
in the US as discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
6.3 South Africa’s Response to Privacy Concerns of UAS   
The Civil Aviation Act does not expressly address the specifics on the assurance of 
the right to privacy in the UAS use. It only sets out the provision generally as a right 
to be considered in its monitoring. Indeed, it is not so prominent when compared to 
the objectives of safety and security that are specifically addressed in distinct parts 
of the Act. This is reflective of the international framework to the UAS issues, which 
is also comparatively marginal in respect to provision on privacy.   
                                                          
145 Civil Aviation Régulations (Eight Amendement), Section 101.05.3. 
146 Civil Aviation Régulations (Eight Amendement), Section 101.05.3. 




Chapter 7 of the Civil Aviation Act, which makes provision for monitoring of 
regulatory compliance, however, mentions the right. Specifically, Section 145 makes 
provision on the powers and manner of conduct of searches and seizures, and 
powers of arrests for offences provided under the Act. Section 145(1) of the Act 
envisages monitoring of the Act through conduct of warrantless searches on 
aircrafts. The Act obligates the monitoring officers to ensure that any search 
contemplated be conducted with strict regard for decency and order and with 
respect for each person's right to dignity, freedom, security and privacy.148  This 
means that all the entries and inspections under the Act must also be conducted in 
a manner that upholds the right to privacy. These provisions are a glimpse of hope 
of setting standards of respect for the right in the UAS operations. 
 
The mention of the respect for the right in the monitoring and enforcement sections 
of the Civil Aviation Act is indicative of the reactive approach taken in the respect 
for the right to privacy. It does not envisage taking of active steps to ensure, for 
instance, that operators’ manual contains provisions on the respect of right to 
privacy. A more proactive approach is found in the regulation that limits the 
operation of UAS to a lateral distance of 50 metres from any structure or public road. 
This is aimed at helping to prevent clandestine uses of UAS to invade the right to 
privacy.149   
 
There are other instances when SA-CATS addresses the issues of negligent and 
reckless operation of UAS. The second part of Section 101.05.9 of the Regulations 
prohibits any person from operating UAS in a negligent or reckless way, as to 
jeopardize safety of any person, property or other aircraft in the air or on the ground. 
Since privacy invasion is a means of jeopardizing property or a person, it can be 
said that the right, and its guarantee, can be inferred. There are many such 
                                                          
148 Civil Aviation Act, Section 145(13). 
149 Civil Aviation Regulation (Eight Amendment), Section 101.05.03. 
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examples that form the above analysis of substantive provisions on safety 
operations that go a long way in ensuring there is no violation of people’s right to 
privacy. 
 
The requirement under Section 101.01.7 (d) of the Civil Aviation Regulation (Eight 
Amendment), which obligates pilots to observe all statutory requirements relating to 
liability, privacy and other law enforceable by any other authorities further 
exacerbate the requirements set out above. This part, therefore, invites all the 
operations of UAS to comply with the provision on the protection of the right to 
privacy as encapsulated in Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa.  
 
Instructively, the South African Constitution provides safeguards concerning privacy 
of every citizen. People’s right to privacy include the right not to have their person 
or home searched, their property searched, their possessions seized or their 
communications infringed.150 Obviously, such rights can be limited by law, in case 
those limitations are reasonable in a just and open society based on human rights 
equality and freedom.151 Further protection of these rights is discussed in the human 
rights instruments, both at the international and continental levels that are applicable 
to South Africa. As discussed in the overview of the framework, the challenge that 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples Right does not have provisions for 
privacy specific to UAS is a limitation on continental efforts, as far as South Africa is 
concerned. As noted in the same part, however, the application of human rights 
treaties, which have codified the international custom, are buffer for protection of the 
right to privacy regarding the use and operation of UAS. 
 
                                                          
150 Constitution of Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 14. 
151 Constitution of Republic of South Africa, Section 7 (3) and 36 (1) & (2). 
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7. General Challenges in Regulation of UAS in South Africa 
The steps set out above evidence significant legislative steps in provision for the 
safety, security and privacy provisions in South Africa, albeit with the inherent 
challenges set out under the respective subheadings. Other general gaps 
identifiable under the existing framework are discussed below. 
 
7.1 Exclusion of Toy Operators 
As described above, the South African UAS Regulatory framework only applies to 
the RPAs. The definition of an RPA under the Civil Aviation Regulations, as 
amended in 2015, covers unmanned aircrafts while expressly excluding toy and 
model aircrafts. The regulations only apply to private, commercial, corporate and 
non-profit operations of certain players. That it excludes autonomous UAS, non-type 
certified aircraft, model aircraft and toy aircrafts, further creates a challenge in the 
path of integration and harmonization of UTM for UAS. While the practice of 
exclusion of model aircrafts is in line with the framework under the ICAO, the 
objective of exclusion of toys in South Africa is based on the fact that they are used 
for hobbies. With the ubiquity in UAS use, almost a decade after the laws were made 
and amended, such toy aircrafts can be used for clandestine activities, irrespective 
of their weight and size. They, therefore, are a potential threat to safety, security 
and privacy of the users and the public. Further, the exclusion is reported to cause 
a lot of confusion amongst citizens of South Africa, which leads to breaking aviation 
laws related to UAS.152  
 
7.2 Lack of Provisions on Community - Based Organizations 
Further, and unlike in the US, South Africa has no provision for community-based 
organizations that can seek UAS approvals for its members. This leaves a window 
through which unscrupulous operators can fly UAS to the detriment of safety and 
                                                          
152 Khyanyile N “Fun with a Warning” https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/fun-with-a-
warning-20190204-2 (Date of use: 4 January 2020). 
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security of civil aviation in general, and UAS in particular. It is also a missed 
opportunity to complement the enforcement capacity of SACAA owing to the latter’s 
limited capacity. In this thesis analysis, therefore, SACCA should consider practice 
and adopt it in the local community as once involved, they help in oversight and 
reporting incidences.  
 
Practically, the exemption may pose such challenges as interception of UAS for 
criminal activities, which may in effect violate people’s right to privacy as protected 
by Section 14 of the South African Constitution. However, as a way of comparison, 
the US case appears to have an advanced way of dealing with this category, by 
giving mandate to community-based organizations where members join hands to 
form their own local organizations and seek authorization from FAA, which partners 
with such organizations on bases of recreational purposes and approval of 
operations. 
 
7.3 Wide Powers of the Director of Civil Aviation  
Though the powers of the Director of Civil Aviation are limited in terms of grant of 
permission for use of UAS in the controlled places, the Director still has broad 
powers of publishing technical standards and sole responsibility for safety and 
security among others.153 These powers enable the exercise of discretion in 
exempting pilot licensing requirements, including allowing operation in a controlled 
airspace. Ideally, one individual, given the rapidly rising nature, classes and use of 
UAS should not exercise all these powers. Therefore, this thesis suggests that the 
exercise of such discretion should be seriously limited to reduce exposure of civil 
aviation to the desires of one individual with potential of abuse to the detriment of 
the entire civil aviation sector. Formation of a security committee involving a multi-
agency or an appeal panel could suffice in cases where one is dissatisfied by 
decisions made by the Director General. Perhaps the case of Absa drones’ fireworks 
                                                          
153 Civil Aviation Act, Section 86(3)(a). 
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permissions over Johannesburg is an example of a ticking time bomb on the ability 
to manufacture a UAS’s disaster through this challenge in the regulatory framework. 
 
7.4 Implementation Challenges 
The mandate to monitor and enforce compliance with the aviation law is provided at 
section 113 of the Civil Aviation Act. Under this section, the SACAA is empowered 
to enter, inspect and examine any aircraft, place and premises.154 Further, it 
considers the information furnished by the operators, considers books and 
documents, and has power to conduct seizures and inspections, liaison with criminal 
enforcement agencies, among others for the proper administration of the Civil 
Aviation Act. Increase in the use of UAS means that there is an increase in the 
number of engaged inspectors and investment in training and creation of 
awareness. All these require hefty funding.  
 
Despite the legal and institutional framework, together with the regulatory provisions 
and implementation, there persists certain challenges that could backtrack the 
regulation of UAS use.155 The SACAA fulfils important roles but faces numerous 
hiccups ranging from workforce constraints and resultant enforcement challenges. 
For example, many UAS are imported into the country while some are declared at 
port of entry; however, some do not declare them at customs for registration and 
monitoring purposes, hence providing difficulties in effectively enforcing compliance 
of required civil aviation standards.156 
 
                                                          
154 Civil Aviation Act, Section 113(1)(a). 
155 Lindiwe Nchabelenga is a lawyer and an Inspector at South Africa Civil Aviation Authority. Ms 
Lindiwe, who is national civil aviation inspector for SACAA, traces the source of this 
challenge to the overstretching in the institutional capacity. 
156Mngadi M “Two Lebanese brothers in court for Hezbollah drone export case” 
https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/two-lebanese-brothers-in-court-for-
hezbollah-drone-export-case-20180226-2 (Date of use: 4 October 2020). 
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Further implementation challenge is supported by evidence of recent reports from 
the mainstream media in South Africa. An example is the case involving two 
Lebanese and two South African citizens arrested in January 2018 and arraigned in 
Kempton Park Magistrate's Court for allegedly illegally exporting components of 
drones to Hezbollah in Lebanon.157 The accused persons were charged in court for 
illegally exporting UAS components to the Hezbollah, which is classified as a 
terrorist organization. The case is yet to be litigated and concluded at the time of 
writing this thesis. However, prima facie, the case depicts some of the challenges 
experienced with slow stride of implementation of UAS regulation, hence the urgent 
need for SACAA to put its house in order and get the UAS integration into effective 
operations to avert and mitigate such risks. The existence of these challenges 
shows that SACAA has not been able to maintain a critical balance between 
integration and criminal law administration. Specific challenges in the 
implementation are expounded below.158  
 
7.5 Absence of Southern African Civil Aviation Safety and Security Organization  
The ICAO-led framework recognizes that safety and security activities and 
programmes can be better harnessed at regional and sub-regional levels. In other 
words, it would be meaningful to have South Africa with a higher compliance rating 
when its neighbours have lower rating so as to harness regulatory peer influence 
amongst the States. It is for this reason that ICAO has rolled out an initiative for 
Regional Aviation Safety Groups through the ICAO Regional Offices.159 
 
As briefly highlighted above, Member States to SADC lag behind as appertains to 
establishing a regional body to unequivocally deal with civil aviation within the sub-
regional bloc. The effort seen in establishing the Interim South African Safety 
                                                          
157Mngadi https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/two-lebanese-brothers-in-court-for-
hezbollah-drone-export-case-20180226-2 (Date of use: 4 October 2020). 
158https://mybroadband.co.za/news/gadgets/126654-12-things-you-need-to-know-about-south-
africas-new-drone-laws.html (Date of use: 10 November 2019). 
159 https://www.icao.int/safety/SafetyManagement/Pages/Regional-Aviation-Safety-Groups-
(RASGs).aspx (Date of use: 4 January 2020). 
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Organization by SADC with reluctance of entire membership ratification is 
backtracking in effect, as compared with their East African counterparts who have 
CASSOA at the sub-regional level. This challenge is further exacerbated by the fact 
that Africa is yet to establish African regional UAS regulations, as discussed in 
chapter Three of this thesis. In view of such circumstances, a Southern African 
States’ civil aviation body could be useful in regulating civil aviation within the SADC 
region in helping to address safety, security and privacy challenges associated with 
movement of UAS across the boundaries.  
 
The need for such regional activities is also necessitated by the potential negative 
effects of not having one. Failure to take up such regional opportunities may result 
in possibilities of clandestine UAS movements into neighbouring countries within a 
regional economic community, with less developed or no UAS regulations, and thus 
compromise the safety, security and privacy in the use and operation of the UAS in 
South Africa. It is projected that regulation at the regional and sub-regional States 
would address issues including general aviation safety and security with a segment 
dealing with UAS registration, certification, and compliance, among others through 
creating a basis for development and harmonization of UAS regulatory mechanism, 
systems and steps.   
 
8. Conclusion  
The movement for regulation of UAS in South Africa, which started mildly in 2002, 
gained momentum in 2011. It is remarkable that the framework has specific and 
express provisions for UAS established in 2015. It is also commendable that unlike 
in the US, there are no reports of conflicts between the State and federal laws on 
regulation. South Africa has a three-sphere government structure that enables it to 
adopt a US-like structure of regulation, albeit with lack of community-based 
organizations. Additionally, the South Africa’s active participation in ICAO Security 
Panel puts it ahead as regards moral obligation to comply with safety and security 
measures in the ICAO-based framework. This adds onto its adoption of the Chicago 
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Convention, although lack of SADC-based civil aviation regulations seems to 
backtrack its sub-regional efforts in as far as safety and security is concerned.  
 
The substantive provisions of the Civil Aviation Act, 2009, the regulations thereunder 
and robust framework of circulars issued by SACAA, are particularly relevant in 
regulating safety, security and privacy issues, which significantly mirror the 
international approach envisaged under the ICAO framework. Despite the 
development of a robust legal and institutional framework, together with a high rate 
of ICAO-participation, which gives rise to a higher rate of compliance with ICAO 
framework compared to other African countries, South Africa is still grappling with 
lack of an efficient legal framework. For instance, the framework does not 
adequately address the UAS-specific issues of privacy. This is a serious challenge 
since the constitutionally backed right to privacy is too general and does not address 
the challenges caused by recent technological developments in aviation, which 
need to be captured under the Regulations. Regarding safety, exclusion of toy 
operators of UAS from the Regulations has serious safety implications, which may 
surpass its justification.  
 
The institutional legal frameworks for implementation of the law have played an 
important role in defining standards, guidelines, monitoring and licensing of UAS. 
Whereas the Regulations have gone a long way in providing a regulatory framework 
for UAS, its current design has loopholes regarding power of the Director of SACAA. 
The implementation challenges related to weak links in the institutional framework 
have overreaching effects in compromising safety and security. These challenges 
affect potential uses of the UAS. Consequently, the UAS legal and policy 
frameworks in South Africa, without the integration roadmap within the country and 
the region, do not fully speak to current needs and challenges in UAS operations, 
as well as integration development. Generally, South Africa has made fundamental 




LEGAL, POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR UAS IN KENYA 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a reflective analysis of the regulatory framework for regulation 
of UAS in Kenya. It seeks to analyse how Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA) has 
been effective in addressing safety, security and privacy concerns arising from the 
use and challenges of UAS as discussed in chapter Two of this thesis as a way of 
integrating UAS operation into civil aviation airspace. It forms the basis for a 
proportional analysis with the assurances provided in the US as discussed in 
chapter Four and in South Africa as discussed in chapter Five of the study. The 
chapter approaches the analysis by providing a brief background, overview of the 
legal, policy and institutional framework, principally under the Civil Aviation Act, No. 
21 of 2013 and KCAA Amendment Act of 2016 respectively. It then critically 
analyses the salient regulatory provisions within the regulatory framework vis-à-vis 
their efficacy in addressing the safety, security, and privacy concerns associated 
with UAS operations in civil aviation.  
 
The chapter forms basis for analysis of Kenya’s UAS regulatory framework with 
other jurisdictions that are subject of the study to aid the integration process. The 
term Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAs) is used interchangeably with UAS 





2. Background to Regulation of UAS in Kenya 
Use of UAS is on the rise in Kenya, primarily for civilian applications.1 UAS have 
traditionally been used in Kenya for various purposes, namely: remote sensing, 
aerial photography, surveying, disaster management, communication, protection of 
fisheries and forest resources, coastguard, locust control, research and 
development, oil and mineral exploration.2  Currently, these uses have increased to 
cover issues of wildlife management and agriculture. Wildlife management 
pioneered the use of UAS technology from Unmanned Innovation Inc in Kenya at 
the Ol Pejeta Conservancy to control poaching.3 This came against a backdrop in 
realization of timing inadequacies in traditional methods of poaching control.4 
Overall, the results have been very positive, in terms of combating poaching.5  
 
Another area that is increasingly gaining more attention and traction is control of 
cattle rustling amongst nomadic communities such as the Pokot, Maasai, Turkana 
and the Samburu, among whom livestock keeping is the main economic activity.6  
Attempts have been made to integrate UAS in tracking cattle, directing security 
personnel and surveillance to locate rustlers and stolen cattle. Researchers in 
Kenya such as Mbote and Muriungi project potential use in the mapping and 
surveying in areas that are far from town.7  
 
                                                          
1 The Civil Aviation Act (Remote Piloted Aircraft Systems) (UAS) Regulations of 6 October 2017 
Legal Notice No 269 (annulled) (hereinafter referred to as the 2017 RPAs Regulations) had 
allowed Kenyans to own UAS for sports, private activities and commercial purposes. KCAA 
has now developed a roadmap on how to re-introduce the regulation back to operation. Also 
see Andae G “Kenya flies behind peers in drones regulation” 2019-9-18 Business Daily 
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/tech/Kenya-flies-behind-African-peers-in-
drones-adoption/4258474-5278452-fvbplqz/index.html (Date of use: 6 October 2019). 
2 Andae https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/tech/Kenya-flies-behind-African-peers-in-
drones-adoption/4258474-5278452-fvbplqz/index.html (Date of use: 6 October 2019). 
3 Wright W “Aeroplane” 106.    
4  Odido D and Madara S “Emerging” 112. 
5  Odido D and Madara S “Emerging” 112. 
6  Odido D and Madara S “Emerging” 113. 
7 Kameri-Mbote P and Muriungi M “Potential contribution” 172.  
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The increased civil use of UAS in Kenya is partly fuelled by the government’s long-
term and short-term development policies,8 whose realization is pegged on 
infrastructural, scientific, technological and innovation development.9 Other than 
government policy, Kenya has an ambitious agenda in land, human resource 
development, security and public sector reform.10 However, the intended reforms 
have encountered numerous obstacles, such as identified sources of insecurity as 
conflicts and cattle rustling require government counter-measures to address 
them.11 In addition to such ‘traditional’ conflicts, there are emerging crimes, such as 
terrorism, piracy and cybercrime that the government has been fighting. This 
requires sophisticated technology, such as UAS, to help the police respond to 
growing insecurity. Obviously, increase in traditional uses cause concerns of safety, 
security and privacy of the members of the public and users of the UAS in such 
operations.  
 
On the other hand, use of UAS by the military is not widespread, but there are 
scattered instances of use in the sector. For example, the Kenya Defence Forces 
(KDF), in 2012, acquired an UAS at a cost of $9.86 million to support its operations 
in the operation led African Union Mission on Somalia (AMISOM),12 in Somalia and 
targeted at weakening the Al-Shabaab militia group camps, which have been 
undertaking terrorist attacks against Kenyans.13 The US military has on a number 
of occasions, used Kenya’s airspace to launch attacks against terrorist targets in 
Somalia.14 Kenya too, has undertaken several strikes against AlShabaab hideouts 
                                                          
8 Government of Kenya Vision 2030 of 2007. 
9http://www.president.go.ke/2017/12/12/speech-by-his-excellency-hon-uhuru-kenyatta-c-g-h-
president-and-commander-in-chief-of-the-defence-forces-of-the-republic-of-kenya-during-
the-2017-jamhuri-day-celebrations-at-the-moi-international/ (Date of use: 10 November 
2019). 
10 See Ronald HK “Managing the public sector in Kenya: reform and transformation for improved 
performance” 2012 JAG 128-143. 
11 Wright W “Aeroplane” 107. 
12 AMISSOM refers to the African Union Mission in Somalia. 
13 Otuki N “Kenya buys Sh1bn pilotless aircraft in war on Al-Shabaab” 2012-2-25 Business Daily 
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/Kenya-buys-Sh1bn-pilotless-aircraft-in-war-
on-Al-Shabaab .(Date of use: 4 June 2018).  
14 Olingo A “Kenya now drafts regulations, joins Rwanda to allow drones into its airspace” 2016-4-17 
The East African https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Kenya-joins-Rwanda-to-allow-




in Somalia resulting in casualties, in an effort to eliminate piracy along the Kenya-
Somalia border and stamp out terrorism in general.15 The Kenyan framework has 
not attempted to adopt regulation on such military operations. Indeed, the long title 
of the Civil Aviation Act is clear that the Act is only concerned with orderly 
development of civil aviation in Kenya.  
 
3. Legal Framework and Foundation to Regulation of UAS in Kenya  
Kenya ratified the Chicago Convention in May 1964. Accordingly, the country is 
bound by obligations of State parties concerning regulations found in Article 11 of 
the Convention. Kenya is a member of ICAO thus bound by the ICAO Annexes, 
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) such as ICAO Annex 17 on 
security and Annex 19 on Safety Management System (SMS): the Annexes are 
domesticated through development of National Civil Aviation Security Programmes 
and State Safety Programme (SSP) respectively. Kenya gets support through ICAO 
guidance materials such as Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973), Aviation Safety 
Manual (Doc 9869),  Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAs) (Doc 
10019 AN/507) of 2015, ICAO UAS Circular No. 328-AN/190 of 2011,  and Circular 
330 AN/189 on Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management of 2011. This 
international instruments applicability mirrors other jurisdiction already discussed 
under this thesis. Kenya has ratified several Conventions and numerous treaties in 
relation to civil aviation, as briefly highlighted below.  
 
Pursuant to Article 2(6) of the Constitution of Kenya, the Conventions ratified before 
or after the promulgation of the Constitution in 2010 by Kenya automatically form 
part of Kenyan law. Kenya is a party to the Convention on Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft, Convention relating to Unlawful Acts Relating to International 
Civil Aviation,16 Protocols Relating to an Amendment to the Chicago Convention, 
                                                          
15 Olingo https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Kenya-joins-Rwanda-to-allow-drones-in-its-
airspace-/4552908-3162800-13jswqt/index.html (Date of use: 10 November 2019). 
16 Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Convention relating to Unlawful Acts 
Relating to International Civil Aviation of 10 September 2010 (entered into force 1 July 2018). 
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Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircrafts,17 Convention on 
International Interests in Mobile Equipment (The Cope Town Convention) and the 
Protocol on the Convention on International Interest in Mobile Equipment on Matters 
Specific to Aircraft Equipment (the Cape Town Protocol), Convention on Unification 
of Certain Rules Relating to International Air Carriage signed at Warsaw in 12 
October 1929 as amended by the Haque Protocol of 1955 (the Warsw Convention), 
the Convention for the Unification of International carriage by Air , signed at Montreal 
on 28 May 1999 (the Montreal Convention) and Convention on Compensation for 
Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties,18  among others. As an example, 
Kenya domesticated the Cape Town Convention and the Cape Town Protocol by 
enacting the International Interest in Aircraft Equipment Act No. 27 of the 2013, 
which gives the High Court of Kenya jurisdiction in respect of claims brought under 
the same. The provisions of these Conventions are binding on Kenya by virtue of 
the good faith principle and the principle of pacta sunt servanda.19 Kenya, therefore, 
draws from the spirit of international law to provide guidance for State parties to 
develop regulations that enable integration of UAS operations in civil aviation in their 
respective jurisdictions and to assure safety, security and privacy concerns.20 
 
At the continental level, Kenya is a member of the African Union and a party to the 
Africa Union (AU) Constitutive Act.21 Like South Africa, which is also a member of 
Africa Union, at domestic level, Kenya is guided by the Constitution. The 
Constitution recognizes the institutional framework under the Africa Civil Aviation 
Commission, a specialized agency of the African Union. The Commission takes lead 
in fostering liberalization of air transport and compliance with the ICAO framework.22 
The institutional framework of the Africa Civil Aviation Commission forms the basis 
                                                          
17 Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircrafts of 19 June 1948 UNTS 4492 
(entered into force 17 September 1953). 
18 Convention on Compensation for Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties of May 2009. 
19 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, Preamble and Articles 2(1) (a) and 26. Pacta 
sunt servanda is a latin idiom which may be translated to mean treaties must be complied 
with or agreements once made must be kept. 
20 See chapter Three, sections 4.1-4.3 on the international law reps0osne to safety, security and 
privacy concerns to UAS use and operations.  
21 Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2001. 
22 Constitution of the Africa Civil Aviation Commission of 17 January 1969 (entered into force 17 
March 1972) (as Revised in 2009), Article 3. 
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of cooperation with regional economic blocs or communities and ICAO to ensure 
that aviation matters of mutual interests are settled.23 It is noteworthy that the 
commission is mandated with the overall responsibility of safety, security and 
environmental protection in the aviation sector within the African continent, among 
other functions. 
 
At sub-regional level, Kenya is a member of the East African Community since it 
ratified the EAC Treaty of 1999.  Article 92 of the EAC Treaty of 1999 requires Kenya 
to harmonize its laws and policies on civil aviation in order to prove efficiency of the 
aviation sector as a support sector to other sectors of the economy. The Treaty 
requires Kenya to ensure that the aviation transport systems are safe and efficient. 
Further, the country is obligated to ensure maintenance of a high level of security 
for air operations, including joint searches.24 The EAC has created a framework 
through the Civil Aviation Safety and Security through the EAC Civil Aviation Safety 
and Security Oversight Agency Act.25 The only challenge regarding implementation 
is the fact that the EAC laws do not have a direct applicability and absolute 
supremacy over the national ones owing to the provision of Article 8(2) of the Treaty 
for the Establishment of the EAC, of 1999, which requires the States to develop 
domestic laws to give effect to those of the EAC.  
 
At the domestic level, the substance of civil aviation law can be traced from as early 
as the 1970s. The Kenya Civil Aviation (Amendment) Act26 was enacted in 1970 
and over time, underwent amendments in 1977 through to 1979, resulting in the 
establishment of Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA) as an autonomous body 
taking over the functions of the Directorate of Civil Aviation.27 
                                                          
23 Constitution of the Africa Civil Aviation Commission of 17 January 1969 (entered into force 17 
March 1972) (as Revised in 2009), Article 17. 
24 EAC Treaty 1999, Article 92 (3) (m). 
25 See EAC Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency Act of 2007, Sections 1, 2 and 3(a). 
26 The Kenya Civil Aviation (Amendment) Act, chapter 394, Laws of Kenya 




In terms of its regulatory approach post-2010, Kenya adopts a devolved governance 
structure with one national government and 47 county governments that operate 
distinctively, albeit interdependently.28 Under the Fourth Schedule to the 
Constitution of Kenya, 2010, civil aviation, under the larger umbrella of transport and 
communications, is the function of the national government. Generally, the national 
government had not lived to regulation of UAS within this larger mandate up to 2017. 
Accordingly, the UAS integration into non-segregated (civilian) airspace in Kenya, 
for a long time and especially in the pre-2013 legal regime, remained a challenge 
due to a lacuna in a binding UAS regulatory framework in Kenya.  
 
In 2013, there developed an urgent need for law reform in the response mechanism 
for safety, security and privacy provisions relating to, among others, UAS.  This led 
to development of principal civil aviation regulatory framework, primarily set out in 
the Civil Aviation Act of 2013.29 The Act defines an aircraft as “any machine that 
derives support in the atmosphere from reactions of the air other than reaction of 
the air against the earth’s surface, and includes all flying machines, aeroplanes, 
gliders, seaplanes, rotorcrafts, airships, balloons, gyroplanes, helicopters, 
ornithopters and other similar machines but excludes State aircraft’’.30 This definition 
did not expressly provide for the regulation of operation of UAS. Such an application 
could, however, be drawn by strong implication owing to the inclusive nature of the 
definition which covered ‘other machines’ such as balloons and other aircrafts. 
Further, regarding the exclusion of State aircrafts, both the Civil Aviation Act, 2013 
and the Civil Aviation (Amendment) Act, of 2016 are categorical that the laws apply 
to the civil aircrafts. The application of the rules to State aircraft is possible through 
the direction of the Cabinet Secretary responsible for Transport as under Section 
3(2) of the Civil Aviation Act, 2013 is applicable only for expediency of regulation of 
State aircrafts but does not in any way mean that military UAS are subjected to the 
                                                          
28 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 6 (3). 
29 The Civil Aviation Act 21 of 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the Civil Aviation Act), Section 83 
repealed the Civil Aviation Act Chapter 394 Laws of Kenya. 
30 The Civil Aviation Act, Section 2 (j). 
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regulatory frameworks under the Civil Aviation Act, 2013 and Civil Aviation 
(Amendment) Act, 2016.31 
 
The principal law under the Civil Aviation Act, 2013, recognizes the application of 
international Conventions. The envisaged Conventions are numerous, and include 
protocols, and any Annexes thereto relating to civil aviation, to which Kenya is a 
party. It is upon the Board of the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority to make legislative 
proposals for giving effect to the international Conventions and instruments.32 
 
Three years after the enactment of the Civil Aviation Act, 2013, Parliament enacted 
the Civil Aviation (Amendment) Act33 which introduced a raft of legal changes in the 
regulation of civil aviation in Kenya. One notable change was the provision of the 
definition of unmanned aerial vehicle to mean:  
“a pilotless aircraft is flown without a pilot-in-command on-board and is either 
remotely or fully controlled from another place (ground or another aircraft, 
space) or programmed and fully autonomous.”34  
 
This definition is expansive as it envisages both the manner of control and 
operations of UAS. Secondly, and for the first time in a legislative enactment, the 
2016 Amendment Act provided an express recognition of UAS under Kenyan 
aviation law requiring regulation. Henceforth, the amendment law of 2016 
represents a great stride as far as formal recognition, and integration of the UAS 
into the Kenyan civil airspace is concerned in achieving the spirit of Article 3 of the 
Chicago Convention.  
                                                          
31  Section 3(ii) of the Civil Aviation Act provides that: The provisions of this Act shall not, except 
where expressly included or if the Cabinet Secretary so directs by order published in the Gazette, 
apply to state aircraft or to any class or classes of state aircraft. 
32 The Civil Aviation Act, Section 15(3)(a)(ii). 
33 The Civil Aviation (Amendment) Act 42 of 2016 (hereinafter refered to as the Civil Aviation 
(Amendment Act). 




Additionally, the Constitution of Kenya35 provides fundamental safeguards with a 
bearing on regulation of use, manufacture and operation of UAS. Specifically, it has 
a Bill of Rights that recognizes and protects, among others, the right to privacy. 
Under chapter Four of the Constitution (Bill of Rights), enforcement of the right can 
be done through a petition to the High Court on an allegation that the right has been 
infringed, breached or threatened.36 
 
The Kenyan legal framework gets support from a number of legislations that 
acknowledged regulation of civil aviation as far as it relates to use, manufacture and 
operation of UAS. Kenya has a specific law on enforcement of data protection. The 
Data Protection Bill, was finally enacted into Law after passing by Parliament on 7 
November 2019, and assented to by President Uhuru Kenyatta on 8 November 
2019. The Data Protection Act37 enhances privacy rights as enshrined under the 
Kenyan Constitution.38 The latest passage of the law comes against a backdrop of 
many reported instances in which human rights groups have reported excess 
surveillance over the Kenyan airspace by UAS.39 Other relevant national legislations 
relating to the implementation and enforcement of the integration of UAS into the 
Kenyan national aviation airspace are the National Security Council Act,40 Kenya 
Airports Authority Act,41 Security Laws (Amendment) Act42 and Regulations made 
under them. Other relevant Regulations are the Kenya Civil Aviation (Security) 
Regulations,43 Civil Aviation (Air Operator Certification and Administration) 
Regulations,44 Civil Aviation (Operation of Aircraft) Regulations,45 These regulations 
                                                          
35 Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
36 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 23(1).  
37 Data Protection Act 24 of 2019. 
38 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 31 (c) and (d). 
39 Privacy International “State of Privacy Kenya” https://privacyinternational.org/state-
privacy/1005/state-privacy-kenya (Date of use: 29 September 2019).  
40 National Security Council Act 23 of 2012. 
41 Kenya Airports Authority Act No 3 of 1991. 
42 Security Laws (Amendment) Act 19 of 2014. 
43 Kenya Civil Aviation (Security) Regulations of 2015 as amended in 2020 
44 Civil Aviation (Air Operator Certification and Administration) Regulations of 2013. 
45 Civil Aviation (Operation of Aircraft) Regulations of 2013. 
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were amended in 2018 to Civil Aviation (Operations of Aircraft for Commercial Air 
Transport) Regulations, 2018 and Civil Aviation (Rules of the Air) Regulations.46  
 
Flowing from the legislative developments through the Civil Aviation (Amendment) 
Act, 2016, the Cabinet Secretary for Transport and Infrastructure, being responsible 
for civil aviation, has mandate to enact civil aviation regulations including those of 
regulating UAS. The development of regulations on implementing particular 
provisions for UAS under the 2016 Civil Aviation (Amendment) Act was immediately 
kick-started. In October 2017, the 2017 Civil Aviation (Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
Systems) Regulations were developed by the KCAA. The Regulations applied to a 
wide spectrum of dealings in remotely piloted aircrafts, ranging from manufacturing, 
assembly, procurement, importation, testing, operation and maintenance of the 
aircraft.47 The scope of the Regulations covered all remotely piloted aircraft except 
State aircrafts, unmanned free balloons or airships and toys that operate within an 
aerodrome, not less than 500 metres from the aerodrome boundaries. Generally, 
the registration of the aircrafts was based on categorizations and classification, 
which puts currency on use and weight respectively, from class 1A to class 3C.48 
The operations were categorized into personal, commercial and recreational 
purposes of use of RPAs.  
 
The 2017 RPAs Regulations were short-lived as Parliament adopted a report of the 
Committee on Delegated Legislation on 26 June 2018 in its second session, and 
pursuant to the provisions of section 15 of the Statutory Instruments Act49 and 
Standing Order 210 (4) (b) of 2018, annulled them in entirety for reasons of 
inadequate public participation during development, as required by the Statutory 
Instruments Act. Also suffering a similar fate in terms of suspension was the Kenya 
Civil Aviation Policy though not under parliament’s mandate for revocation. Its main 
                                                          
46 Civil Aviation (Rules of the Air) Regulations of 2013. 
47  The 2017 RPAs Regulations, Regulation 3.  
48 The 2017 RPAs Regulations, Regulation 4. 
49 Statutory Instruments Act 23 of 2013. 
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objective is to support operation of UAS in a safe, secure, harmonized and seamless 
environment equal to manned operations.50 The suspension was a missed 
opportunity for the security measures that were practically beefed up through 
authorization systems at the Ministry responsible for Transport and Department of 
Defence headquarters under the policy. It was also a missed opportunity for security 
measures through practical steps for cancellation of permits in light of State safety 
interests that were necessary to complement the Civil Aviation (Rules of the Air) 
Regulations and Civil Aviation (Safety Management) Regulations. 
 
Despite the annulled 2017 RPAs Regulations, there are certain cross-cutting 
reassurances of safety, security and privacy issues relating to UAS that can be 
obtained from myriad Regulations that have been passed pursuant to provision of 
Section 82 of the Civil Aviation Act. They include the Civil Aviation (Rules of the Air) 
Regulations,51 the Civil Aviation (Airworthiness) Regulations,52 and the Civil Aviation 
(Personnel Licensing) Regulations.53 In addition, instrumental in the regulatory 
framework is the Kenya National Civil Aviation Security Programme and Safety 
programmes.  
 
From the historical perspectives on development and law reform set out above, it is 
clear that the integration of UAS into civil aviation had been thrown into a limbo, for 
the intervening period between end of June 2018 and March 2020.  During this 
period, KCAA had to embark on addressing the issues raised by Parliament such 
as observance of public participation in all counties, and providing measures to 
address safety and national security while adhering to Constitutional right to privacy. 
In order to preserve the status quo, in the intervening period, the Cabinet Secretary 
for Transport, Infrastructure, Housing, Urban Development and Public Works, 
through Kenyan Gazette Legal Notice No 76, on 26 March 2019 published 
                                                          
50 Republic of Kenya Policy on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems of 2017. 
51 Civil Aviation (Rules of the Air) Regulations of 2013. 
52 Civil Aviation (Airworthiness) Regulations of 2013 (as amended in 2016). 
53 Civil Aviation (Personnel Licensing) Regulations of 2013 
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prohibition to fly and operate Unmanned Aircraft, effectively stopping usage of UAS 
within the Kenyan airspace until such a time when new regulations were to be 
enacted.  
 
Further, as Captain. Kibe54 posits, after the nullification of the 2017 RPAs 
regulations, the first meeting by UAS Working Group was held on 11 September 
2018, to provide a roadmap and strategy to the Cabinet Secretary for Transport, 
Infrastructure, Housing, Urban Development and Public Works, the Attorney 
General, and Parliament on how to expedite the UAS regulation. The roadmap took 
into account the views of Parliament such as enhancing security, privacy concerns, 
undertaking public participation in all counties, and adherence to the Statutory 
Instrument Act.55  
 
By December 2019, KCAA had concluded the public participation exercise in 
compliance with the directive of Parliament by capturing concerns raised and 
conducting a workshop in Nairobi.56 In April 2020, the process of redevelopment 
and public consultations on the Regulations culminated into the Cabinet Secretary 
for Transport, Infrastructure, Housing, Urban Development, and Public Works 
promulgating the Civil Aviation (Unmanned Aircraft Systems) Regulations,57 2020, 
through gazettement in the Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 34 Legislative 
Supplement No. 22, issued as Legal Notice 42 of 2020. This was in the exercise of 
the powers conferred to the office by Section 82 of the Civil Aviation Act No. 21 of 
2013.  
 
                                                          
54 This was an interview with Director-General KCAA that was conducted on 11 September 2018. 
55 Act No 23 of 2013. 
56 Authors’ interview with Director-General during the Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight 
(CASSOA) 5th Symposium held Burundi on 27 -28 February 2020.  
57 Civil Aviation (Unmanned Aircraft Systems) Regulations Legal Notice No 42 of 2020 (hereinafter 




The 2020 UAS regulation regulates various UAS activities such as import, export, 
manufacture, assembly, and testing of UAS. It has five parts that regulate various 
aspects of certain operations of the UAS in Kenya. Part I addresses categorization 
of operation and registration of UAS. Part II provides for categorization of operation 
and registration of UAS. Part III provides for the operation of UAS. Part IV addresses 
issues of security. Part V focuses on miscellaneous issues. The substantive 
contents make provisions for several issues of safety and privacy to be discussed 
shortly after institutional framework. 
 
4.  Institutional Framework:  
4.1 Organs, Structure and Key Functions of KCAA 
The Civil Aviation Act establishes certain institutions responsible for implementation 
of provisions relating to regulation of UAS. Part III of the Act makes provision on 
duties of operators and concerned stakeholders in ensuring safety of persons on 
board. These safety and security concerns are implemented through enforcement 
of criminal sanctions, most of which are robustly described in Part V of the Act. The 
Act also creates a National Civil Aviation Administrative Review Tribunal to deal with 
grievances on licensing and ensure consumer protection. 
 
Even more pivotal is the establishment of the KCAA. The Authority’s main objective 
is efficient and economic planning, developing and managing civil aviation, and 
regulation and operation of safe civil aviation systems in Kenya. The institutional 
discussion of the authority and its nexus with the above objectives as set out in 
Section 6 of the Civil Aviation Act is discussed below.  
 
KCAA is established under Section 7(1) of the Civil Aviation Act. The Board of 
Directors, established under Section 13 of the Act, governs the Authority. The KCAA 
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Board is composed of the following: The Chairperson, who is appointed by the 
President; the Director-General, appointed under Section 19 of the Act; Principal 
Secretary in the Ministry responsible for matters relating to civil aviation or his/ her 
representative; Principal Secretary to the National Treasury or his/her 
representative, Principal Secretary in the Ministry responsible for matters relating to 
internal security or his/her representative. Other members of the Board are persons, 
not being public officers, who are appointed by the Cabinet Secretary through a 
competitive process, and who are to be independent upon appointment and 
maintain such independence during their term of service on the Board. To ensure 
efficacy in the discharge of their mandates in relation to the safety, security and 
privacy issues, the additional persons are brought on board on account of their 
demonstrable expertise, professional knowledge and experience in accountancy, 
auditing and aviation law or business and management.58  
 
In addition to the Board, KCAA discharges its mandate through the support of four 
directorates, three operational and one support, namely: aviation safety standards 
and regulations, air navigation services, East African School of Aviation and 
corporate services. The first three provide the services, which are core to the 
mandate of KCAA, while corporate services provides support services delivery. The 
directorates have departments, which though not a creation of the law, are 
designated for convenience in the day-to-day operations of civil aviation matters, 
and enforcement of the above explained mandate. The departments are critical in 
creation of assurance in the safety, security and privacy fronts for use of UAS. 
 
The role of the Board, as is the case in South Africa, is policy formulation whereas 
the responsibility for the day-to-day running of the KCAA is bestowed upon the 
Director General of the Authority, who exercises all powers and discharge of all 
functions of the Authority with control over personnel and activities.59 The other 
                                                          
58 Civil Aviation Act, Section 7. 
59 Civil Aviation Act, Section 20.  
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general duties of the Board are outlined in the Act to include oversight of KCAA in 
financial matters such as remuneration and general administrative matters. It 
ensures that the safety and security of civil aviation, and UAS in general, is done in 
accordance with existing legislation.60 The specific duties of KCAA are 
establishment, co-ordination and maintenance of State safety and security 
programmes, certification of aircraft operators, enforcement of approved technical 
standards of aircraft, licensing and monitoring of aeronautical personnel, provision 
of technical services for the design, installation, and modification of electronic, radio 
and other equipment used in the provision of air navigation services.61 In execution 
of the mandates related to safety and security of aviation in Kenya, KCAA Board 
and Management work in conjunction with the National Civil Aviation Security 
Committee and Airport Security Committees. 
 
The conduct of KCAA’s duties is done within two broad mandates, which are 
oversight mandate and a mandate of enforcement. The oversight mandate includes 
ensuring integrity of the systems, equipment and facilities of the Authority, issuance 
and dissemination of publications referred to in the regulation, production of 
accurate, timely, comprehensive and relevant air transport information for planning 
and decision-making. The Authority is also responsible for approving, certification 
and licensing of aircraft maintenance organizations and regulation of aviation 
training institutions in Kenya. This is in addition to the establishment, management 
and operation of training institutions for purposes of the Authority, registration of 
rights and interests in aircraft, planning, development and formulation of the 
airspace master plan for safe and efficient utilization of the Kenyan airspace, 
establishment, co-ordination and maintenance of State aviation safety and security 
programme, licensing and certification of aerodromes, regulated agents and air 
navigation service providers.62  
 
                                                          
60 Civil Aviation Act, Sections 15 and 16.  
61 Civil Aviation Act, Sections 15 and 16. 
62 Civil Aviation Act, Sections 15 and 16, Section 7(P-U). 
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The oversight mandate of KCAA, on the other hand, takes an economic perspective 
as it includes protecting consumer and environmental rights, and ensuring fair 
trading practices by giving effect to the Chicago Convention and other international 
agreements relating to civil aviation, to which Kenya is party; and performance of 
such other functions as may, from time to time, be conferred on it by the Cabinet 
Secretary or by any other written law.63  
 
This double package of mandates evidently grants KCAA a full-fledged power to 
execute its legislative functions. KCAA has made steps to tailor-make its mandate 
and functions to achieve safety and efficiency. For instance, KCAA’s consumer 
protection initiative is based on its commitment to provide a safe and efficient civil 
aviation environment that contributes to the achievement of Kenya’s developmental 
objectives, as articulated in Kenya Vision 2030.64 Despite the optimism, scholars 
like Waithera note possible challenges of lack of adequate funding as having a 
potential to compromise the achievement of this mandate.65  
 
The listed modes of appointment to the KCAA Board confirms the position of Section 
4(3) of the 2013 Act, as State agency, with the mandate to ensure safety, security 
and privacy concerns regarding aircrafts including UAS.66 Should the government 
seriously consider the plans for privatization in future, it ought to follow the ICAO 
                                                          
63 Civil Aviation Act, Sections 15 and 16, Section 7 (V-AA). 
64 The Aviation Consumer Protection Section of KCAA was established in 2004 with the objective to 
ensure that all Aviation Consumers obtain the best services and value from the service 
providers within the aviation industry. The section is also responsible for informing, educating 
and protecting consumers and thus ensuring services provided in the aviation industry are 
of the highest standards, comparable to that in other parts of the world and hence consumers 
are informed of their rights and responsibilities. See more information on 
https://www.kcaa.or.ke/about-us/consumer-protection (Date of use: 4 October 2020). 
64  The Kenya Vision 2030  was launched in 2008 by the President Mwami Kibaki aims to transform 
Kenya into a newly industrializing, middle-income country providing a high quality of life to all its 
citizens by 2030 in a clean and secure environment. 
65 Waithera EN Factors Influencing Aviation Safety: The Case of Kenya Civil Aviation Authority 
(Master of Arts thesis University of Nairobi 2015) 3.     
66 https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2018-06-05-04/ (Date of use: 13 January 2020). 
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Privatization Policy, which Kesharwani notes has significant benefits once all the 
safeguards are met.67 
 
As is correctly noted by Waithera, KCAA has, since its establishment in 2002, 
continued to implement its mandates. This is, however, not without challenges, chief 
among them being inadequate funding.68 Be that as it may, KCAA is still recognized 
as playing a critical role of ensuring that an appropriate civil air transport framework 
is established and sustained as an enabler of air transport infrastructure.69  
 
Further, and in order to overcome these challenges in discharge of its mandate, 
KCAA is undertaking various projects with the aim of delivering on its part to Kenya 
Vision 2030 national development blueprint that targets to making Kenya a middle-
income nation by the year 2030. It is doing this through aligning organizational 
structure to strategy, recruitment, training and retention of competent staff, right-
sizing and resourcing the organization appropriately, achieving international safety 
and security compliance, re-organization of the airspace and modernization of air 
traffic management systems.70 In addition, KCAA is in the process of providing 
infrastructural development for aviation medical centre for aviation medical 
examination training, medical examiners for licensed medical doctors to conduct 
medical examination for medical fitness of pilots who are eligible for issuance of 
medical certificates as required under the current UAS 2020 Regulation second 
schedule r 20 (3) r. 1(c) & r 3.    
 
 
                                                          
67Kesharwani T “Privatization in the Provision of Airport and Navigation Services” 
https://www.icao.int/Meetings/AMC/MA/1999/aps/01_kesharwani.pdf (Date of use: 13 
January 2017). 
68 Waithera Influencing Aviation 3.   
69 Kenya Civil Aviation Authority Strategic Plan 2012/13-2016/17, Page 6. 
70 Kenya Civil Aviation Authority Strategic Plan 2012/13-2016/17, Page 6. 
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As far as implementation is concerned, KCAA’s mandates include licensing of air 
services, provision of air navigation services, establishment and maintenance of a 
system for the registration and marking of civil aircraft, securing sound development 
of the civil aviation industry in Kenya, advising the government on matters 
concerning civil aviation, and co-ordination and direction of search and rescue 
services. KCAA is mandated to facilitate and provide necessary support for aircraft 
accident and incident investigations conducted by the Chief Investigator, carrying 
out investigations on incidents that are not classified as accidents and serious 
incidents, the safety, security, economic and technical regulation of civil aviation and 
dealing with incidents of unlawful interference with aviation security.71 
 
4.2 Partnership with ICAO 
Under section 8(2) (d) of the Civil Aviation Act, the KCAA is mandated to enter into 
partnerships with any person, agency or authority within and outside Kenya for the 
purposes of achieving its objectives and delivering on its mandates. Pursuant to this 
provision, KCAA has partnered with ICAO with a view to addressing safety and 
security issues arising from the civil aviation management. Consequently, KCAA 
staff have been active participants in the ICAO meetings on regional aviation 
safety.72  
 
The partnership extends to training at the East Africa School of Aviation (EASA) that 
has its curriculum addressing safety and security issues in civil aviation operations. 
ICAO uses the school directorate of KCAA as centres for excellence worldwide. It is 
one in less than ten across the world. EASA has the following training departments; 
aviation business management, aviation safety and security, air navigation, services 
maintenance and curriculum development unit.73 The school is also the training wing 
                                                          
71 Civil Aviation Act, Section 7 (a-k). 
72 See ICAO “Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Regional Aviation Safety Group for Africa-Indian 
Ocean” (Nairobi 12-13 October 2017) 1-32. 
73 East Africa School of Aviation “East Africa School of Aviation-ICAO Regional Training Centre of 
Excellence” easa.ac.ke  (Date of use: 18 September 2018). 
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of KCAA as an Approved Training Organization. Other institutions are the, ICAO 
Aviation Security Training Centre and the Government Safety Inspector Training 
Centre that is endorsed by ICAO, and accredits the school, both as an institution 
and its curriculum.74  
 
4.3 KCAA and Regional Cooperation 
KCAA is an active player in the development of the regional efforts for regulation of 
safety and security aspects of civil aviation at the East African Community level. It 
cooperates with the East Africa Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency 
(CASSOA). At the sub-regional level, is the EAC Air Transport Facilitation 
Committee to oversee the harmonization of national laws of EAC Partner States 
towards reflecting the ICAO Annex 17 on Aviation Security and Annex 19 on 
Safety.75 Going by statistics, the CASSOA is ranked as a higher performer in 
oversight of safety issues in the world and only comes second to the European 
counterpart organization.76  
 
Other than in EAC, KCAA has made significant strides in the aviation security 
through partnerships with other aviation stakeholders. For example, it partners with 
IATA through the latter’s safety and security programmes. Kenya is a partner to the 
IATA Secure Freight Pilot Program, which aims at security of flights and cargo.77 
KCAA, through EASA, partners in training with International Air Transport 
Association (IATA), the institution that provides training associated with airlines. 
 
                                                          
74 KCAA “About EASA” https://www.kcaa.or.ke/easa/about-easa> (Date of use: 11 September 2020). 
75 Makau H “Best Practices to Enhance Cooperation and Collaboration between Aviation Security 
and Customs” in Enhancing Air Cargo Security and Facilitation (Paper presented to the 
ICAO-WCO Joint Conference 16-17 April 2014 Manama Bahrain)1-10. 
76 CASSOA “Aviation Safety: A Collaborative Approach” in Symposium Report (Paper Presented in 
the 4th EAC Aviation Symposium 1-2 February 2018 in Crowne Plaza Nairobi) 5.  
77 Makau H “Cooperation” 5. 
240 
 
The next part of this chapter trains its focus on substantive issues of safety, security 
and privacy in use of UAS as identified in chapter Two of this thesis, and how they 
are redressed under the Kenyan policy and legal framework. 
 
5. Response to Safety, Security and Privacy Challenges in UAS Operations  
5.1 Kenya’s Response to Aviation Safety in UAS Operations  
It shall be recalled that safety challenges principally arise from the design of UAS 
regarding the sense and avoid technology. Safety of aircraft has been a key 
legislative regulatory issue since the development of the KCAA Aviation Policy. The 
Policy made further safety assurances by requiring any person operating or 
controlling UAS operations to undergo training and familiarize with relevant rules 
and procedures applicable within any airspace through which the aircraft may be 
flown.78  
 
Further, the Policy required that any UAS be operated in a manner that minimizes 
hazards to persons, property or other aircraft and in accordance with conditions 
specified by the Authority from time to time.79 Such rules would be critical to ensure 
that operating an UAS in civilian airspace is controlled to limit danger to civil aircraft 
in accordance with the Civil Aviation (Rules of the Air) Regulations and the UAS 
Regulations. 
 
Under the Civil Aviation Act, it is clear that the mandate of the KCAA includes 
establishing, coordinating and enhancing State Safety Programmes. Part III of the 
Act generally lays prohibitions of all persons from engaging in acts that imperil safety 
of the aircraft. This provision was implemented through criminal sanctions of a fine 
to the tune of two million shillings.80 Under section 20 of the Act, the Director General 
                                                          
78 The 2017 RPAs Regulations, Regulation 29. Also see the annulled aviation policy 
79 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 54. 
80 Civil Aviation Act, Section 46(1)-(2). 
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was to audit the performance of the State Safety Programmes and hold executives 
accountable to such programmes. Section 10 of the Civil Aviation (Amendment) Act, 
2016 amended the Section 20 of the 2013 Act to introduce the power of the Director 
to establish a safety oversight system and to prohibit flights in unsafe conditions.81 
 
Additionally, the regulation of aviation trainings had underpinnings of safety. The 
Civil Aviation Act imposes an obligation on KCAA to approve, licence and certify 
training institutions.82 The Director General is mandated to establish schools to offer 
training in the aviation industry.83 The Authority has come up with the Civil Aviation 
(Approved Training Organizations) Regulations,84 2013 that govern the application, 
issuance, renewal, suspension and revocation of licences and certificates to the 
Approved Training Organizations. A review of the criteria for training institutions, 
which is Appendix 18 of the National Safety Programme, shows that authorizations 
of government agencies and other safety agencies must be obtained. Besides 
EASA, other licenced training institutions that consider safety as a key aspect of 
their training programmes are the Kenya School of Flying, Moi University School of 
Aerospace and Sciences, Think Aviation Training, Nairobi Flight Training, Mombasa 
Aviation Training Institute, Valentine Air Services, Ninety-Nine Flying School and 
KQ Pride Centre. 
 
Under the 2020 UAS Regulations, safety of UAS use and operation is a key 
consideration in registration and licensing of UAS in Kenya.85 This explains why 
categorization of the UAS is the basis of licensing due to safety risks posed by 
operations of the UAS.86 Any amendment to the Remote Aircraft Operators 
Certificate can only be approved, if it is necessary, for the safety of commercial 
operations of the UAS. It is a general requirement for operation of UAS that requests 
                                                          
81 Civil Aviation (Amendment) Act, Sections 10(b) and (c). 
82 Civil Aviation Act 2013, Section 3B (q). 
83 Civil Aviation Act, Section 5A(2)(v). 
84 Civil Aviation (Approved Training Organizations) Regulations of 2013. 
85 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 4(c). 
86 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 5. 
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for authorization to include aeronautical safety communications frequencies 
equipment.87 Safety is also considered when KCAA considers and takes the 
decision for cancellation, revocation, or variation of such authorizations.88 
 
The 2020 UAS Regulations offer myriad assurances of safety in all the operations 
provided in its scope. For instance, it is incumbent upon operators and owners to 
ensure that the remote piloted aircraft system is airworthy.89 This means that all the 
UAS operating in the Kenyan airspace are required to meet the standards of safe 
operation depending on type and design. This goal is achieved by providing an 
additional general obligation on owners and operators to operational control and 
safety of operations as well as compliance with the request for information by KCAA, 
which include issuing certificate of aircraft’s airworthiness, licences, authorization 
certificates, operations speeds, and capabilities such as communication, frequency 
and sense and avoid systems.90  
 
The provision of sense and avoid systems set out above represents a notable 
improvement in the 2020 UAS Regulations as they were not provided under the 
annulled 2017 RPAs Regulations. Despite this effort, challenges still persist as the 
regulation refers to adherence to rules of air mainly applicable to manned aircraft In 
appreciating the fact that not all UAS have capability to detect and avoid other 
aircraft, the regulation provides for remote pilots to maintain awareness so as to see 
and avoid other aircraft and yield the right of way to all aircraft and vehicle, which 
may not be practical in some incidences where UAS fly beyond sight of the operator. 
The challenge is exacerbated by challenges arising from lack of unmanned traffic 
management (UTM) system that could help collision avoidance with capability to 
detect where command and control centre of UAS operation are located,91 the 
                                                          
87 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 23(2)(l). 
88 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 22(1)(a). 
89 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 12. 
90 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulations 23 (1)(a) and (d). 
91Jeaneret C and Rambaldi G Drone governance: a scan of policies, laws and regulations governing 
the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in 79 countries (CTA 2016) 14.  
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communication link enhances both safety and security of the airspaces by way of 
interception of unauthorised intrusion of UAS.      
 
Despite the challenges regarding sense and avoid systems, it is not lost that the 
obligation on operators demonstrates an approach the KCAA is starting at the 
lowest level of compliance, which is with the operators and owners whose safety 
considerations are supposed to complement its requirements when exercising the 
oversight mandate. The general compliance ensures that there is reduction of 
accidents and collisions with other UAS as well as manned aircrafts.  
 
In order to practically achieve these safety concerns, the 2020 UAS Regulations 
impose certain limitations on safe operations of UAS. For instance, Regulation 24 
provides the vertical height limit of operation of UAS. Specifically, it prohibits the 
operation of UAS 400 feet above ground level or at night and must be fitted with 
cameras and operate with Visual Meteorological Conditions. The Regulation also 
requires that the distance from other vessels, buildings, trees in lateral and vertical 
distances must not fall below 50 metres. This provision imposes reasonable care on 
UAS operators to ensure safety of road users and pedestrians. The Air Navigation 
Service Providers are mandated to provide for procedures that ensure integration 
of UAS as regards aviation safety.92 The KCAA has mandate to impose further 
operating restrictions on UAS in the interest of safety.93 These restrictions were 
evidently geared to preventing accidents that can be caused by collisions with things 
borne of nature.  
 
During their operations, the operators of UAS are obligated to use sight to ensure 
they avoid collisions with other aircrafts and must at all times yield the right of way.94 
This rule guides how the UAS integrates into the civil aviation airspaces in relation 
                                                          
92 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 36(2). 
93 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 38(1)(a). 
94 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 31(1). 
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to other manned aircrafts and is based on the rationale that their way can be easily 
diverted by the pilot in command with comparative ease when compared with that 
of manned aircrafts. The pilots too, through the UAS owners and operators, are 
obligated, apart from medical compliance, to ensure that they do not consume 
alcohol or psychoactive substances less than 8 hours prior to reporting on duty.95 In 
additions, the pilot must have UAS system pilot certificate issued pursuant to 
Regulation 19. 
 
In an apparent realization of the inevitability of accidents even with strict adherence 
to the above set, out safety means, the Regulations make provisions on obligations 
during the happening or after the occurrence of an accident relating to UAS. The 
Regulations envisage use of emergency procedures, command and control, and air 
traffic control communication by operators of the UAS.96 A challenge that may don 
the achievement of this requirement is that, Kenya has not yet established a 
command and control system (CCS), which is a necessary element in integration of 
the UAS into the national civil airspace. CCS is a technological system used by 
security agencies to ensure that UAS flying in the national airspace of the country 
are identified immediately they enter the country’s national airspace.97 The 
technology is important for Kenya to ensure that her airspace is safe from acts of 
unlawful interference to civil aviation.  
 
The operations on aerodromes are regulated restrictively by KCAA.98 Should 
accidents happen, there arises an obligation to report the same to KCAA so as to 
aid the investigations carried out by the Authority.99 Another reactive approach is 
through provision of insurance. The current framework for regulation of UAS at 
Regulation 40 addresses issues of insurance against third party injuries. Regulation 
40(4) appears to provide some exemption, by providing that KCAA may dispense 
                                                          
95 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 44. 
96 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulations 23(2)(n), 35(1) & 36. 
97 Jeaneret C and Rambaldi G Drone governance 14. 
98 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 26. 
99 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 25(1). 
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with the requirement for insurance depending on the category of UAS, meaning 
small UAS may operate without comprehensive insurance. Insurance protection is 
important, otherwise non-observance of liability means other aircraft, persons and 
property on the ground are exposed to unnecessary danger linked to lack of third-
party claims and compensation by insurance companies. 
 
The safety requirements permeate the organizational arrangements for commercial 
operators of UAS. For example, in terms of staffing, a commercial UAS operator is 
required to have an accountable manager responsible for its SMS.100 Such a system 
is an approach to managing safety of UAS use and operation, through 
organizational structures, policies, and procedures.101 In developing the system, the 
regulations address adequacy issues by requiring certificate holders to design the 
system in a manner, that commensurate with the size and complexity of their 
operations.102 The Regulations are definitive as stipulates the standards of an 
effective safety management system. For instance, such a system must identify 
actual and potential safety hazards, develop remedial actions and mechanisms for 
continuous assessment of its appropriateness.103  
 
The Regulations also have provisions for training of persons undertaking private 
UAS operations only through authorized training centers.104 In an apparent 
recognition of risks that result in the operation of commercial UAS, the Regulations 
provide additional requirements for training of the pilots of UAS for commercial 
use.105 For commercial operators, they are required to comply with additional 
requirements of the Remote Aircraft Operators Certificate (ROC) including adequate 
staffing, ownership and safety requirements.106 Generally, training as provided for 
under Regulation 21 of 2020 UAS Regulation is expected to equip one with the 
                                                          
100 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 38. 
101 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 2. 
102 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 19. 
103 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 2. 
104 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 21(1). 
105 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 45. 
106 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 14(1)-(3). 
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competencies for award of the remote pilot certificate. An applicant for a remote pilot 
certificate under Regulation 20(1) of the 2020 UAS Regulations must demonstrate 
a level of knowledge appropriate to privileges granted to such holder, in the following 
disciplines: air law, UAS general knowledge, flight performance, planning and 
loading, human performance, meteorology, navigation, operational procedures, and 
principles of flight related to UAS and radiotelephony. In addition, he or she must 
pass a skills test to demonstrate ability and competency to perform as a remote pilot 
of the specific UAS category and associated UAS, the relevant procedures and 
manoeuvres appropriate to the privileges granted.107 
 
Overall, KCAA is responsible for the implementation of the safety provisions and 
requirements. It reserves the power to conduct surveillance and inspections to 
ensure compliance accountability. The provisions of the Act are implemented 
through offences and general penalties fines not exceeding one million shillings for 
each offence or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or to both.108 
 
5.2 Kenya’s Response to Aviation Security in UAS Operations  
As discussed in chapter Two of this thesis, security concerns principally arise from 
the threats of national interference caused by the traffic management and command 
control challenges. In response to this challenge, the KCAA developed an Aviation 
Policy in relation to UAS. Kenya’s Aviation Policy was designed to promote and 
facilitate civil aviation by ensuring provision of an effective regulatory framework for 
UAS operations throughout the country. Its main objective being to support 
operation of UAS in a safe, secure, harmonized and seamless environment equal 
to manned operations.109 However, just as the 2017 RPAs Regulation, the Policy 
suffered the fate of suspension by Parliament. Parliament recommended that until 
the questions raised on security, public participation, and privacy were addressed, 
                                                          
107 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 20(1) as read with the Second Schedule the Regulations. 
108 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 51(2). 
109 Republic of Kenya Policy on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems of 2017, Page 1. 
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the Policy remained suspended. In the analysis of the researcher, a Policy is an 
internal KCAA document and not a law made by Parliament, hence Parliament had 
no locus to nullify it, such action was therefore, null and void ab initio and ultra vires. 
 
Despite this uncertainty, certain perspectives are derivable from the Policy. 
Discussion of these glimpses is necessary since the adopted Regulation did not 
deviate so much from the Policy. Overall, Kenya’s Policy on UAS was consistent 
with the country’s proposed legislation framework, which provides, inter alia, that all 
persons, institutions or entities with intent to import, test, operate, procure, 
manufacture or assemble UAS must  apply for authorization from the KCAA as 
provided under the then 2017 RPAs Regulations.110 The authorization could only be 
subject to prerequisites of security clearance and approval by the relevant 
ministry.111 Evidently, the focus of the authorization was on maximization of security 
in the use of UAS. 
 
Further security measures were placed in the Policy with a requirement of approval 
from the Department of Defense headquarters, including UAS for civil use. The 
purpose of the involvement of the Ministry of Defence is to ensure that there are 
background checks on owners of the UAS. This condition could obviously prove 
difficult for private applicants seeking registration of UAS as the facility is a restricted 
area where civilian visitors are subjected to stringent security clearance before 
placing their requests.112 From this analysis, the provision appeared to be a policy 
and administrative problem invented by government officials within military circles 
for fear of the insecurity that UAS could pose in the national airspace if they were 
allowed lenient approval status. 
 
                                                          
110 2017 RPAs Regulations, Regulation 6 (2). 
111 2017 RPAs Regulations, Regulation 6 (2).  
112 See Wanjala R ‘Drones in Kenya” 2015 KJLJ-JBSD 62-78. 
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Regarding exports and general removal of UAS out of the country, the Policy 
proposed prohibition of any Kenyan registered UAS from being taken out of the 
country without authorization by KCAA.  All UAS are expected to have adequate 
security to protect the system from unauthorized modification, interference, 
corruption or control/command action.113 In other words, UAS were to operate 
strictly in accordance with rules governing the flight of manned aircraft and meet 
infrastructure requirements applicable to the class of airspace, within which they 
intend to operate, save for where KCAA provides otherwise. 
 
The analysis of the Policy inevitably leads to the conclusion that it placed more 
prominence on regulation of imports and exports, more than on the actual 
operations of the UAS in the country. Accordingly, the stringent measures and 
obstacles that it introduced to deter applicants or importers did not, and still does 
not, in any way address the central problem of UAS operation. What follows is illegal 
importation of UAS and unauthorised use. The possible consequences are that 
Kenya could experience an influx of unlicensed UAS operating in her airspace. 
Moreover, the Department of Defence does not have clearly outlined procedure of 
vetting applicants. Lack of such procedures may be ground for possible arbitrary 
action. The arbitrariness may be exacerbated by lack of coordinated databases 
between authorities dealing with crime and criminal investigations and the Ministry 
of Defence. Once the Policy comes back to life, stakeholders can take opportunity 
and ensure it is synchronised with the yet to be established National Security Policy 
and the National Security Strategy on UAS.  Specifically, they should, at the earliest 
opportunity, ensure that the security Policy on UAS has convergence with the civil 
aviation policy on UAS to avoid conflict of polices and eliminate any lacuna in law 
relating to operation of UAS in Kenya. 
 
                                                          
113 Republic of Kenya Policy on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems of 2017, Page 1. 
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Currently, under the principal legislation, is clear that the mandate of the KCAA 
expressly recognized under Section 7(1) (j) of the Civil Aviation Act includes dealing 
with incidents of unlawful interference and ensuring aviation security.  
 
With regard to the regulatory support to the principal statute, it is noted that prior to 
the development of the 2020 UAS Regulations, general security issues in civil 
aviation were dealt with under the Civil Aviation (Security) Regulations of 2015 as 
amended in 2020, which set of Regulations was undergoing review at the time of 
writing this thesis.114 Specifically, Part III of the Regulations imposed obligations on 
aircraft operators to develop security programmes and security training 
programmes. These programmes would be aligned to the National Civil Aviation 
Programme developed by KCAA.115 Further, Regulation 35 provided that the 
responsibility for security rested with the operator who was under an obligation to 
ensure that its staff and personnel are trained, aware of and comply with the National 
Civil Aviation Security Programme. Additionally, Regulation 47 recognized the 
enforcement power of the KCAA in preventing acts of unlawful interference in 
respect of aircrafts when the Authority acts are based on reliable information. 
 
The 2020 UAS Regulations have established a raft of UAS specific security 
measures. For instance, the Regulations provide that only adult Kenyan citizens or 
residents or persons, and both levels of government have capacity to own UAS.116 
This means that anonymous ownership that may compromise the security of the 
country is not allowed.117 For non-nationals, it is the residence of that particular 
person at the time of application that matter, it means that the person’s stay in Kenya 
musts be authorized under any written law. The change of ownership amongst the 
permissible groups must be notified to KCAA. KCAA is required to approve 
importation and exportation of UAS through issuance of permits.118 This too is an 
                                                          
114 Civil Aviation (Security) Regulations of 2015  as amended in 2020 
115 Civil Aviation (Security) Regulations of 2015, Regulations 9, 10, 13, 14, 21 and 22. 
116 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 6. (1), (b)- (c). and 3. 
117 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 6. (1) (a). 
118 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 7(2). 
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opportunity to weed out visible circumstances of imports that are used for 
espionage. 
 
Under Regulation 8, UAS manufacture must obtain prior authorization with 
additional requirement for security clearance. Although the Regulations are not 
express on how the clearance should be done, it is expected that the NIS, which is 
the disciplined civilian intelligence agency under the Constitution of Kenya 2010,119 
would do the clearance. 
 
Apart from permit and approval systems for manufacture and imports export, 
security assurance is provided for through requirement of prior registration for 
operation or ownership of the UAS. For prior registrations issued by KCAA, the 
Authority considers security clearance similar to that of the manufacturing 
processes.120 Regulation 43 mandates the holders of the remote aircrafts operator’s 
certificate to complement KCAA’s mandate of conducting of background checks, 
checks on criminal records of its personnel, develop interference detection systems, 
and protect integrity of their UAS. Further, they are mandated to train personnel and 
designate a coordinator responsible for security issues.121 
 
The registration is not final and a registration status may be changed by KCAA for 
reasons known to the law pursuant to the provision of Regulation 10. This 
Regulation offers an avenue for the consideration of provision of other legislations, 
already set out in the discussion on domestic framework above that aims at 
safeguarding national security interests to deregister UAS when it compromises the 
security of Kenya. 
 
                                                          
119 See Constitution of Kenya, 2020, Article 242 on the role of NIS 
120 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulations 8(1) and (2). 
121 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 43(a)-(h). 
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Apart from the security approvals provided in dealing applications under the 
Regulations, there are additional security requirements for operators to have 
security procedures.122 The procedures must be developed in accordance with the 
Civil Aviation (Security) Regulations, 2013 (now under review) requirements set by 
KCAA.123 Specifically, they must show the practice to be taken to avoid interference. 
Compliance with the procedures is to be boosted with security surveillance by KCAA 
that target avoidance of unauthorized use and unlawful interference.124  
 
5.3 Kenya’s Response to Privacy Challenges Associated by Operations of UAS.  
It shall be recalled that the privacy concerns of UAS arise from their ability to flow 
close to buildings, properties and homes. Kenya addressed its mind to this 
challenge in its Aviation Policy, which was advanced in the protection of the right to 
privacy. The Policy required that operations of UAS be such that they do not cause 
an infringement on privacy of individuals or entities.125 The protection of the right to 
privacy, however, birthed a huge gap since the Policy, excluded issues pertaining 
to State aircraft, unmanned free balloons or airships, and operations in which more 
than one UAS are managed by a remote pilot station at the same time.126 Under the 
Policy, in the interest of aviation safety, authorization given for operation of UAS 
may be withdrawn or cancelled.127  
 
 
                                                          
122 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 45. 
123 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 45. 
124 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 47. 
125 See Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 31 on right to privacy and safeguard. The policy and 
regulation should therefore provide   that any person conducting operations using UAS 
fitted with cameras shall operate them in a responsible way to respect the privacy of other 
persons and their property as outline in the Constitution.  
126 Republic of Kenya Policy on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems of 2017. 
127 Republic of Kenya Policy on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems of 2017. Also see the aviation 
policy on authorization  
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The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 is the principal law on the protection to right to 
privacy. Article 31 of the Constitution, provides that: 
“Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have, 
their person, home or property searched, their possessions seized, 
information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or 
revealed or the privacy of their communications infringed.”128  
 
Unlike the case with safety and security as set out above, the Civil Aviation Act did 
not make specific provision on how the respect to this right ought to converge with 
operation of UAS. The Civil Aviation (Amendment) Act did not remedy the situation 
either. It was only until the 2020 UAS Regulations were developed that the privacy 
provision was made regarding regulation of UAS operations in the Kenyan airspace. 
Regulation 53 of the 2017 RPAs Regulations had provisions on privacy of persons 
and property.129 It provided a general provision requiring any person conducting 
operations using remotely piloted aircraft system fitted with cameras to operate them 
in a responsible manner, and in a way as to respect the privacy of other persons 
and their property. Under the defunct Regulations, surveillance was required to be 
with the consent of the person or owners of property unless the same was for 
newsgathering. In respect of privacy protection, imaging technology fitted on the 
UAS should be used for investigations, research, and no other purposes that can 
breach privacy. 
 
The UAS 2020 Regulations make provisions for the protection of privacy rights on 
various activities related to UAS.  Specifically, the Regulations prohibit equipping a 
UAS system with an imaging device to conduct surveillance.130 Any use of such a 
system for taking images of persons must be done with written consent of the 
person.131 The same prohibition extends to use of such imaging device to record an 
                                                          
 128 Privacy International https://privacyinternational.org/state-privacy/1005/state-privacy-kenya 
(Date of use: 29 September 2019). 
129 2017 RPAs Regulations, Regulation 54(1). 
130 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 41. 
131 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 41. 
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image of a privately owned or leased real property or such owner, licensee, invitee 
with intent to conduct surveillance.132  
 
The Regulations resolve the difficulty of testing intention by setting the standard of 
a reasonable expectation of privacy upon the operators of UAS. Such a reasonable 
expectation arises where a person or property is not observable by a person located 
at the ground level in a place where they have a legal right to be.133 The Regulations 
also recognize instances of exception to the general protection of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy. These instances include mapping and evaluation of the 
earth's surface, investigations of forests, Search and Rescue, and investigation of 
vegetation or wildlife.134 There is a rider, however, that each of the exemptions can 
only be exercised with prior approval of KCAA.135 Authors such as Nader et al imply 
that these scanty provisions on privacy in respect of UAS regulation is still suspect 
owing to the recent technological changes.136 It seems to be a carry-over of 
concerns arising from the annulment of the 2017 Regulations.  It, therefore, misses 
the ideal situation where, the focus is that the safety, security and privacy should be 
addressed in a balanced manner, which does not compromise any one aspect.137  
 
As for its implementation, there still exists scepticism regarding the impact of the 
use of UAS on privacy. This particularly arises from the Kenyan legal and legislative 
history in respect of rights. Privacy International that shed more light on this issue 
has noted the Kenyan trend that is increasingly giving a chance for conduct of 
surveillances that have real potential to further limit the right to privacy.138 The 
organization attributes the trend to the coming into force of the National Intelligence 
                                                          
132 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 41(2).  
133 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 41(3).  
134 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulations.41 (4) (a)-(d). 
135 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 42(4). 
136 See 2017 RPAs Regulations, Regulations 47, 48 and 49 on security provisions and Regulation 
53 on privacy. 
137 See Nader M et al “Unmanned aerial vehicles applications in future smart cities” 2020 TFSC 1-
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Service Act,139 the National Security Council Act, Cap. 206  (Act No. 23 of 2012); 
and the Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 30 of 2012. The NIS Act allows the NIS to 
limit privacy in the course of its investigations and monitoring activities.140 The 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) on the other hand provides the authorities with 
wide powers to limit the right. For instance, it provides that the right can be limited 
in cases of investigations into terrorist acts, detection and prevention of terrorism.141 
 
The challenges in practice were evidenced more recently when Parliament, in what 
was witnessed a chaotic process, passed the Security Laws (Amendment) Act in 
2014.142 The Act grants powers to national security organs to intercept 
communications, which powers have an effect of limiting the right to privacy, as 
guaranteed under the Constitution of Kenya. As a countermeasure, constitutional 
courts are always open to strike down any infringement of privacy rights as protected 
under Article 31 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010.  
 
Even more worrying is the refrain by the Civil Aviation (Unmanned Aircraft Systems) 
Regulations, 2020 from making positive obligations regarding protection of the right 
to privacy. The provisions on respecting right to privacy are too general and may be 
the origin of poor implementation when stakeholders start interacting with the law.  
 
The limitations, are however, cured by the robust provision on data protection 
provided through the Data Protection Act143. Since the Act is clear on the obligation 
of collectors of personal data including such issues as disclosure, it provides a good 
tool for privacy reassurance with respect to current technological advancements 
pending promulgation of the UAS Regulations. Another positive development to the 
protection of privacy is development of the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes 
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140 National Intelligence Service Act 28 of 2012, Section 6. 
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Act.144 This Act has set out certain constitutional objectives, at Section 3 that are 
geared towards achieving, among others respect for the right to privacy. It provides 
for offences against the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of data, computer-
related and content-related offences that may impact negatively on the privacy of 
data in the computer systems and networks. These bodies of laws protect citizenry 
rights to ensure that information relating to their families or private affairs are not 
unnecessarily required or revealed and complement the existing framework under 
the 2020 UAS Regulations. 
 
5.4 Implementation of the Response Mechanisms  
Generally, the Regulations are implemented through criminal sanctions. Failure to 
comply with the directions under the Regulations attracts a fine not exceeding one 
million shillings for each offence or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three 
years, or to both. Contravention of the provisions of the Third Schedule attracts fines 
in millions of shillings and imprisonment terms, or both.145 The general penalty 
provided for under the Regulations is a fine not exceeding two million shillings or an 
imprisonment term not exceeding three years or both. In my view, however, the fines 
may not be effective in deterring commission of crimes by the owners or operations 
of UAS that are engaged in large commercial enterprises who may end up paying 
the fine without much difficulty despite not being proportionate to the extent of harm 
caused.  However, this view is theoretical since no such instance has manifested 
itself in the Kenyan jurisdiction. Additionally, the oversight role of KCAA and 
CASSOA and the Kenyan courts is also pivotal in the implementation of the 
provisions set out under this chapter. 
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145 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 51. 
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6. Other UAS Integration Challenges  
6.1 Institutional and Operational Challenges of UAS Integration 
Whereas Kenya has made tremendous progress towards regulating UAS through 
promulgation of regulations and active participation at the international level, this 
has not been without challenges. Kenya’s policy and regulatory framework related 
to UAS have been in existence for a short time compared to the United States and 
South Africa.  
 
KCAA is the sole Authority or institution with oversight mandate over aviation 
matters. The Board of Directors is constituted under the Act to complement and 
implement the process of integrating UAS into civilian airspace. But since the Board 
does not work on full-time basis, the technical civil aviation functions are handled by 
a Director-General and his/her technical staff. The import of section 10(3) of the Civil 
Aviation Act is that the Director General of KCAA retains wide powers in respect of 
oversight, safety and security, while carrying out administrative functions of the 
institution. Indeed, the section also explains that the Director General is at the core 
of the creation, operationalization and implementation, and monitoring of the safety 
oversight system. The system has much wider roles including licensing, 
development of technical guidance, surveillance and resolution of safety concerns.  
 
Despite the expansive roles that relate to the UAS, KCAA has six staff members 
who are currently stationed in an established office, specifically dedicated for 
registration of UAS.146 Their prime challenge at the time of this research is lack of 
capacity to undertake registration of the UAS. Secondly, by May 2020, KCAA had 
not made progress concerning integration of UAS into civil aviation. There is need, 
therefore, for concerted in awareness efforts or campaign to be undertaken with a 
view of ensuring that the UAS in possession of the public are registered. It should 
concern everyone that the pace at which the regulation is being implemented 
                                                          
146 Author’s interview with the Director General KCAA on 11 September 2018.  
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compromises the safety of users, stakeholders, operators of UAS, UAS operations 
and manned aircraft in general. 
 
6.2 Inadequate County Governments’ Involvement  
The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 establishes 47 County Governments, which are 
listed in the First Schedule of the Constitution. The Fourth Schedule of the 
Constitution recognizes transport and communication as a mandate of the National 
Government. No such mandate is granted to the 47 devolved units. The legal 
framework too does not apportion any clear role and responsibility to the county 
governments with regard to UAS operation oversight, the reason being aviation is 
not a devolved function. This phenomenon is exacerbated by inadequate 
enforcement machinery, as KCAA is yet to benefit substantially from the capacity of 
the devolved units. Accordingly, KCAA has not been able to factor into 2020 UAS 
regulation Community Based Organization for self-regulation as is the case with the 
US. 
 
There is recognition that the devolved units ought to play a role. For instance, 
Parliament, courtesy of the Hansard dated 26 June 2018, clarifies the need for 
involvement of county governments, citing lack of stakeholder participation in all 
counties while annulling the established 2017 UAS Regulations,147 despite the fact 
that most UAS activities occur in areas under the jurisdiction of the devolved units 
or county governments. These sentiments by Parliament resonate with the 
provisions of Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution, which mandates the 
county governments to be at the forefront in organizing communities for participation 
at various levels of governance.  
 
                                                          
147 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 118. The provision facilitates public participation and 
involvement in the legislative and other business of Parliament and its committee. Also see 
Article 189 which calls for cooperation between national and county Governments.  
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6.3 Insufficient framework for Public Participation in UAS Regulation 
That public access and participation that is a requirement as per Article 118 of the 
Kenya Constitution is perhaps the clearest testimony that citizens in rural areas, who 
are likely to be affected by operations of UAS, must be given a chance to give their 
views with regard to legislation of UAS regulations. The Constitution places public 
participation as a Constitutional principle of good governance.148 This is 
incorporated and further elaborated in statutes149 as well as case laws in Kenya.150 
It would appear that involvement in cases concerning the aviation sector would be 
by way of availing them to create an opportunity to air their opinion or present the 
same by way of memorandum.151 It is expected that if members of the public were 
involved, they would air their views on matters to do with fees they are levied 
regarding registration and operation of UAS, which include reporting authorised 
operations.  
 
The intent and purpose of the participation is both to fulfil the Constitutional 
requirements as well as to ensure that KCAA develops a document that captures 
the aspirations of stakeholders such as the public, military, police, aviation 
operators, manufactures, policy makers, intuitions of higher learning among others.  
 
A review of the Civil Aviation Act of 2013 as amended in 2016, reveals tardiness in 
substantive provisions for public participation. While this thesis appreciates that 
Kenya has an elaborate, albeit inadequate, framework for public participation,152 the 
analysis projects that having such substantive provision would be necessary given 
the unique positioning of civil aviation and most importantly the use and operation 
of UAS. As such, even the practice does not evidence realization of the full potential 
of consultation of communities especially in designing the rescue missions and 
                                                          
148 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 10(2) (b).  
149 See Statutory Instruments Act 23 of 2013. 
150 See Robert N Gakuru & another v Governor Kiambu County & 3 others [2013] eKLR.  
151 https://www.afrocave.com/public-participation-kenya/ (Date of use: 4 November 2019). 
152 See Mwenda AN et al “Trends in consultation and public participation within environmental impact 
assessment in Kenya” 2012 IAPA 130-135. 
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accident management and response. The lack of such enthusiasm within civil 
aviation led to the annulment of the 2017 RPAs Regulations. 
 
It is instructive to note that Parliament cited non-compliance with provisions of the 
Statutory Instruments Act, No. 23 of 2013, which is the statute that creates the basis 
for public participation in the promulgation of statutory instruments such as UAS 
Regulations. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
Kenya has actual and potential civil uses of UAS. It has robust legal, policy, and 
institutional framework for the civil aviation. In recognition of safety, security and 
privacy concerns related to aviation, research has established that Kenya has made 
significant legislative efforts to integrate UAS into the civilian aviation airspace 
through adoption of the Civil Aviation Act and the amendments in the Civil Aviation 
(Amendment) Act and a myriad of other Regulations. The legislative and institutional 
frameworks form the basis for domestication consequential compliance with 
international standards of civil aviation established under the Chicago Convention 
and further elaborated by frameworks developed under the auspices of ICAO.   
 
Secondly, the establishment of the Kenyan institutional framework, coordinated by 
the KCAA, is an important milestone. Institutionally, KCAA has responded positively 
in terms of addressing the general civil aviation safety and security through provision 
of legislative rules and policy formulations. Although the larger fabric of the 
regulatory framework is not specifically dedicated to UAS operations, they govern 
the day-to-day the aviation in Kenyan airspace. Previous lack of UAS-specific 
framework had a major setback in the achievement of the full potential of aviation 
safety and security, and at the same time adhering to safeguards of right to privacy 




The chapter has credited the KCAA for showing great interest in regulation of UAS 
through the RPAs 2017 Regulations, though as noted above, the credit suffered a 
major setback when the interest expressed through gazettement of the Regulations 
was shot down in Parliament in June 2018. The chapter concludes that the events 
of 2017 challenged the achievement of Kenya’s roadmap for integration of UAS into 
the civil airspace. This created a catch-22 situation, in which Kenya, for several 
years did not have UAS regulation in place, to check the increasing number of UAS 
in her airspace.153 Evidently, the lack of regulations spilled over to posing threats to 
safety and security, coupled with actual violation of the right to privacy, due to the 
potential of existing illegal operations of UAS in her airspace. Of all these 
challenges, the privacy concerns seem to be more prominent due to the 
government’s approach of increasingly limiting the right to privacy through adoption 
of legislation on national security among other issues. KCAA on its part responded 
positively with a quick fix of issues raised by Parliament, this culminating into the 
Cabinet Secretary finally gazetting the new UAS law on 30 March 2020. The 
regulation considers adherence to safety, security and privacy concerns with a view 
to smoothening the legal path to integration.
                                                          
153 Kenya did not have an effective UAS regulation after annulment of RPAs regulation of 2017 in 




SYNTHESIS OF OUTCOMES REGARDING INTEGRATION OF UAS INTO CIVIL 
AVIATION IN THE US, SOUTH AFRICA AND KENYA 
1. Introduction    
As a secondary lens, this chapter looks at frameworks from the perspective of 
International Aviation Law, and its adoption to domestic legal, policy and institutional 
framework. The chapter analyses how the current legal responses developed 
separately to deal with UAS’ associated challenges of safety, security and privacy 
rights assurances in South Africa and Kenya. It is clearly established that the US 
has a long history of interaction with UAS, hence the approach to discuss the legal 
responses of the two African States at different stages of developing UAS regulation 
against lessons from the US. The chapter also analyses the notable safety, security 
and privacy challenges experienced by the States before finally making concluding 
remarks.   
 
2. Lessons Learnt 
Though there is no single unified international legal instrument that deals with all 
aspects of the UAS, other than the Chicago Convention. Article 8 of the Convention, 
through recognition of UAS, is a step in the right direction. The framework is 
complemented with Soft laws developed by ICAO such as SARPs, with varying 
levels of biding effect, towards implementation of its provisions of regulation, and 
play a key role towards the integration process. The international framework is 
aimed at inspiring regional and domestic response to, among others, challenges 
concerning integration of UAS into respective national aviation airspaces. From the 
analysis of how the three States considered in this thesis have developed and 
adopted the international framework, it is clear that other than other commonalities 
including establishment of regulatory authorities, there is incongruence in the 
domestic response to regulation of UAS in terms of legislative history and 
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developments, timelines and reasons for amendments of aviation laws.1 The 
incongruence, notwithstanding, it is clear that the States can learn from one another, 
or may showcase to other States not discussed in this thesis, certain lessons 
towards effective integration of UAS into their respective national aviation systems. 
These are divided into three limbs as discussed below. 
 
The first limb relates to the lesson that the States can learn from each other. The 
first lesson regards the need for public participation. Though the three States 
covered herein had general constitutional frameworks for public, private sector and 
stakeholder engagement, the same is wholly inadequate in the regulation of UAS 
issues. Instructively, UAS has unique stakeholders such as manufacturers, 
developers, exporters, importers, owners, pilots, operators of different categories, 
members of the public and the Government. Their involvement is necessary since 
redress for UAS safety, security and privacy concerns mainly targets them or they 
interact with UAS in one way or another.  
 
The Kenyan framework can borrow from South Africa, for instance, regarding the 
participation of the public in the nomination and evaluation in the appointment of 
members to the Aviation Safety Investigations Board. The decision by the Kenyan 
Parliament to annul the 2017 RPAs Regulations for reasons of non-compliance with 
public participation exposes the need for Kenya to consider public participation in 
regulation of use, regulation, monitoring and operation of UAS. 
 
South Africa too can learn more lessons to make the public participation aspect 
more meaningful. Of particular concerns is with respect to provision for public 
participation on substantive procedural and rule-making processes. This provision 
requires and limits the rates of participation in rule-making to accredited 
                                                          
1 See chapters Four, Five and Six of this thesis on analysis of the history and substantive provisions 
of principal laws under FAA Modernization Reform Act, South Africa’s Civil Aviation Act and 
Kenya’s Civil Aviation Act respectively. 
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representatives, advisers, experts and observers but leaves out key stakeholders in 
the value chain of UAS, including members of the public in whom the safety, security 
and privacy concerns converge. 
 
The second lesson regards the need for enhancement of capacity at the regulatory 
authorities of the three States. Unlike the US, the study has established that both 
SACAA and KCAA have less than six staff each, stationed in their offices, 
overseeing UAS applications and registration. These countries need to take cue 
from the US in order to overcome often-glaring logistical problems for effective 
oversight and enforcement of the provision of the framework on safety, security and 
privacy regulations.  
 
Thirdly, is the lesson that the devolution of the regulatory phenomena is a pivotal 
approach in ensuring efficacy. This, however, depends on the constitutional 
framework for such devolution functions. For instance, in the US, the regulation is 
done at Federal and State levels. The same is true for South Africa, which does 
regulation of UAS at the national and local government spheres. Kenya, on the other 
hand has a different constitutional make-up where civil aviation is a sole mandate 
of the national government and not devolved to county governments. 
 
Fourthly, is the need for development of regional and sub-regional agencies dealing 
with UAS regulation. This is necessary both to complement the regulatory work of 
ICAO and to aid in harmonization of approaches among sub-regional organization 
participants. East Africa, Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency 
(CASSOA), in particular, has proved to be effective in respect of Kenya in 
supplement operations of the institutional frameworks for implementation of UAS 
regulatory framework within East Africa. South Africa could take this lesson within 
the regional organization of Southern African Development Community (SADC) to 
provide mechanisms of obtaining regional consensus on regulatory and oversight 
issues. For Southern African Development Community, doing so may start with 
264 
 
expression of political goodwill through ratification of Interim Southern Africa Safety 
Organization (iSASO). 
 
The second limb is the lessons that may be learned from the US’ framework for 
assurance of safety, security and privacy concerns related to UAS. These lessons 
are particularly important because the US has longer experience regarding use UAS 
and established UAS specific regulations.   
 
First, it shall be recalled that the general classification of UAS depends on their 
performance specifications, endurance, maximum altitude, altitude, wing loading 
capacity, among other considerations. The US regulatory framework adopts a 
unique classification of UAS in a manner that upholds robust classification with 
different classes attracting varying safety, and security obligations.2 The South 
African and Kenyan systems can emulate the framework for certificate of waivers in 
order to ensure that at all material times the regulation of UAS is proportionate to 
the risk of the operation in question. This focus will ensure a safety risk assessment 
based approach, which avoids use of a lot of resources in monitoring UAS, whose 
operations and circumstances pose no obvious safety risk, as contemplated under 
the ICAO Circular 330 AN/189 on Civil/ Military Cooperation in Air Traffic 
Management of 2011.3 
 
Secondly, there is need to ensure gradualism and pragmatism in the approach for 
integration of UAS into the civil airspace. From the US’ perspective, the lesson 
relates to focus on safe rather than full integration through the US’ phased-in 
approach. For instance, despite interacting with the UAS in the early 1900s, the FAA 
                                                          
2 See chapter Four, section 5.3. It explains that section 333 of the FAAMR Act allows an operator of 
a UAS weighing less than 50 pounds to apply for a certificate of waiver, which allows the 
equipment to deviate from certain operating rules where the FAA is satisfied that the 
proposed operation does not pose security challenges 
3 See chapter Three, section 4.1 of the thesis which analyses the Circular as requiring that the 




Modernization and Reform Act, which provides for operation of the model aircraft, 
was only adopted in 2012. The pragmatism involves the information of policy and 
legal development with history to ensure that the country does not get it wrong. From 
the regulation of UAS in the US, it is clear that their proper integration into civil 
aviation systems works on the understanding that UAS operations should not 
increase risk to other airspace users, persons and properties on the ground. That is 
why, the US premises its process on a safe rather than full integration. In other 
words, full integration, that is not safe, is self-defeatist and at all times the two 
objectives should be simultaneous. South Africa and Kenya can learn to ensure that 
they do not wait for disaster attacks such as the US September 11 attacks to shape 
their policy, legal and regulatory discourse regarding UAS security 
countermeasures.4 Given their relatively lower levels of experience of UAS, the US 
practice offers a best learning opportunity for South Africa and Kenya to embrace 
pragmatics in their laws and regulations, or at least in the implementation of their 
UAS policy formulation and laws.5  
 
Thirdly, is the lesson related to flexibility. From the US’ perspective, unlike in South 
Africa and Kenya, flexibility is reflected in the recognition of community-based 
organizations that are allowed to form local units, through which FAA allows them 
to establish guidelines on the operation of small model UAS. The regulator, 
however, retains the overall mandate. The approach allows the FAA to concentrate 
on regulation of huge commercial UAS and other recreational UAS that pose serious 
safety, security and privacy risks and leave the rest such as for recreational 
purposes that require less supervision to community-based-organizations like clubs. 
 
 
                                                          
4 See chapter Four, section 2 of the thesis on legislative gradualism through development of Air 
Commerce Act of 1926 Air Commerce Regulations of 1928, Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the Department of Transportation Act of 1966.  
5 See chapter Five, section 2 on the thesis on the history of the US civil aviation industry. 
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Fourthly, the US has provided more robust and proactive frameworks on redress of 
the sensitive matter of security in aviation which is worthy of emulation.6 FAA has 
been comparatively more creative in development of the relevant Committees, 
frameworks under Advisory Circulars, Orders and Programmes that complement 
the provision of principal legislations aimed at addressing UAS safety and security 
challenges.7 Already, South African and Kenyan framework have emulated the US 
system with varying levels of robustness.8 
 
Lastly, is that judicial activism is necessary in filling the void and inconsistences in 
the substantive provision for redress of privacy concern in international and 
domestic frameworks. Analysis of the US regime shows that the country’s courts 
have risen to the occasion and been able to interpret the law in a manner that 
protects the right to privacy. In the wake of worrying trend of legislations that restrict 
the right to privacy, Kenyan and South African courts may learn this lesson to protect 
the rights of the vulnerable person regarding breach of privacy in UAS operations. 
The positive judicial activism as evidenced in selected case law discussed under 
this thesis. 
 
The third limb regards the lessons that can generally be learnt by States not 
discussed in this thesis. The first lesson is that there is an urgent need for clear and 
harmonized domestic standards for policy and regulation of UAS in all States to 
achieve integration into civil aviation. This urgency arises not only from owing to the 
emergence of new issues around sense and avoid technology, command control, 
                                                          
6 Chapter Four, section 5.2 discussion on Title 49 of the US Code and FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act, 2012. 
7 Chapter Four, section 5.2 of the thesis provides analysis of Advisory Circular on Reporting Laser 
Illumination of Aircraft and orders such as FAA Order JO 7110.65, FAA Order No. JO 7210.3, 
FAA Order JO 7110. See also South Africa’s and Kenya’s National Civil Aviation Security 
Committee (NCASC), National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) and National 
Civil Aviation Quality Control Programme (NCAQCP). 
8 Chapter Four, section 5.2 of the thesis provides analysis of the South African Framework under 
National Civil Aviation Security Committee (NCASC), National Civil Aviation Security 
Programme (NCASP) and National Civil Aviation Quality Control Programme (NCAQCP. 
See also chapter Five on Kenyan Framework under Security Amendment Act 19 of 2014, 
National Police Service Act Chapter 84 Laws of Kenya, Prevention of Terrorism Act 30 of 
2012, South Africa Police Service Act 57 of 2008. 
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UAS traffic management (UTM) and protection of privacy, but also unique physical 
capabilities and its actual and potential uses. In addition, the development of the 
standards is necessary to complement the international framework for proper 
functioning and implementation. Notably, in taking the envisaged regulation, States 
may adopt different naming for the UAS since it is the relevance and efficacy of 
regulation, and not merely the name, that is important. 
 
Secondly, in taking the regulatory approaches in respect of UAS, an outright ban 
should not be an option for addressing the safety, security and privacy concerns of 
UAS.9 The research identifies three step approach of: segregate, accommodate and 
integrate approach depending on UAS capacity and the risks posed by the UAS. 
This is because, the States that have been analysed in this thesis have shown that 
UAS not only has several cost, time and efficiency in a wide array of activities, but 
also recorded a projection of possible evolution into human and cargo transportation 
capabilities that may further heighten the existing concerns raised under this study.10 
 
Thirdly, owing to the elusive nature of regulation of UAS, States must strive hard to 
adopt the international framework for regulation including use of guiding material 
developed by ICAO for UAS and increase activities and partnerships with ICAO, 
supported by other international agencies as contemplated under Article 65 of the 
Chicago Convention regarding agreements with other international bodies. This will 
offer a vital complementary system for efficient implementation of programmes and 
approaches towards integration of UAS into the national airspace of the respective 
States. Regarding implementation of this lesson, States may want to emulate the 
active participation by South Africa in the ICAO Council which additionally imposes 
on the State, a moral obligation to comply with effective implementation index of the 
                                                          
9 Chapter One, Section 2.3.1 of the thesis on the explanation of ‘outright ban’ regulatory approach. 




existing regulatory framework and providing continual policy and legislative 
improvement.11 
 
The fourth lesson is on the direct correlation between economic development and 
regulation of aviation matters including UAS concerns since policy, regulatory 
mechanisms and approaches for integration of UAS require proper planning and 
investment of resources not readily at the disposal of the underdeveloped and 
developing countries. States should, therefore, ponder about the sustainable 
economic development and the UAS integration planning in order to achieve 
sustainable regulatory results containing efficient enforcement. An example is the 
US, a developed country that has been able to develop sense and avoid systems, 
and address the technological bases of safety, security and privacy concerns of 
UAS with comparative ease.12 
 
2.1 Safety Challenges 
With respect to the safety challenges, the international law under the Chicago 
Convention and ICAO framework of Annex 19 has robust provision on the safety 
assurances. Where necessary, in respect of the States, the framework is 
complemented by other international instruments that are differentially ratified by 
States.13 At the domestic level, the three States considered in this thesis have 
adopted the legislative frameworks that regulate certification, authorization, remote 
pilot licencing, training and maintenance of visual line of sight to ensure the safety 
of UAS operations.14 In other words, the States to varying degrees and through their 
respective aviation regulatory institutions regulate skills and behaviour of operators 
                                                          
11 Chapter Five, section 3 of the thesis analyses the institutional framework of SACAA which provides 
details of SACAA’s partnership with ICAO. 
12 Chapter Four, section 2 of the thesis provides the history and background of regulation of civil 
aviation recognizes the technological and economic developments of the US. 
13 See chapter Three on analysis if international framework, Chicago Convention, ICAO Annexes 2 
& 19, ICAO Circular No 328 AN 190, and complementary framework under Hague 
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970. 
14 See respective analyses under chapter Four, section 5.1, chapter Five, section 6.1 and chapter 
Six, section 5.1 of the thesis. 
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as tools for ensuring that safety of UAS use is assured as a means of achieving 
integration of UAS into civil aviation airspace.  
 
In both South Africa’s and Kenya, necessary filings of safety levels and systems 
precede the authorization for use of UAS. The licensing of the skills is classified 
depending on the level of risks associated with the weight and use of the UAS. 
Moreover, the licensing requires authorized training, medical examination and 
attainment of majority age. South Africa licensing classification is comparatively 
more robust since it recognizes additional safety parameters.15 Another difference 
is the measurements regarding the maintenance of the visual line of sight.16  
 
Analysis of the regulatory regimes reveal that the States have developed some form 
of regulation regarding the design of the UAS together with the development for the 
sense and avoid technologies to ensure avoidance of collision as the UAS is 
integrated into the respective national aviation systems. Simply put, the States to a 
varying degree regulate the design, specifications and the operational systems of 
the UAS in order to ensure compliance with the set safety standards as well as 
management of UAS systems. Both South Africa and Kenya regulate the carrying 
of dangerous materials.17 Although they recognize the need for the sense and avoid 
in the UAS integration plans, the technology presents implementation challenges to 
the two jurisdictions for small UAS.18 Another common challenge is non-regulation 
of environmental concern of noise arising from UAS in both States.  
                                                          
15 Chapter Five, section 5 of the thesis expounds the classification based on parameters such as 
impact, energy, operational length above the ground, rules of flight and air operation. 
16 Chapter Five, section 6.1 of the thesis explains that in South Africa, the UAS operation within 
restricted Visual-Line-of-Sight is an operation conducted within 500 metres of the UAS pilot 
and below the height of the highest obstacle within 300 metres of the UAS. Under the 
discussion in chapter Six, section 5.1, of the thesis, the Kenyan minimum which is set at the 
minimum of 400 feet from the ground level. 
17 Chapter Five, section 6.1of the thesis expounds the South Africa’s provisions on regulation of 
dangerous goods with only private UAS is exempted. Same is the case for Kenya as under 
chapter Six, section 5.1 of the thesis albeit with focused on the impact on aviation insurance.  
18 For Kenyan implementation challenges are explained under chapter Six, section 6. South African 
challenges relating to toy and community-based organizations are at chapter Five, section 7 





With respect to the authorization, design and specifications as well as systemic 
requirements, the States are inspired by the ICAO Regulations. It will be recalled 
that South Africa and Kenya have domesticated ICAO Annex 19 on Safety 
Management System that regulates safety among member States, supported by 
ICAO Safety Management Manual and ICAO circular 328-AN/190 that serves as a 
sources of information and guidance in development of aviation State Safety 
Programme (SSP), safety regulation and policies. 
 
2.2. Security Challenges  
With respect to aviation security challenges, the international law has responded 
through assertion of the State sovereignty in regulation of civil aviation matters in 
international instruments as enshrined in the Chicago Convention Articles 
1(sovereignty) and 2 on territoriality. In safeguarding aviation security, States 
operate under customary international law based on general State practices such 
as right of overflight.19 Moreover, the frameworks provide for commitments in 
providing authorization mechanism, programmes and audit processes for 
assurance of addressing security challenges as provided for under ICAO Annex 17 
and Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973). At the domestic levels, the States 
considered in this thesis have developed rules to create a balance between 
recognition of lawful use of UAS and the regulation of related unlawful acts that pose 
a threat to national security. Principally, these rules such as National Civil Aviation 
Security programmes and several regulations relate to the assertion of State 
sovereignty as the basis for authorization. The States assert the principle of 
sovereignty of the State as basis of their regulation of security concerns of UAS 
activities. Further, South Africa and Kenya provide for mandatory provisions for 
registration of UAS and authorization as well as adherence to security programmes. 
                                                          
19 Chapter Three, section 2 of this thesis provides a background of analysis on the international 
framework for regulation of UAS.  
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In Kenya, however, there is an even more robust multi-agency approach where the 
active involvement of other security agencies and the Department of Defence, is 
pivotal in the regulation of UAS. This high-level security measure taken by Kenya is 
akin to the US’ approach through the involvement of the Department of Homeland 
Security. 
 
Analysis of the regimes shows that the two States take other pro-active security 
approaches to conduct background checks on operation and regulation of storage 
of UAS.20 Lastly, both jurisdictions demand that UAS not in use be stored and 
prepared for flight in a secure manner.21 It is noted that, a further step in the 
development of requirements for organizational arrangements requires operators to 
ensure security measures and programmes are both established and 
implemented.22 
 
As regards security controls through registration requirements, background checks, 
and regulations of storage of UAS as well as the organizational tools, the States 
have domesticated ICAO guidance material on security such as ICAO Circular 328-
AN/190. This commitment is evidence that South Africa and Kenya have not only 
ratified the Chicago Convention but also domesticated ICAO Annex 17, which is 
demonstration of the desire to ensure aviation security in the total chain of regulation 
of UAS through the national legislations and policies. 
 
                                                          
20 Compare SA-CATS 101 r 101.04.8 discussed in chapter Five, section 6.2 of this thesis and the 
Kenya Aviation Policy, Kenya Civil Aviation (Remote Piloted Aircraft Systems) Regulations 
2017, reg 6 (2) (now annulled) and Regulation 43 of the 2020 UAS Regulations discussed in 
chapter Six, section 5.2 of the thesis. 
21 See chapter Five, section 6.2 on discussion on the content of the General restrictions SA- CATS 
101, section 101.05.3 in South Africa and chapter Six part 5.2. 
22 See chapter Six, section 5.2 on the description of Kenya’s National Civil Aviation Security 
Programme section 4.3 on partnership with IATA through the latter’s safety and security 
programmes. South Africa’s programme functioning through analysis of SA-CATS 101, r 
101.04.5 and part 4 on the role of Civil Aviation Security Department of SACAA and section 
111 of the Civil Aviation Act 2009 on development of National Security programme under 
chapter Five, section 6.2 of this thesis.  
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2.3. Privacy Challenges 
With respect to privacy challenges, the international framework provides 
comparatively less aviation-related privacy safeguards compared to other safety 
and security concerns.23 This is reflected in the domestic frameworks of the States 
that consequently adopt differential levels of effective implementation index as 
evidenced in the differential levels of legislative steps and judicial activism in the 
United States, South Africa and Kenya.24 The domestic frameworks are also heavily 
dependent on the national constitutional frameworks for protection and 
enforcement. The States’ reliance on such protection in the international system is 
therefore, placed on the International Bill of Rights and several country’s 
constitutions. Although constitutions are fundamental with safer protections against 
breach, they are too general for specific protections save for the US, which has 
proved to offer far better protection, at least from the analysis of jurisprudence.25  
 
That notwithstanding, the legal frameworks of all the States considered in this thesis 
have tended to adopt domestic rules that complement the UAS-specific rules 
regarding privacy concerns.26  In particular, they focus on distance as a tool to 
balance the freedom of UAS and respect for the privacy of others. In other words, 
all three legal systems, to varying degrees, regulate the distance from persons or 
property at which a UAS may be used or operated. The distances vary of course,27 
but appear to be integral in protecting the right of privacy under the UAS regulations.  
                                                          
23 See chapter Three on the analysis of International Bill of Rights instruments on assurance of piracy 
and tardiness of such provision on the Chicago Convention, 1944. 
24 US, South Africa and Kenya’s frameworks on regulation of privacy is discussed under chapter 
Four, section 5.3, chapter Five, section 6.3 and chapter Six, section 5.3 respectively.  
25 The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the US discussed under chapter Four, section 5.3 
and the Constitution of Kenya 2010 discussed under chapter Six, section 5.3 provide for 
general protections. Analysis of key highlights of the US jurisprudence is under sections 
5.3.1-5.3.3. 
26 While South Africa has developed Civil Aviation Regulations of 2015, Kenya has developed UAS 
2020 Regulations. The US on its part utilizes the Academy of Model Aeronautics Safety Code 
of 2018 as read with FAA Modernization Reform Act.  
27 In US, the Academy of Model Aeronautics Safety Code of 2018 generally prohibit flying the UAS 
closer than 25 feet to an individual. In South Africa, there is a limit the operation of UAS to a 




The analysis of the regulatory regimes also suggests a trend in favour of regulating 
the components of UAS as a means for achieving balance between integrating UAS 
and protecting privacy rights of the people on the ground and their properties, 
although it varies in degree. For example, while the US and Kenya have rules on 
the attachment of cameras, South Africa’s rules are less clear and have to be 
inferred.28 
 
Finally, with regard to the distance regulation and the component requirement, the 
regulatory frameworks in three States adopt by the principal legislative framework 
under the Chicago Convention, which places emphasis on prohibition of use of 
photographic apparatus in an aircraft over the territory of another State.29 
  
3. Conclusion 
The global regulation of the UAS is moving towards a non-restrictive approach. The 
approach is dictated by various factors including the legislative development levels 
of the States. As such, the developing States should not get stuck with the wait-and-
see approach but consider regulation on an ad hoc basis. For developed countries, 
like the United States, the suggested way forward is to adopt legislation to cover for 
new emerging situations of possible use of UAS to transport cargo and hopefully 
people. Generally, however, the two categories of countries ought to monitor the 
general trajectory of development of the UAS technology and adopt the best 
approach, while embracing more flexibility to achieve better the goals of integration. 
Emphasis should be on approaches that do not compromise safety, security and 
violate the universal fundamental human right to privacy.  
                                                          
28 For example, See chapter Six, section 5.3 on the analysis of 2020 UAS Regulations, Regulation 
24(1)(e) and its provision on regulation of imaging devices. The SA-CATS do not have 
express provision on such. 




South Africa and Kenya have different legislative processes, made distinct steps in 
the development of the policies, and regional approach to aviation regulation, but 
they have in the last few years made phenomenal progress in integration of UAS 
into civil aviation. The two African countries, who are both signatories to the Chicago 
Convention, have strived to adopt the ICAO-based framework. Consequently, 
therefore, the States’ regulatory frameworks recognize the general need to regulate 
UAS activities as a way of achieving integration of UAS into civil airspace, despite 
deviations such as extent of consensus in relevant regional economic communities. 
The more recent Kenya UAS 2020 Regulation offers evidence for similarity of 
approaches in ensuring safety and adoption of State safety programmes, effective 
licensing, and authorization, categorization of UAS, public participation frameworks, 
security standards and observance of people’s privacy. Other similarities occur in 
the regulatory approaches and enforcement of UAS Regulations, such as criminal 
sanctions.  
 
The jurisdictions face similar challenges caused by lack of unanimity in Sense and 
Avoid technology, and tardiness in having UAS-specificity in privacy provisions in 
the existing legislation. Others relate to concerns in environmental, enforcement, 
privacy, licensing and authorization. This chapter has further established long-
standing involvement of the US in UAS, which presents a good example from which 
South Africa and Kenya can learn relevant UAS regulatory lessons. Key among 
them is the safe and pragmatist integration of UAS, integration, which targets safety 
as opposed to full integration. Other worthwhile lessons are flexibility in the 
regulation of safety and privacy concerns arising from use of UAS. The US’ UAS 
regime presents the two African countries with an opportunity to learn lessons on 
use of community-based organizations as well as introduction of certificate of waiver 
framework. Kenya has a lot to learn regarding the need to embrace use of local 
authorities or counties in effective enforcement of UAS regulation as well as 
strengthening her public participation framework from a constitutional requirement 




CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND WAY FORWARD 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of findings of the research, as analysed in the 
preceding chapters of this thesis. The rationale of the study is absence of unified 
international UAS regulatory framework in hampering integration into civil aviation. 
The objective is developed against the backdrop of increased technological use of 
UAS without effective integration into the national airspace. To address this 
problem, the thesis made inquiry into how and to what extent the existing 
international regulatory framework of the Chicago Convention and ICAO address 
current UAS-related challenges of safety, security and privacy. The area of focus 
are how the US, South Africa and Kenya through institutional, policy and legal 
frameworks have responded to UAS regulation in addressing current needs and 
challenges in operation within their domestic frameworks. 
 
The thesis further sought to investigate the rights and obligations of States in 
addressing UAS challenges under international and domestic laws, with a view to 
providing possible recommendations to aid faster and safer integration of UAS into 
civil aviation by the States under study. This chapter dutifully presents the findings 
in respect of these concerns. Finally, it utilizes the findings and the conclusion to 
offer practical recommendations and opportunities for improvement in operations of 
UAS to international, regional, sub-regional, domestic frameworks and stakeholders 





2.  General Conclusions 
The background and analysis of the research questions was made in the preceding 
seven chapters. Chapter One provides the background and overview of the study. 
It provides the background to the problem as well as the philosophical, conceptual 
and theoretical underpinnings of the study. Specifically, it provides expansion of use 
of UAS, and increased safety, security and privacy concerns and advancement in 
technology as the basis for an array of regulatory approaches regarding UAS. It 
provides the general implementation and enforcement challenges experienced by 
States that have opted to regulate UAS in their domestic frameworks and proceeds 
to offer a vivid description of the research methodology.  
 
Chapter Two demonstrates that States are faced with circumstances that make 
regulation of UAS almost inevitable. It emphasizes that in so choosing to take up 
the challenge, States have to decisively deal with the unique safety, security and 
privacy concerns arising from the use of UAS.  
 
Chapter Three traces the international law response to the three thematic areas of 
safety, security and privacy challenges. That the Chicago Convention has blended 
well with the creation of the ICAO framework and complemented by other 
international human rights instruments, international customary law and general 
principle of law to address the concerns in the three areas. It emerges that the 
concern for privacy is unevenly addressed compared to the other two thematic 
areas, that is, safety and security.  
 
Chapter Four analyses the response to integration of UAS by the US, jurisdiction 
with a longer history with UAS regulation and thus highly advanced framework to 
address the three thematic areas through a more proactive regulatory agency, 
namely FAA. The challenge of unbalanced focus on privacy concerns as well as 
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lack of sense and avoid technology in some UAS appears to takes a toll on 
enforcement and regulatory framework. 
 
Chapter Five analyses the South African framework and its redress of concerns on 
the three thematic areas. It is established that the framework is cognizant of and 
addresses the areas, albeit with differential levels of focus, the lowest focus being 
on privacy. South Africa is lauded for her active participation in ICAO activities 
though the efforts are faced with institutional challenges due the absence of regional 
efforts at the SADC level to support her domestic integration of UAS into civil 
aviation. 
 
Chapter Six analyses Kenya’s response to strides the concerns of the three thematic 
areas. Kenyan has made strides via legislative amendments in 2016, the 
development of UAS policy, and the 2017 RPAs Regulation that was annulled but 
re-enacted as 2020 UAS Regulations to address the challenges of safety, security 
and privacy among others. The frameworks have a laudable albeit little focus on 
privacy concerns. At its nascent stages, however, Kenya has challenges related to 
sense and avoid technologies, UTM, command and control, lack of involvement of 
county governments for effective enforcement and categorization of UAS regulation. 
 
Chapter Seven provides a synthesis of findings. The three jurisdictions have certain 
common elements in their approach of regulation of UAS. Some challenges are 
common across the States. The States can learn from each other on matters of 
classification of UAS, training, authorizations, integration planning and regional 
efforts. The chapter establishes that pragmatism, flexibility, gradualism and 
classification of UAS stand out as areas of effective redress of the concerns of UAS 




3.    Recommendations  
This part discusses recommendations based on the above general and specific 
conclusions of the problem statement and research questions. The 
recommendations are addressed to the ICAO, and the relevant structures, bodies 
and institutions within domestic jurisdictions of the US, South Africa, Kenya and, by 
limited extension, regional and continental agencies for implementation towards 
successful integration of UAS into civil aviation as they endeavour to address safety, 
security and privacy challenges associated to UAS operations.  
 
3.1 ICAO   
First, there is need to broaden the meaning of aircraft in the Chicago Convention. 
Enacted in 1944, the Chicago Convention was designed to specifically address 
international law for manned aircraft and by extension unmanned aircraft as 
provided for under Article 8 of the Convention. For States without UAS-specific laws, 
the treaty law can only be made by implication, which is not sustainable as it only 
promotes a wait and see approach in regulation of UAS at domestic level. Some 
authors too affirm the conundrum by suggesting that the implication of its application 
has not been without controversy.1 Adoption and remodelling of the Chicago 
Convention on UAS, in the manner envisaged for amendment under Article 94 and 
having State parties, ratify it, has potential of boosting commitment of State parties 
such as South Africa and Kenya and others that are yet to develop UAS legislation. 
Alternatively, though not most ideal, ICAO State parties may consider adoption of a 
new convention or additional protocol tailored to address UAS, considering the ever-
changing technological and operational landscapes. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Marshall D “Unmanned Aerial Systems and International Civil Aviation Organization Regulations” 
2009 North Dakota Law Review 693. 
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Secondly, Although, Annex 6 Part IV is under development for UAS operations. 
ICAO uses the term RPAs because its main focus is on large UAS that fall in that 
category as UAS encompasses both small and large UAS. Hence ICAO limits itself 
to above 25kg UAS. This means that there is need for ICAO to consider 
development of ICAO Annex 20 for UAS. The Annex should be binding to all 
member States so that UAS application is well regulated to address global emerging 
technological trends appearing as moving target, on uses, designs and capabilities 
of UAS. Alternatively, the conditions and standards set out under the ICAO Circular 
328.AN/190 on UAS may be revised and adopted through an amendment then 
ratified as the Annex. The Annex will be prominent for parties who comply for 
purposes of international obligation, best practice, moral authority to external forces 
of international power politics or other reasons. It is envisaged that this 
recommendation to the ICAO is relevant in the short term, pending the complete 
execution of the first recommendation made above to ensure that UAS has equal 
prominence as that under Annex 6 that deals with Operation of Aircraft with a view 
to giving more emphasis on expected increase of UAS operation.  
 
The thesis further recommends enhancement of security and safety mechanisms. 
In order to meet the security and safety standards provided for under ICAO Annexes 
17 and 19 respectively, there is need for requirements that UAS to be enhanced 
with the help of modified global positioning system data to avoid possible 
manipulation by hackers who use such data for criminal activities such as, terrorism, 
cyber-attacks, navigation systems, among other acts of unlawful interference 
against civil aviation. Another viable requirement is that safety and security are 
enhanced by improving communication between UAS, other aircraft, control towers 
and ground crew. This can be done by way of sharing UAS operational frequencies, 
UTM, common data, and video links, through the development of counter-jamming 
technologies and providing background security and safety checks to the applicants 




Lastly, ICAO should ensure a robust framework for regulation of UAS-specific 
privacy concerns. In seeking to level the concern of privacy with that of safety and 
security, it is recommended that ICAO considers development of another Annex 20 
as suggested above to make provision for privacy.   
 
3.2 South Africa and Kenya  
This thesis makes ten recommendations to both jurisdictions as follows: Firstly, 
South Africa and Kenya should strengthen aviation institutions to make them 
efficient and able to cope with technological advances regarding UAS. The 
efficiency of these institutions can be ensured through public participation, upholding 
of independence of regulators, and establishment of permanent regulatory units that 
deal with UAS. This would help to address existing challenges such as regulatory 
independence, capacity building and ability to issue policy statements in the 
dynamic civil aviation sector for sustainable development. 
 
Secondly, the States should constantly review UAS regulations as work in progress 
through relevant departments of transport and infrastructure with a view to 
strengthening them, taking into consideration new technological advancements 
associated with UAS. The relevant departments may also consider when it is 
appropriate to collaborate with community-based organizations and to adopt the 
classification model that distinguishes model aircraft and regulated aircraft in 
respective national aviation systems. It is envisaged that such clarity in 
categorization shall aid the aviation regulators to determine the extent to which UAS 
is allowed to operate within the airspace, the information they are likely to collect 
about individuals, their uses and disclosure requirements, as well as possible impact 
on individual privacy. In addition, the States should emulate the US in development 
of efficient categorization of UAS for a more focused regulatory approach regarding 




Thirdly, the States should develop minimum standards for operator dynamic training 
with curriculum focus on proficiency and safety in UAS control and interaction with 
other aircraft in the national airspace. This will go a long way in ensuring safety of 
civil aviation, given that, as identified in chapter One of this study, the UAS sector 
continues to grow exponentially. 
 
Fourthly, the executive and legislative authorities should either develop or maintain 
a delicate balance between protection of human rights including right to privacy and 
public security regarding use and operation of UAS to ensure that the former is not 
sacrificed at the altar of the latter. Countries, such as South Africa, can borrow from 
Kenya’s annulled 2017 RPAs Regulations and the current Kenya 2020 UAS that 
has provisions devoted to provisions on privacy protection. This is a sure way of 
complementing the International Bill of Rights assurances on privacy protection. To 
further entrench these efforts, it is recommended that courts adopt judicial activism 
akin to the US’ in order to bridge the lacuna in the provisions and implementation of 
the same across the African continent, regional, sub-regional and domestic 
jurisdictions.  
 
Fifthly, both States should develop requirements that mandate individuals to 
mitigate potential impact on personal privacy, such as protecting UAS against 
unauthorized disclosure. The license should specify those who would be individually 
responsible for safe use of UAS and the information collected thereof.  
 
Sixthly, the States should endeavour to expand opportunities for citizens to air their 
grievances or complaints through legally recognized fora. A statement of the UAS 
operators that is accessible online should accompany all licenses granted by State 




Seventhly, South Africa and Kenya should adopt lessons of pragmatism, gradualism 
and flexibility from the US on integration of UAS into civil aviation. This will require 
formulation of effective UAS regulation enforcement mechanisms and development 
of implementation roadmaps with achievable deadlines. Priority should be placed 
on ensuring there is proper listing of all unmanned aircraft irrespective of size or use 
for data compilation and information sharing with relevant agencies or countries. 
Clear sanctions for violators of UAS regulations as established should be effectively 
enforced.  
 
Eighthly, it befits to aver here that the importance of UAS should not be ignored with 
the rising globalization, coupled with rapidly changing technology, States should set 
aside more resources and funding for further progressive research in a discipline 
that is, without doubt, the future of civil aviation. UAS may impact on how people, 
work, live, move and associate with each other as technology advances. 
  
Ninthly, the States should consider UAS traffic management (UTM), which has 
capacity to detect where command and control centre for the UAS in operation is 
located. The purpose is for the enforcement officers to ensure compliance through 
monitoring of UAS hovering in civil airspace for effective oversight. The 
implementation will support the regulation in addressing the safety and security 
challenge in the civil aviation industry.  
  
Lastly, South Africa and Kenya should consider allocating resources for command 
and control system (CCS), which is essential for civil aviation to control UAS 
movement within their airspace. It is proposed that such improved system be 
available in at least every regional security or civil aviation office or at the county 
level. The technology, once established, will go a long way in providing 




3.3 Kenya  
In respect of Kenya, this thesis makes the following five recommendations: 
Firstly, Kenya should make regulatory requirements for UAS operators to mitigate, 
risk against other airspace users, ground property and people in general, although 
the 2020 UAS Regulation has provision and requirement to take up insurance before 
they are allowed to operate safely within the national airspace to mitigate civil liability 
issues and claims.2 What is missing is the guidance on how insurance applied, the 
lacuna in the regulations is the assumption that the aircraft premium computation 
would work for UAS which may not be appropriate due to different sizes of UAS. 
 
Second, Kenyan should consider developing a policy to co-ordinate and 
progressively harmonize matters relating to civil aviation, and UAS in particular, in 
line with the Chicago Convention. Of prime concern is an appeal to integrate UAS 
as emerging technology into the national airspace, complete with safety and security 
regulation of their operations. Other than complementing Kenya’s National Security 
Policy and the National Security Strategy, provides, the Policy should address 
environmental management, disposal of ruined UAS, safety and security, air traffic  
management, training, research, innovation, policy direction on protection of privacy 
rights, involvement of county government structures, monitoring and evaluation of 
UAS systems.   
 
Thirdly, the Government should provide the KCAA with sufficient funding to 
undertake major research in the field of UAS, which could help achieve Kenya’s 
dream of full integration of unmanned aircraft system into civil aviation.  
 
                                                          
2 Legal Notice No 42. KCAA UAS Regulation of 30 March 2020 r.40. 
284 
 
Fourthly, the East Africa School of Aviation (EASA) should be best utilized in 
addition, to offer training relating to UAS and certification to those who qualify. 
Moreover, it should evolve into Aviation University of East Africa and contribute 
effectively and immensely in the area of research and technology to achieve 
integration of UAS regulation into civil aviation, among other academic 
achievements.   
 
Fifthly, the KCAA cannot oversight itself; it is high time the East Africa School of 
Aviation, as a service provider, is delinked from other directorate of KCAA to 
concentrate on providing learning and research for the aviation industry.  
 
3.4 USA 
The study has without doubt established that the US has a longer history of dealing 
with UAS operation than the two African countries. It is recommended, therefore, 
that such experience needs to be shared with other countries towards building 
capacity and for effective enforcement. UAS have capacity to transcend beyond 
domestic jurisdiction, which may have impact on the safety, security and privacy of 
American citizens either in the US, domiciled in Africa or visiting destinations in the  
continent, hence, there is urgent need for institutionalized partnership between the 
US and other countries to safeguard its airspace from unlawful intrusion from 
unregulated jurisdictions. 
  
The thesis recommends to FAA to steer the sharing of experiences with aim of 
strengthening effective regulations in the Africa States. Such partnership can also 
increase international trade and sustainable development emanating from 




3.5 Regional / Sub-Regional Economic Communities: EAC, SADC and AFCAC 
Whereas the study is not meant for regional and sub-regional civil aviation entities 
in Africa, as it progressed, it was established that UAS have capability to fly across 
borders of several States, consequently establishing some shortcomings within 
SADC where South Africa is domiciled, and the East Africa Community for Kenya. 
The identified shortcomings mirrors what happens at the continental level, hence, 
the justification to include recommendations for EAC, SADC and AFCAC as per the 
findings of the study.  
 
Regarding EAC, the Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency (CASSOA) 
should, as a matter of priority, urgently consider a framework for establishment and 
creation of a specific office dealing with UAS, complete with qualified staff. Doing so 
will increase harmonization of regulation within the region and improve coordination 
of UAS integration in East Africa and domestic jurisdictions such as Kenya.  
 
Regarding SADC, South Africa should actively support SADC members in the 
establishment of a regional civil aviation organization through to full ratification in 
order to preserve the remarkable regulatory and institutional frameworks that it has 
developed towards integration of UAS within the 15 SADC member States. Lesson 
learnt from the EAC’s Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency can be 
used to aid SADC in establishing such a model organization. This will help in 
overcoming the challenges of lack of implementation by the interim Southern Africa 
Safety Organization (iSASO), which is not yet fully in operational. 
 
For both EAC and SADC, this thesis recommends that they consider harmonization 
of procedures and standards with like bodies within the African continent. This may 
mirror the FAA. Such a move would create the ideal ground for effective oversight 
and enforcement of UAS in several States. Kenya and South Africa stand to benefit 
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by benchmarking from lessons of countries where UAS is long entrenched into 
regulation covering several States. 
 
At the continental level, AFCAC, established under the AFCAC Constitution that 
was adopted on 16 December 2009, should consider establishing structures within 
its operations of UAS to progressively and incrementally complement interventions 
for addressing safety, security and privacy challenges at the continental level. This 
is in addition to amendment and revision of the AFCAC Constitution as provided for 
under Article 22 (of the Constitution) to strengthen the oversight role and provide 
regulations for general civil aviation. Lastly, an office dedicated specifically for UAS, 
modelled on the framework of the FAA, should be created by taking similar 
measures.  
 
4. Areas for further Research 
This study considered policy, institutional, legal and regulatory issues on UAS under 
international air law, the US, South Africa and Kenya, areas that are not so volatile. 
As such, there is a need for further research on the uniqueness of the regulation of 
UAS in volatile States. Such a study should focus on how best to integrate the UAS 
into civil aviation for unequalled success. In addition, further research needs to be 
undertaken in view of future prospects of UAS having capacity to carry people and 
cargo and the projected effects on current conventional civil aviation architecture. In 
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The rationale to include this appendix is to appreciate the different types of UAS 
operating in civil aviation airspace and their capabilities, as discussed in this thesis. 
This enables the reader to have an idea of the UAS design and abilities.       
Examples of UAS and RAPAS 
 
 





















































Vision-du-Ciel - France– cyclvol2 
Photos sourced from the UVS International Photo Database on 6   May 2016.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
